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Abstract
Edge computing or fog computing enables realtime services to smart application users by stor-
ing data and services at the edge of the networks. Edge devices in the edge computing handle
data storage and service provisioning. Therefore, edge computing has become a new norm for
several delay-sensitive smart applications such as automated vehicles, ambient-assisted living,
emergency response services, precision agriculture, and smart electricity grids. Despite having
great potential, privacy threats are the main barriers to the success of edge computing. At-
tackers can leak private or sensitive information of data owners and modify service-related data
for hampering service provisioning in edge computing-based smart applications. This research
takes privacy issues of heterogeneous smart application data into account that are stored in
edge data centers. From there, this study focuses on the development of privacy-preserving
models for user-generated smart application data in edge computing and edge service-related
data, such as Quality-of-Service (QoS) data, for ensuring unbiased service provisioning.
We begin with developing privacy-preserving techniques for user data generated by smart
applications using steganography that is one of the data hiding techniques. In steganography,
user sensitive information is hidden within nonsensitive information of data before outsourc-
ing smart application data, and stego data are produced for storing in the edge data center.
A steganography approach must be reversible or lossless to be useful in privacy-preserving
techniques. In this research, we focus on numerical (sensor data) and textual (DNA sequence
and text) data steganography. Existing steganography approaches for numerical data are irre-
versible. Hence, we introduce a lossless or reversible numerical data steganography approach
using Error Correcting Codes (ECC). Modern lossless steganography approaches for text data
steganography are mainly application-specific and lacks imperceptibility, and DNA steganog-
2raphy requires reference DNA sequence for the reconstruction of the original DNA sequence.
Therefore, we present the first blind and lossless DNA sequence steganography approach based
on the nucleotide substitution method in this study. In addition, a text steganography method
is proposed that using invisible character and compression based encoding for ensuring re-
versibility and higher imperceptibility. Different experiments are conducted to demonstrate
the justification of our proposed methods in these studies.
The searching capability of the stored stego data is challenged in the edge data center
without disclosing sensitive information. We present a privacy-preserving search framework
for stego data on the edge data center that includes two methods. In the first method, we
present a keyword-based privacy-preserving search method that allows a user to send a search
query as a hash string. However, this method does not support the range query. Therefore,
we develop a range search method on stego data using an order-preserving encryption (OPE)
scheme. In both cases, the search service provider retrieves corresponding stego data without
revealing any sensitive information. Several experiments are conducted for evaluating the
performance of the framework.
Finally, we present a privacy-preserving service computation framework using Fully Ho-
momorphic Encryption (FHE) based cryptosystem for ensuring the service provider’s privacy
during service selection and composition. Our contributions are two folds. First, we introduce
a privacy-preserving service selection model based on encrypted Quality-of-Service (QoS) val-
ues of edge services for ensuring privacy. QoS values are encrypted using FHE. A distributed
computation model for service selection using MapReduce is designed for improving efficiency.
Second, we develop a composition model for edge services based on the functional relation-
ship among edge services for optimizing the service selection process. Various experiments
are performed in both centralized and distributed computing environments to evaluate the
performance of the proposed framework using a synthetic QoS dataset.
Chapter 1
Introduction
The availability and popularity of ubiquitously linked smart devices are building a critical
factor in computing. The Internet-of-Things (IoT) [2] are connecting millions of wearable and
smart devices, machines, and vehicles via wireless networks. Hence, interconnected devices are
capable of collecting and exchanging various types of data among themselves [3, 4]. As a result,
IoT is making everything connected and smarter, and a variety of applications can leverage
the power of IoT for providing fine-grained services for users. IoT devices face challenges of
processing power, battery lifetime, storage, and network bandwidth in general [5]. However,
IoT devices generate a massive amount of data and require further processing for providing
smart services to end users. Conventionally, IoT data are uploaded to central servers, and
results are sent to end users after processing. Cloud computing technology has become a
popular choice for IoT applications [5]. The cloud computing provisions several services to end
users at low cost with elastic resources with regard to infrastructure, platform, and software
[6].
Nevertheless, cloud computing is not a universal solution to all IoT applications. Uploading
IoT data to the cloud for storing and processing requires high network bandwidth. Hence, data
transmission costs are increased. Additionally, the performance of the overall system degrades
with an increased amount of IoT data. The performance aggravates for IoT applications that
are delay-sensitive, also known as realtime applications. In a delay-sensitive application, the
response time is non-negotiable. Automated vehicles [7] in smart transportation, ambient-
3
Background and Motivation 4
assisted living in [8] smart healthcare, emergency response services [9] in smart city, precision
agriculture [10] and smart electricity grids [11] are few examples of delay-sensitive IoT ap-
plications. Moreover, many IoT applications require mobility support, geo-distribution, and
location-awareness. In order to reduce latency, data storage and processing need to be done at
proximity. From that point, cloud computing is not a feasible solution for the aforementioned
realtime IoT applications.
Edge computing, or fog computing, encompasses data storage and computing at the network
”edge”, called edge node or edge devices [12, 13, 14]. Smartphones, tablets, laptops, personal
computers, access points, roadside units, and cellular base stations are a few examples of edge
nodes. As these devices are located nearby, data flows between edge and IoT devices require less
transmission cost and achieve faster response time. In addition, the bandwidth requirements
of the cloud servers are mitigated by the edge nodes. Thus, computation and data storage
tasks are offloaded to edge nodes for providing computation and storage as services.
IoT devices, edge nodes, and cloud form a layered hierarchical service delivery model for
realtime IoT applications. Figure 1.1 presents a typical edge computing based service systems.
IoT devices produce heterogeneous types of data and send them to local edge devices within
a private edge networks. Local edge devices perform initial processing, and send data and
service requests to public edge networks. The public edge networks contains edge data centers
and edge service managers. An edge data center stores IoT data for realtime access. On the
other hand, an edge service manager handles service requests from IoT applications. The edge
computing based service system supports a wide range of applications such as smart healthcare
[15], smart homes [16], smart agriculture [17], smart transportation [18], and smart electricity
grids [11]. Since edge computing is considered as a significant extension of cloud computing,
some security and privacy issues of cloud computing exist in the edge computing [6]. The
security and privacy threats would unavoidably hamper the vision of edge computing.
1.1 Background and Motivation
Edge computing is offered by the Internet and cellular services providers. Hence, these service
providers that act as edge service providers deploy Wireless access points and cellular base
Background and Motivation 5
Figure 1.1: An architecture of Edge Computing based service systems
stations as edge nodes and form public edge networks. Thus, edge node-based data centers
and service managers are controlled by the Internet and cellular services providers. Edge
computing allows the addition of new edge nodes by its service providers on demand. As
a result, rogue nodes can be included by attackers who pretend to be valid nodes. These
rogue nodes can scan valuable data to leak private or sensitive information of data owner and
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Figure 1.2: Privacy issues of storing data and service provisioning in the Edge Computing
modify service-related data for hampering service provisioning in edge computing based smart
applications.
As smart applications collect a massive amount of data about an object (human or machine),
the leakage of sensitive information from data is gaining attention by edge service providers.
By gathering several sensitive or private information of a data owner, edge service providers
can target particular service users and customize their service offers. It is also possible that
data owners’ sensitive information would be misused. For example, reading a particular house’s
smart meter data will disclose lots of information about residents of a house. Thus, preserving
the privacy of data owners is extremely important. However, data quality and usability should
not be reduced while privacy is preserved.
Nevertheless, authorized data users may require access to sensitive information of particular
data owners for ensuring accurate services. For instance, a doctor needs to identify a patient
to provide remote health services in an ambient assisted living application. A legitimate user
of a particular data needs to search and retrieve the data from the edge data center. However,
it is crucial to ensure that sensitive information is not revealed to the unauthorized entities
in edge computing during a search operation. In other words, the search operation should be
performed in a privacy-preserving manner.
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In order to ensure realtime services with reduced response time in edge computing, cloud
services are offloaded from cloud to several edge nodes in a distributed manner. Unlike cloud
services, a service orchestration or composition is required for ensuring optimal service expe-
rience to service users. Edge data centers store service-related data such as Quality-of-Service
(QoS) values. One or more edge nodes may act as service composers for performing service
orchestration tasks using these QoS values. In general, QoS data in the edge data center would
be stored as plaintexts. Hence, the stored QoS data in the edge data center can be modified
by attackers to gain service providers’ service-related sensitive information, and privacy can be
leaked. In addition, QoS data can be modified by an attacker to influence the service compo-
sition tasks. Therefore, privacy preservation deemed necessary during service composition as
well. Figure 1.2 illustrates several privacy issues in edge computing.
This research addresses two types of privacy issues in edge computing. First, the privacy
of data owners who store their data in the edge data centers. Second, the privacy of service-
related data that are used during service selection and composition tasks. In this research, we
aim to use the secure data hiding technique, called steganography [19], as the tool for ensuring
the privacy of data owners in smart applications. On the other hand, we use Fully Homomor-
phic Encryption (FHE) [20] based privacy-preserving computation approach for preserving the
privacy of the service selection and composition process.
1.2 Preliminaries
Before going into the technical details, this section provides an overview of a few essential ter-
minologies that include steganography based data privacy and FHE-based privacy-preserving
computation.
1.2.1 Steganography and Data Privacy
Steganography is one of the data hiding techniques that store secret messages inside data. The
hiding is performed in a way so that the existence of the secret message inside the public
medium is obscured. The data that contains secret information is known as cover data. The
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Figure 1.3: The general model of steganography
data produced after performing the steganography is called stego data. A sender of commu-
nication uses a set of secret information for securing the steganography process. The set of
secret information is called stego key. Hiding the secret message inside a cover data produces
stego data. The sender shares the stego key with the intended receiver of the communication
privately. Later, the sender sends the stego data to the receiver. A receiver uses the key to
retrieve the secret message from stego data. The main strength of steganography is that it
makes it difficult for the eavesdropper to figure out where the message is [21]. The general
model of the steganography process is presented in Figure 1.3.
In literature, the steganography is widely used for providing privacy and authenticity to sen-
sitive data in covert communication [1, 22]. In edge computing based service systems, ensuring
privacy of smart application data is extremely important. Including sensitive information with
outsourced data in the edge data center alleviates the risk of privacy breach. The steganography
is a popular approach for ensuring privacy in several applications [22, 23, 24]. For example,
patient sensitive information can be embedded inside health data (wearable sensor or IoT data,
and pathological test data) prior to uploading in edge data center. A legitimate data user (e.g.
a doctor) can retrieve a patient secret identification information if required. However, the doc-
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tor can use the stego patient data for diagnosis purpose without knowing patient identity. An
overview of steganography based data privacy preservation model on edge computing is illus-
trated in Figure 1.5. Cover mediums that are used in steganography can be classified as image,
audio, video, numerical, genomic and text data types (please refer to Figure 1.4). Image is the
most widely used cover medium used in the steganography [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33].
However, steganography is also performed on audio [34, 35] and video [36, 37]. Other popular
supported cover medium types are numerical data (e.g. signal or sensor data) [22, 1, 23], text
[38, 39, 40, 41], and genomic (e.g. DNA) [42, 43, 44, 45] data types. Collectively, text and
DNA data types can be considered as textual cover medium.
Figure 1.4: Different types of cover medium used in steganography
1.2.2 Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)-based Privacy Preserving
Computation
The ability of Homomorphic Encryption (HE) has been studied broadly in the last few years
for performing computations on encrypted data. HE has inspired many researchers to employ
it in many real-world application domains such as financial, healthcare, and IoT. With the
help of the HE cryptosystem, individuals and enterprises can encrypt their data and delegate
to any third party for conducting specific analysis tasks on encrypted data. Figure 1.6 shows
the main functionalities of Homomorphic Encryption (HE).
Data owners desire to secure their data while it is stored and handled by a third party, such
as a cloud computing provider. HE was first proposed by Rivest [46] where the privacy homo-
morphism concept was used to carry out computations in an encrypted domain. Consequently,
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Figure 1.5: Overview of steganography based privacy-preservation model of sensitive data
many other HE schemes have been proposed, such as ElGamal [47] and Paillier [48]. However,
these schemes are unable to carry out a variety of computations on encrypted data. In 2009,
Gentry [20] introduced the first Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) scheme.
1.2.3 Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme
The FHE scheme supports basic arithmetic computations on encrypted data. Hence, FHE is
used as a privacy-preserving technique. The work in [20] follows properties of ideal lattices [49].
FHE supports an unlimited number of arithmetic operations. As a consequence of the work in
[20], several homomorphic encryption schemes are proposed based on three branches: lattice-
based [50, 51], integer-based and learning with errors (LWE) [52] or ring-learning-with-errors
(RLWE) [53] based encryption. Despite being a potential cryptographic technique, some of the
FHE schemes remain quite impractical for real-world applications due to their computational
Research Challenges 11
Figure 1.6: Overview of Homomorphic Encryption (HE) based privacy-preserving computation
model
overhead and the number of resources that they require for computations.
1.3 Research Challenges
In this thesis, we aim to address key challenges related to steganography based data pri-
vacy preservation and FHE based privacy-preserving service computing on edge computing.
Steganography causes distortion in the cover medium [22, 54]. For example, hiding a secret
message inside a cover image by altering the least significant bit (LSB) of the image deteriorates
its quality. The steganography process is called lossy or Irreversible if the full reconstruction
of a cover medium is not possible from stego medium. Lossless or reversible steganography is
a process that reconstructs a cover medium after extracting the hidden information from the
stego medium. The reconstruction of the cover medium is not very important, where the cover
medium is only the carrier of secret message in the communication system. However, there are
applications where the cover medium must be exactly reconstructed. Assume that smart ap-
plications that store IoT data (numerical and textual data) in edge data centers, must require
accurate data for the success of the applications. Smart meter reading in smart electricity grid
applications, and remote patient monitoring data (e.g., biosignals), and genomic data (e.g.,
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deoxyribonucleic acid or DNA) and medical records in text format in smart healthcare are
few examples of applications that require a reversible or lossless cover medium for successful
steganography. The aforementioned numerical and textual data types cannot tolerate data
loss. Therefore, applying steganography for privacy preservation of numerical and textual data
types is challenging. As lossless steganography approaches for the aforementioned data types
are still unexplored, we develop lossless or reversible steganography approaches in this research
for texts, DNA sequences, and biosignals. A summary of several reversible steganography ap-
proaches for image [26], audio [55], and video [56] have already been proposed. Therefore,
we do not consider reversible steganography approaches for image, audio, and video in this
research.
The data owners hide their sensitive information within their data and produce stego data.
The stego data are outsourced to the edge data center for storing and further use. Storing stego
data introduces a new challenge. The challenge is searching the stego data of a particular data
owner from the cloud without revealing the identity of the data owner. Privacy-preserving
search techniques for encrypted data is a popular research area [57, 58, 59, 60]. However,
existing privacy-preserving search approaches are not applicable for stego data due to the
difference in fundamental characteristics of stego data and encrypted data. From there, we
propose a privacy-preserving search mechanism over stego data.
The edge computing provides a service platform for several realtime service providers in
smart applications. A service provider registers his/her service information in edge nodes acting
as a service registry. An edge node that is playing the role of service manager takes service
queries from service users and performs a service selection process to find suitable services. The
service’s quality-of-service (QoS) parameters are used to perform the service selection process.
Later, a QoS-aware service composition mechanism is performed by the edge node functioning
as a service composer to find the best composite service for the requesting user. As we have
discussed earlier, the service selection and composition process can be biased. An attacker can
modify the QoS information to give advantage to one or more service providers. Therefore,
we present a privacy-preserving framework for service computation using fully homomorphic
encryption (FHE).
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Summary of the key research challenges are discussed below under two broad categories:
• Challenges of steganography approaches:
– In order to use steganography for privacy preservation in edge computing, steganog-
raphy methods need to be lossless for appropriate use in smart applications.
– Steganography methods are data type-specific. A steganography approach for a
particular data type cannot be applied to other data types due to the fundamental
differences in characteristics. As smart applications involve heterogeneous data
types, different lossless steganography approaches are required.
– Existing numerical steganography approaches [22, 1, 61, 62, 63] fail to reconstruct
cover medium after extraction of secret information. Therefore, these methods can-
not be used for privacy preservation of smart application data in edge computing. To
the best of our knowledge, a reversible or lossless numerical steganography method
does not exist.
– Though several lossless steganography approaches for text documents [64, 65, 39, 66]
have been proposed so far, these approaches are not useful in the context of smart
applications due to some limitations. The imperceptibility of text cover medium is
very low in general. A slight modification in a text file content is easily detectable
[64]. Various researches on text steganography have been done so far. The research
works in [65, 39] are based on degenerating the document content. These approaches
are application-specific. Compression based text steganography approaches are pro-
posed in [64, 66]. These works compress the cover file to produce a stego file. Thus,
the stego files cannot be used for general purpose and become more attractive for
an attack. In addition, current methods are not applicable for small text data such
as social networks blogs. A high capacity text steganography method is required to
ensure the privacy of social networks blogs text data in edge computing.
– Most of the current DNA sequence steganography methods are not blind, i.e., origi-
nal cover DNA sequence data is required as reference during extraction of secret mes-
sage [42, 43, 44, 67, 68, 69]. Therefore, the aforementioned DNA steganography tech-
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niques are not usable in our scenario. Moreover, research works in [44, 68, 69, 70, 71]
result in high modification rate of cover DNA sequence data and are irreversible.
– Data characteristics of stego data need to be preserved to protect against security
attacks. The imperceptibility of the stego data becomes less if the data character-
istics of stego data are not preserved. As a result, distorted stego data attracts the
attacker, and the robustness of the steganography method becomes poor. Addi-
tionally, using highly distorted stego data for research and analysis purposes in our
scenario may provide inaccurate results.
– The development of privacy-preserving data retrieval techniques is challenging for
stego data in the cloud. In order to retrieve stego data of an individual, the secret
key needs to be given to the cloud for extracting the secret identifier of the stego
data and return it to the user. In this case, no privacy is preserved. If the secret key
cannot be provided to the cloud, all of the stego data needs no be downloaded by
the user at the local system and perform the query. It is not a practical solution. To
the best of our knowledge, no privacy-preserving data retrieval technique exists for
stego data in the cloud. Several research works in [72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80]
have been done on privacy-preserving data retrieval for encrypted data. However,
the research works are not applicable for data retrieval from stego data due to
fundamental differences between stego data and encrypted data.
• Challenges of privacy-preserving service computation:
– Existing privacy-aware service selection and composition approaches model relation
between user and service provider privacy preferences. To the best of our knowledge,
no research work exists that performs service selection and composition, keeping
corresponding QoS values private.
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Figure 1.7: A lossless steganography and privacy-preserving service computation related re-
search problems.
1.4 Research Questions
The main research objective of this thesis is two folds. First, we aim to develop a lossless
or reversible steganography methods to ensure the privacy of numerical, text, and DNA data
in the edge computing. Second, we aim to build a privacy-preserving service computation
framework for the edge computing based service systems. The targeted research problems in
this thesis are summarized in Figure 1.7.
In order to overcome the aforementioned research challenges the following research questions
are defined with the aim of achieving a lossless steganography and privacy-preserving service
computation related research problems.
Research Questions 16
Aim-1. Developing lossless steganography techniques for building privacy preserv-
ing model
RQ-1. How to develop lossless or reversible steganography method to hide secret information
within numerical data?
This question addresses the deteriorating characteristics of the numerical steganography ap-
proach. Applying the existing numerical steganography approaches, some of the data in the
cover signal are lost after the extraction of sensitive information from stego numerical data. In
this question, we apply error correction codes based on Hamming Code [81] and Golay code
[82]. In order to ensure the lossless property of numerical data, we hide sensitive information
as error bits in the cover numerical data by encoding with the aforementioned error correction
codes at the data owner’s end, and correct errors by decoding with these codes at legitimate
user’s side.
RQ-2. How to develop lossless and blind steganography method for DNA sequence data types
with low modification rate?
This research question is designed to address issues with irreversible or lossy characteristics,
dependence on a reference DNA sequence, and a higher modification rate of the stego data of
the DNA steganography approach. Most of the existing DNA steganography methods require
to transfer the cover DNA sequence data as a reference to the receiver for extracting the secret
message. Such steganography methods are known as un-blind steganography method. Another
limitation of existing DNA steganography is that the modification rate of stego DNA sequences
is very high compared to the cover DNA sequence. Our proposed DNA steganography method
is lossless and blind while keeping the modification rate of the stego DNA sequences much lower.
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RQ-3. How to develop a reversible text steganography method with higher imperceptibility?
We design this research question to address the issue with the imperceptibility of the text
medium. In general, the imperceptibility of existing lossless text steganography methods is
very low. Most of the current research work on text steganography is application-specific (e.g.,
Microsoft Word). By answering the research questions, we demonstrate that our proposed
lossless text steganography method is highly imperceptible and compatible with a wide variety
of applications.
Aim-2: Developing a privacy preserving search mechanism for stego data
RQ-4. How to develop a privacy preserving search mechanism for stego data?
This question addresses the difficulty of searching specific data from the collection of stego
data in the edge data center. Due to privacy reasons, sensitive personal data of related objects
that can be used to link a stego data with related objects are cannot be stored in the edge
data center. Therefore, searching for specific data from the collection of stego data becomes
impossible. In order to preserve privacy, a search mechanism is required to search a specific
stego data from the edge data center without revealing any sensitive information. The gen-
eral model of privacy-preserving search technique supports only the encrypted database and
not applicable to stego data. In this question, we develop a privacy-preserving technique for
retrieving stego data in the edge data center. The privacy is preserved by not sharing the
secret key of steganography to the edge data center. Data retrieval is performed by the edge
data center without knowing the secret key and secret information embedded inside stego data.
Aim-3: Developing privacy preserving service computation framework
RQ-5. How to develop a privacy preserving service selection approach keeping service provider’s
QoS information private using fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)?
We develop this question to build a privacy-preserving edge computing-based service selection
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model that selects the set of services based on the optimal QoS value from the service repos-
itory. The proposed model consists of the service composer and service monitor. The service
composer is untrusted, and the service monitor acts as a trusted party. In order to preserve
privacy during the service composition task, the service monitor encrypts all the QoS data.
Hence, the service composer has to select services using encrypted QoS data. To answer this
question, we use fully homomorphic encryption that allows performing computation on en-
crypted QoS data during the service selection task. The final output is a candidate composite
service with the set of selected services.
RQ-6. How to develop a service composition model for edge services that use a privacy-
preserving service selection approach keeping service provider’s QoS information private using
fully homomorphic encryption?
This question is designed to address the privacy-preserving service composition model in the
context of edge computing based service systems. The service composition is not straight-
forward if there are functional dependencies among services. In this question, we build a
composability model by addressing the functional dependencies among services and apply the
privacy-preserving service selection approach developed in RQ-5.
1.5 Research Contributions
The contributions of this thesis corresponding to the aforementioned research questions are as
follows:
1. Lossless steganography methods for preserving privacy of smart applications
data
In this thesis, we develop privacy-preserving methods using lossless steganography for
only numerical (biosignal) and textual (DNA and text) data. As we have mentioned in
Section 1.3, steganography methods are data type-specific. A steganography method for
a particular type does not apply to other data types. Hence, a lossless steganography
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method is required for each type of health data. To solve issues concerning first three
research questions (RQ-1 to RQ-3), different steganography models are developed to
work in edge computing. The significant contributions regarding this problem are as
follows:
• With regard to the first research question, we present two reversible biosignal steganog-
raphy methods in this work using Hamming Code and Extended Binary Golay Code
based error correction methods. Both of our proposed methods embed sensitive in-
formation as errors within different types of biosignals such as ECG, PPG, and EEG.
The error correction method is used to extract the secret message, and reconstruct
original biosignal.
• We propose a lossless and blind method for the DNA steganography technique to
overcome the challenge addressed by second research question. In our proposed
steganography method, secret information is embedded within the DNA sequence.
A set of secret keys is used for embedding secret information within DNA sequences.
The set of secret keys is generated by the data source and distributed among data
consumers using a secured channel. Data consumers can extract secret informa-
tion from DNA sequences and use them. The secret message is extracted from the
DNA sequence without any reference DNA sequence. Therefore, our proposed DNA
steganography method can be used for the privacy preservation of DNA sequence
in the edge computing based healthcare system. The key contributions of our pro-
posed method are reversibility and blindness. Our proposed method is able to fully
reconstruct the DNA sequence without any error and does not rely on the public
DNA database for the hiding and extraction of the secret message. These features
makes it usable in healthcare systems.
• With respect to the third research question, we build a highly imperceptible and
lossless text steganography approach. Text steganography is a challenging task as a
slight modification in the text file can be identified. In general, the imperceptibility
of text steganography is very poor. Additionally, the data hiding capacity of text
steganography is very less. Current research works fail to solve both imperceptibil-
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ity and capacity problems simultaneously. We propose a data compression based
reversible text steganography scheme addressing both imperceptibility and capacity
problems of text steganography. Our proposed method embeds a secret message
within the text file as an invisible character by following a set of embedding rules.
2. Privacy preserving search mechanism for stego data
We propose the first privacy-preserving search technique for stego data in an untrusted
edge data center with regards to the challenge identified by the fourth research question.
Outsourcing data to the edge data center introduces serious privacy issues to the patient.
For example, a dishonest edge service provider may disclose patient sensitive information
to business organizations for some financial benefits. Using steganography, patient sensi-
tive information is hidden within data for privacy preservation. As a result, stego data
is generated. To the best of our knowledge, no method exists for searching a particular
stego data without disclosing any information to the cloud. We propose a framework for
privacy-preserving search over stego data that supports querying a single data as well as
range search. We systematically describe each component of the proposed framework.
3. Privacy preserving service selection and composition
In relation to the fifth and sixth research questions, we present a privacy-preserving service
computing framework for edge computing based service systems. In the edge computing
based service system, the best service is selected from a set of edge services based on
their Quality-of-Service (QoS) information. The QoS information of services is sensitive
to the service provider’s point of view. We claim that the service selection process can
be biased in the edge computing platform. A service provider can bribe a dishonest edge
service manager for taking unfair advantage during a service selection process. Therefore,
it is essential to execute the service selection tasks keeping QoS information private. The
significant contributions related to this are as follows:
• We develop a service selection model in which the Service selection task is performed
by the edge service composer on encrypted QoS values to ensure privacy. We use
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a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme in this paper for encrypting QoS
values. In order to reduce computation overhead, we propose a MapReduce model
for parallel execution. We conduct several experiments to evaluate the performance
of our proposed privacy-preserving service selection framework using a synthetic
QoS dataset.
• The aforementioned service selection tasks are not straightforward if there exists
functional dependency among service. We introduce a novel QoS-aware edge ser-
vice composition model to overcome this issue. Next, the proposed composition
model is used to select services for determining the optimal composite service us-
ing our proposed privacy-preserving service selection method. We conduct several
experiments to evaluate the performance of our proposed privacy-preserving service
composition framework using a synthetic QoS dataset.
1.6 Thesis Organization
The organization of this thesis includes the following chapters as below:
• Chapter 2: Lossless Steganography method for Numerical Data
Biosignal steganography approaches are presented in this chapter, illustrating the prob-
lem of data deterioration in biosignals due to steganography. Solutions presented here is
in relation to RQ-1. This chapter has the following two sections:
– 2.1: Lossless Biosignal Steganography approach using Hamming Code
based Error Correction Method. This section presents the first lossless biosig-
nal steganography method. The main contribution of the paper is submitted as a
full research paper as follows:
Rahman, M. S., Khalil, I., Yi, X. (2019). A Lossless Data Hiding based Authenti-
cation of Biosignals in Mobile Cloud Healthcare Systems. International Journal of
Medical Informatics. (Under review).
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– 2.2: High Capacity Lossless Biosignal Steganography approach using Ex-
tended Golay Code based Error Correction Method The second method
is provided in this section. The data hiding capacity of an error-correcting code
based lossless biosignal steganography method is improved in our second approach.
The main contribution of the chapter is submitted as a full research paper as follows:
Rahman, M. S., Khalil, I., Yi, X. (2020). Reversible Biosignal Steganography
Approach for Authenticating Biosignals using Extended Binary Golay code. IEEE
Journal of Biomedical and Health Informatics (Accepted)
• Chapter 3: Lossless Steganography method for Textual Data
In relation to RQ-2 and RQ-3, this chapter presents textual data steganography meth-
ods. We consider two types of textual data in this chapter: DNA and text. Therefore,
this chapter has the following two sections:
– 4.1: Lossless and Blind DNA Steganography In this section, a lossless and
blind DNA steganography approach is presented in relation to RQ-2. The DNA
allows lossless data embedding and extraction without any reference DNA sequence
(i.e., blind). In addition, the modification rate of the stego DNA sequence compared
with the cover DNA sequence is very less in the proposed method. The main
contribution of the chapter also appears in [83].
– 4.2: Highly Imperceptible Text Steganography In this section, a lossless text
steganography approach is presented with regard to the challenges stated in RQ-3.
The solution uses Unicode based encoding and Huffman code based compression
technique for achieving reversibility and higher imperceptibility. The main contri-
bution of the chapter appears in [38].
• Chapter 4: Privacy Preserving Search over Stego Data on Untrusted Cloud
In relation to the solution of RQ-4, two privacy-preserving search techniques for stego
data are described in this chapter. This chapter has the following two sections:
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– 4.1: A Simple Privacy-Preserving Search over Stego Data. This section
describes the first privacy-preserving search over stego data on the untrusted cloud.
The proposed method builds a secure, searchable index using symmetric key encryp-
tion and cryptographic hash. The method allows a user to submit a query string as
a hash value with any number of search attributes while preserving the privacy of
the query data and outcome. The main contribution of the section also appears in
[84].
– 4.2: A Privacy-Preserving Range Search over stego Data. In this section, a
privacy-preserving search over stego data on the untrusted cloud with a range query
is presented. This method can be used in conjunction with the method described
in Section 5.1. The data owner creates a secure, searchable index for the numeric
attributes using order-preserving encryption (OPE) [85] method. The main contri-
bution of the chapter is submitted as a full research paper as follows:
Rahman, M. S., Khalil, I., Yi, X. (2019). Privacy-Preserving Range Search Frame-
work for StegoData on Untrusted cloud. Knowledge-Based Systems. (Under re-
view).
• Chapter 5: Privacy Preserving Service Computing
We provide a framework for privacy-preserving service computing in this chapter with
regard to the solution of RQ-5. A framework for service selection and composition using
FHE is discussed in this chapter. This section describes how QoS-aware service selection
tasks can be performed on encrypted data. Firstly, the QoS values are encrypted using
the service monitor’s (a trusted party) public-key and stored in the edge data center.
The service composer uses encrypted QoS values to determine a set of best services with
different functionality. The set of selected services are composed together to fulfill the
service goal. Secondly, this section articulates the functional dependency among services
and builds a composability matrix for the edge services. Next, the privacy-preserving ser-
vice selection approach developed in the first part is optimized using the composability
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matrix to find the optimal composite services. The performance of the privacy-preserving
service selection process is improved using a MapReduce task distribution model. The
privacy-preserving service selection part also appears in [86]. The overall edge service
composition part of the chapter is submitted as a full research paper as follows:
Rahman, M. S., Khalil, I., Yi, X., Atiquzzaman, M. (2019). Towards Privacy Pre-
serving Edge Service Composition using Fully Homomorphic Cryptography. Engineering
Applications of Artificial Intelligence. (Under review).
• Chapter 7: Conclusion
This chapter concludes the thesis by summarizing the main contributions, key findings,
and limitations of the proposed methods. In addition, the significance of this research
and potential future directions are also discussed.
Note The succeeding core chapters (Chapter 2–6) of this thesis contribute to several key
research questions on privacy-preserving approaches based on lossless steganography for smart
application data and FHE based privacy-preserving serving computation in the edge comput-
ing. The core chapters appear in a self-contained and self-explanatory manner, which includes
real-world scenarios. Different scenarios require different types of contexts. Therefore, the
relevant contexts and content, including discussions on related work, developed models, and
experimental results are presented in each of these chapters separately.
Chapter 2
Lossless Steganography method for
Numerical Data
As discussed in Chapter 1, IoT data generated from the different smart applications are stored
at edge nodes acting as data centers in the public edge network. These edge nodes can be
compromised by an external attacker, and data can be leaked. The owner of an edge node
providing data storage service can scrutinize and gather valuable information from stored data.
The privacy of stored data is breached in both of the aforementioned scenarios. Hence, ensuring
the privacy of stored data is necessary at edge nodes acting as an edge data center.
In addressing this issue and in relation to the first research questions as presented in Section
1.4, this chapter presents lossless steganography method for numerical data. Data generated by
smart meters, wearable health devices, temperature, and humidity sensors are a few examples
of numerical data in the context of edge computing. For the sake of simplicity, the wearable
health device’s data are termed as numerical data throughout this chapter. In general, wear-
able health devices allow continuous monitoring of physiological parameters (e.g., heart rate,
blood oxygen levels, and body temperature) with physical activities [87] and produce different
types of biosignals. The biosignal refers to a signal collected from physiological phenomenon
using bio-sensors [88]. In general, biosignals are numerical time series data. Electrocardiogram
(ECG), electroencephalogram (EEG), and photoplethysmogram (PPG) are well-known biosig-
nals.
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A traditional encryption technique protects the data by converting it to a meaningless form,
called encrypted data. The characteristics of the original data is totally lost in the encrypted
data [19]. An encrypted data is not suitable in preserving the privacy of sensitive data in the
edge networks as the encryption key needs to be shared to all of the users. However, sharing the
encryption key with all of the users would fail the motivation of the privacy preserving approach.
For example, an encrypted biosignals cannot be used for analysis tasks without decrypting it.
In order to analyze an encrypted biosignal, an analyst should have the encryption key which
would reveal the patient sensitive information to the analyst.
As it is mentioned in Chapter 1, the sensitive information related to numerical data can be
hidden before sending it to the edge data center and extracted by a legitimate user at the time
of use using steganography approaches. The key strength of steganography approach is that
it can be used for hiding the existence of the sensitive information within a data [19]. At the
same time, the steganography approach does not change the characteristics of the stego data
embedding the sensitive information. Applying steganography approaches on data would allow
data users to perform normal tasks on stego data. Therefore, the steganography is a suitable
technique for preserving the privacy of data in the edge networks.
While using steganography, it is essential to maintain the quality of the original data after
the extraction of sensitive information. Existing steganography approaches for time-series
numerical data cannot reconstruct the original data after extracting the hidden message from
it. That is, original numerical data becomes lossy or irreversible. Therefore, the data become
erroneous and not suitable in a privacy-preserving scenario. In this chapter, we present the
first lossless steganography technique for numerical data using Error Correcting Code (ECC)
[89] in order to solve the aforementioned data quality issue. Our proposed solution consists of
two approaches. The first approach uses Hamming Code based Error Correction [89], and other
method uses Extended Golay Code based Error Correction [82] methods. We conduct several
experiments to demonstrate the performance of our proposed methods. Experimental results
establish a lossless property of the proposed approaches while maintaining other steganography
properties. The latter method can hide three times more sensitive data within time-series
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numerical data.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The motivations for this work and the
challenges to overcome are highlighted in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 briefly describes some key
related work. We discuss our proposed lossless biosignal steganography approach using Ham-
ming Code based Error Correction method in Section 2.3. Next, we present another lossless
biosignal steganography approach using the Extended Golay Code based Error Correction
method in Section 2.4. We show the result of our experiments, discuss the performance of our
proposed steganography method in Section 2.5. Finally, Section 2.6 summarizes this chapter.
2.1 Motivation and Contribution
As discussed in Chapter 1 and earlier in this chapter, using steganography techniques on
biosignals is challenging. This section describes motivations, challenges, and contributions to
this chapter.
2.1.1 Motivation
The key motivations behind lossless biosignal steganography are stated below.
• Hiding secret messages inside biosignal might change the characteristics of the stego
biosignal significantly [54, 22]. As a result, the stego biosignal cannot be diagnosed
without error. Moreover, the eavesdropper would detect the presence of secret message
inside the biosignal. Hence, the deterioration of the cover biosignal should be minimal.
Otherwise, the primary objective of steganography would be failed.
• Exiting data hiding approaches for biosignal [22, 54] cannot reconstruct original biosignal
after extracting the hidden message from it (i.e., lossy). Hence, these approaches are not
usable for preserving privacy of sensitive information in the biosignal. Biosignal is un-
doubtedly crucial for diagnosis purposes in cardiac illness. If the elements of biosignal are
changed, it would be difficult for healthcare providers to perform an accurate diagnosis.
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• Steganography approaches are data type-specific. Steganography approach for any of
the other data types, such as text, audio, video, image, and DNA, cannot be applied to
biosignals.
• Recent research works in [61, 22, 62, 63] present steganography approaches for biosignals.
However, the aforementioned works in the literature are lossy or irreversible.
• Lossy biosignal cannot be used for an accurate diagnosis. Hence, the primary objective
of privacy preservation would fail.
2.1.2 Contributions
To solve the above shortcomings of the biosignal steganography technique, we propose a lossless
biosignal steganography approach. The significant contributions of this chapter are listed
below.
1. Two reversible biosignal steganography methods are proposed that Successfully extract
hidden secret messages without any error. Additionally, they support various types of
numerical data, such as ECG, PPG, and EEG.
2. Hiding a single bit of the secret message using the Hamming Code based error correction
method is randomly embedded within a sample of the cover biosignal that increases the
security of the proposed steganography approach. Embedding procedure generates stego
biosignal with a negligible amount of signal distortion. Hence, the imperceptibility of
stego biosignal is very high.
3. The other approach hides three bits of the secret message randomly within a sample
of cover biosignal using the Extended Golay code-based error correction method. As
a result, the hiding capacity of the steganography approach is increased, sacrificing a
negligible amount of imperceptibility of the stego signal.
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2.2 Related Work
In this section, we consider some of the key existing steganography approaches that use biosig-
nal as a cover medium. Electrocardiogram (ECG) data is mostly used as a cover medium for
performing biosignal steganography. Therefore, we describe some of the recent research works
related to the ECG steganography method in this section.
[61] presents a Fast Discrete Curvelet Transform (FDCT) based ECG steganography ap-
proach. In this work, a 1D ECG signal is converted into a 2D image. Next, the curvelet
transform is applied to generate coefficients. The secret message is hidden inside the coeffi-
cients. In fact, the work in [61] applies steganography on the 2D cover image of the ECG signal
rather than the ECG signal.
Discrete Wavelet Transformation (DWT), Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT), and Discrete
Cosine Transform (DCT) based ECG steganography is demonstrated in [62]. In this work,
DWT, DCT, and DFT are used to decompose an ECG signal into multiple non-overlapping
sub-bands. Secret bits are embedded into sub-bands with lowest frequency coefficients. In
order to extract hidden information, the aforementioned transformation is performed first.
Next, the secret bits are retrieved from the sub-bands with the low-frequency coefficients.
The research work in [22] proposed a 5-level wavelet decomposition based steganography
approach for hiding patient data inside the ECG signal. Each level of decomposition segments
the original signal into two signals. Thus, 32 sub-bands are generated after performing 5-level
wavelet decomposition. Shared secret key and scrambling matrix is used for embedding patient
secret information. Inverse wavelet packet re-composition is applied on watermarked 32 sub-
bands to construct the stego ECG signal. The extraction process of secret patient information
works almost similarly. Instead of embedding the secret bit into locations determined by the
shared secret key, bits are read to reconstruct the secret patient information.
A continuous Ant Colony Optimization (CACO) based ECG steganography method is pre-
sented in [63]. The work uses DWT to decompose the cover ECG signal. Singular value de-
composition (SVD) and quantization approach are used for watermark embedding. This work
formulates an optimization problem and solves using the CACO algorithm to obtain multiple
scaling factors (MSFs). MSFs provide better imperceptibility and robustness of watermark
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Table 2.1: The Summary of Related Work
Model Description Remarks
[61] • FDCT based ECG steganography method. • An image steganography approach rather than signal
• ECG signal is converted into 2D image steganography.
• Curvlet transform is applied on 2D image to generate coefficients. • Cover signal is not fully reversible(i.e. lossy)
• Secret message is inserted into coefficients.
[62] • DWT, DFT and DCT based ECG steganography approach. • Developed for ECG only
• ECG signal is decomposed into multiple non-overlapping sub-bands • Cover signal is not fully reversible(i.e. lossy)
• Secret bits are embedded in the sub-bands with lowest frequency coefficients.
[22] • DWT based ECG steganography approach. • Developed for ECG only.
• ECG signal to decompose into 32 sub-bands. • Cover signal is not fully reversible(i.e. lossy)
• Secret message is scrambled using a secret scrambling matrix.
• Scrambled secret message is embedded within sub-bands.
[63] • Continuous Ant Colony Optimization (CACO) is used to select • Cover signal is not fully reversible(i.e. lossy)
the embedding location.
• DWT is used for decomposing ECG signal.
• SVD and quantization approaches are used for embedding
secret message within the cover ECG signal.
[1] • FWHT is used to convert biomedical signals from the spatial to frequency • Works for ECG, EEG, PPG, etc.
domain and coefficients are generated. • Only least-significant values of coefficients are
• Private information is encrypted with a secret key prior to the embedding. employed to embed the patient’s private information
• Low sequence coefficients are represented in a 3D-matrix • Low sequence coefficients are re-scaled to integer. Hence,
• Multiple 3D templates are generated from 3D-matrix. cover signal is not fully reversible(i.e. lossy)
• Encrypted private bits are randomly embedded in 3D templates.
when used in quantization.
The proposed approach in [1] works for various types of biosignals, such as ECG, EEG, and
PPG. The work uses Fast-Walsh Hadamard Transform (FWHT) to convert the biomedical
signals from the spatial to the frequency domain. Low series and high series coefficients are
generated as a result of this. Low series samples are very significant for rebuilding the signal.
On the other hand, high series coefficients have less impact during the reconstruction of the
signal. Only least-significant values are employed to embed the patient’s private information
for ensuring minimal distortion in the signal. The work in [1] has less amount of distortion in
stego biosignal. Hence, it improves the work in [22]. Nevertheless, the PRD of reconstructed
biosignal in [1] is less than < 1%. As a result, the work cannot be considered as a reversible
biosignal steganography method. Table 2.1 summarizes the aforementioned work on biosignal
steganography.
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2.3 Lossless Biosignal Steganography approach using
Hamming Code
We give a detail description of the proposed lossless biosignal steganography method in this sec-
tion. The key objective of our proposed method is to develop a lossless or reversible biosignal
steganography technique. Additionally, our method considers imperceptibility and robustness.
We use biosignal (e.g. ECG, EEG, PPG, etc.) as cover biosignal and patient personal infor-
mation as secret message in this algorithm.
There are two phases of the proposed biosignal steganography method: tagging, and ex-
traction and reconstruction. The tagging phase embeds the secret message into biosignal as
error using Hamming Code based error correction technique [89] and produces stego biosignal.
On the other hand, the extraction phase extracts the secret message from stego biosignal and
reconstructs cover biosignal.
2.3.1 Preliminaries
We assume that we have a cover biosignal C with p samples. A Sample is a floating point
number in decimal format. Formally, C can be denoted as C = {ci|1 ≤ i ≤ p}, where ci is the
i-th sample. We have a secret message M with q bits and denoted as M = {mi|1 ≤ i ≤ q},
where mi is the i-th bit in secret message. We assume that number of bits in secret message
(q) is less than or equal to number of samples (p) in cover biosignal (i.e. q ≤ p). Prior to
the tagging phase, three parameters n, k and r are chosen such that n = 2r − 1(r ≥ 2),
k = 2r − r − 1(r ≥ 2) and r = n− k. Here, n denotes the code length, k denotes the length of
information bits in the code, and r denotes the number of parity bits in the code. Two binary
matrices, G and H, are constructed based on the aforementioned parameters. The matrix G
is a k × n matrix, called a generator matrix. Formally, G can be represented as:
G = {gij |1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, gij ∈ {0, 1}}
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We assume that G is in standard form [89]. The matrix H is a (n−k)×n matrix, called parity
check matrix. The formal representation of H is as follows:
H = {hij |1 ≤ i ≤ (n− k), 1 ≤ j ≤ n, hij ∈ {0, 1}}
The construction of G and H must satisfy the property H.GT = 0, where GT is the transpose
of G.
Following subsections describes the tagging, and extraction and reconstruction phases in
detail.
2.3.2 Tagging Phase
In tagging phase, the secret message M is embedded into cover biosignal C to produce stego
biosignal C. The tagging phase contains several steps. Steps of the tagging phase are described
below in detail.
At the first step, cover biosignal C with p samples in decimal format is converted to a binary
matrix E for the encoding purpose. In order to do this, C is converted to a binary matrix Cb by
converting each biosignal samples into a binary block according to IEEE754 double-precision
floating-point format [90]. According to IEEE754 double-precision floating-point format, a
decimal number is represented using 64 bit binary block. From there, the length of a row of
Cb is l = 64. The dimension of Cb is p × l. A binary string is constructed by sequentially
concatenating all of the rows of Cb. Length of the concatenated binary string becomes pl.
Next, the binary string is converted to a matrix E of k columns, where k is the length of
information bits of code. Therefore, the number of rows of E is equal to plk . Mathematically,
E can be defined as:
E = {eij |1 ≤ i ≤ pl
k
, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, eij ∈ {0, 1}}
At the second step, a matrix of codewords E is generated. The i-th codeword in E is defined
as ei = (n, k, r), where n is the number of bits in ei, k is the message part of ei, and r is the
number of parity bits in ei. Section III-A describes about the process of choosing n, k and r.
E can be expressed as:
E = {eij |1 ≤ i ≤ pl
k
, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, eij ∈ {0, 1}}
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A row ei of E is passed to an encoding function ~ to produce corresponding codeword ei of E.
Here, ~ performs the encoding using Hamming Code. In fact, ~ is the linear product of ei and
generator matrix G. The encoding operation can be depicted as follows:
ei = ~(ei, G) = ei ·G (2.1)
At the third step, parity matrix S is generated. As G is in standard form, the first k
columns of each row of E are information (or secret message) bits and next (n − k) bits are
parity bits. The parity matrix S is a sub-matrix containing the last (n − k) columns of E.
Hence, S is a matrix with plk rows and (n − k) columns. A row st of S can be expressed as
st = {ek+1, ek+2, . . . , en−1, en}, where 1 ≤ i ≤ plk .
At the fourth step, q number of random locations in Cb are identified. The random location
determination is a two step process. Firstly, a pseudu-random sequence X containing q integer
elements are generated using a pseudo-random sequence generator seed (α). X can be depicted
as X = {xi|1 ≤ i ≤ q}, where q is the number of bits M and xi represents the xi-th row of
Cb. Secondly, for each xi find a random number yi that indicates a location of mantissa part
of double-precision binary block. The random column selection depends on the value of i-th
secret message bit (i.e. mi). If the value of mi = 0, then yi points to a random location in
xi-th row of Cb that has ’1’ in Cb[xi, yi]. If the value of mi = 1, then yi points to a random
location in xi that has ’0’ in Cb[xi, yi]. Here, yi refers to the yi-th column of xi-th row in Cb
and 13 ≤ yi ≤ 64. The location Cb[xi, yi] determines the tagging location of mi.
At the final step, secret message M is embedded in the binary matrix of cover biosignal Cb
as error and stego biosignal is generated. According to the design of our tagging algorithm,
there can be at most one-bit error per biosignal sample. Hence, the error can be corrected
with the Hamming Code based error correction method. Initially, each secret message bit
mi is embedded in Cb[xi, yi]. Next, every row of Cb is converted to a floating-point decimal
number to get stego biosignal C. Here, C contains the exact same number of biosignal samples
which is equal to p. Formally, C can be denoted as C = {Ci|1 ≤ i ≤ p}, where Ci is the
i-th sample of stego biosignal. Fig. 2.1 illustrates the overall view of the tagging procedure.
Algorithm 5 represents the tagging procedure of secret message into cover biosignal to generate
stego biosignal.
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Algorithm 1: Tagging a Secret Message into Biosignal
Input: Cover biosignal C with p samples, secret message M with q bits, length of
information bits k in code, generator matrix G, seed for generating
pseudo-random sequence α
Output: Stego biosignal C with p samples
1 begin
2 Convert C into a binary matrix Cb with a dimension p× l. Next, convert p× l matrix
Cb into
pl
k × k matrix E.
3 Generate a matrix of codewords E such that
E = {eix|1 ≤ i ≤ plk , 1 ≤ x ≤ n, eix ∈ {0, 1}} and ei = ~(ei, G) = ei ·G.
4 Obtain pl × (n− k) parity matrix S from the last (n− k) columns of E.
5 Selects q number of random locations in Cb. A random location Cb[xi, yi] is
determined based on a pseudo-random sequence X = {xi|1 ≤ i ≤ q} that is generated
based on α. For each xi, get a random column yi of xi-th row of Cb based on the i-th
secret bit mi. If mi = 0, select a random column yi containing ’1’. If mi = 1, select a
random column yi containing ’0’.
6 Each mi ∈M(1 ≤ i ≤ q) is embedded at Cb[xi, yi] derived in Step-5. Next, convert
each row of Cb into decimal and produce stego biosignal C = {ci|1 ≤ i ≤ p}.
7 end
Figure 2.1: Overall View of the tagging Procedure
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2.3.3 Generation of Stego Key
A stego key SK is generated after tagging secret message into cover biosignal. The SK is a
tuple < k, n,H, S, α > where:
• k is the length of information bits in a codeword.
• n is the length of a codeword.
• H is the (n− k)× n parity check matrix
• S is the plk × (n− k) parity matrix
• α is the seed of the pseudo-random-sequence function
2.3.4 Extraction of Secret Message and Reconstruction of Biosignal
Figure 2.4 illustrates the overall view of the extraction procedure of secret message and re-
construction of cover biosignal. Secret message M is extracted, and cover biosignal C is
reconstructed from stego biosignal C in this phase. The extraction and reconstruction phase
use stego key SK for this purpose. Similar to the tagging phase, extraction and reconstruction
phase has multiple steps. At the first step, C with p samples in decimal format is converted to
a binary matrix E
′
for encoding. Initially, Each sample in C is converted to a binary matrix Cb
using the same procedure as mentioned in the first step of tagging phase. Hence, Cb becomes a
p× l binary matrix. A binary string is constructed by sequentially concatenating all of the rows
of Cb. Length of constructed binary string becomes pl. Next, the binary string is converted
to a matrix E
′
of k columns. Here, the value of k is obtained from SK. As a result of the
conversion, the number of rows of E
′
is equal to plk . Formally, E
′
can be defined as:
E
′
= {e′ij |1 ≤ i ≤
pl
k
, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, e′ij ∈ {0, 1}}
At the second step, encoded matrix E′ is generated that contains secret message bits as
errors. Initially, plk × n − k parity matrix S is obtained from SK and appended to E
′
. As a
result, plk × n encoded matrix E′ is obtained. E′ can be represented as:
E′ = {e′ij |1 ≤ i ≤
pl
k
, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, e′ij ∈ {0, 1}}
Lossless Biosignal Steganography approach using Hamming Code 36
At the third step, each row of E′ is checked for error using syndrome checking. Secret
message bits are extracted at the same time in this step. Initially, a syndrome table (T ) is
generated from parity check matrix (H) that is taken from SK. In the Hamming Code based
error correction method, T is generated using the following equation:
T = Ht, (2.2)
where, Ht is the transpose of matrix H. Therefore, T becomes a n × (n − k) matrix. A row
tj(1 ≤ j ≤ n) of T is called syndrome. tj denotes the location of error bit in a codeword. Next,






j is the j-th row of E
′ and 1 ≤ j ≤ plk . There exist an error at the j-th bit of e
′
i if
vj 6= 0 and vj = tj . If an error is found, then j-th bit of e′i is added into a vector X. At the
same time, error is corrected by altering the bit from 0 to 1 or 1 to 0. Here, X represents the
binary vector of extracted secret message bits. The first bit of X denotes the first secret bit
that is extracted, second bit of X denotes the second secret bit, and so on. The length of X
becomes q after extracting all secret message bits that is equal to the length of original secret
message. Nevertheless, X contains the permuted secret bits and requires a reverse permutation
for obtaining original secret message.
At the fourth step, a pseudo-random sequence (R) is generated with p elements using pseudo-
random sequence generator seed (α). α is taken from SK. A new empty vector X is created.
Next, the j-th bit of X is inserted into location of X pointed by the j-th element of R (i.e.
Xj = Xrj , where 1 ≤ j ≤ p). Later, X is converted to a binary string M . Here, M is our
extracted secret message.
At the final step, cover biosignal is reconstructed from corrected matrix of codeword E′ .
The first k columns of plk × n matrix E′ are converted to a p× l matrix Cb. Each row of Cb is
the binary representation of a biosignal sample. Convert each row of Cb to decimal according
IEEE754 double-precision floating-point format and store it to a matrix Cex. Here, Cex is our
reconstructed cover biosignal. Our proposed method reconstructs the cover biosignal without
any error. Therefore, our proposed method is a reversible biosignal steganography method.
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Algorithm 4 represents the extraction procedure of secret message and reconstruction procedure
of cover biosignal.
Algorithm 2: Extracting secret message from stego biosignal and recon-
struction of cover biosignal
Input: Stego Biosignal C with p samples, Stego Key SK
Output: Secret message M with q bits, reconstructed biosignal Cex with p samples
1 begin
2 Convert C into a binary matrix Cb with a dimension p× l. Next, convert p× l matrix
Cb into
pl
k × k matrix E
′
.
3 Encoded matrix E
′
with a dimension plk × n is generated by appending plk × n− k
parity matrix S at the end of E
′
obtained in Step-1.




by obtaining a syndrome string vj = e
′





ij is stored in X and e
′
ij is altered. X is permuted secret message bits.
5 Generate a pseudo-random sequence R = {ri|1 ≤ i ≤ q}. Create a vector
X = {xi|1 ≤ i ≤ q}, and store each xi ∈ X at xi-th index of X. Next, convert X to a
binary string M that is our retrieved secret message.
6 Convert E
′
to a p× l matrix Cb, and convert each row of Cb into decimal to store in a
matrix Cex. The Cex is reconstructed biosignal.
7 end
2.3.5 Security Strength
In this section, we semantically analyze the security strength of our proposed lossless biosignal
steganography method. For this purpose, we calculate the cracking probability of the proposed
steganography method. Cracking probability can be defined as the probability of the attacker’s
success in revealing the secret message for a specific algorithm. We assume that the number of
samples in cover biosignal and the number of bits in secret message are known to the attacker.
Let, the number of samples is p in cover biosignal, and the number of bits in secret message
is n. Here, n ≤ p. The cover biosignal sample is converted to a binary matrix where each row
corresponds to a binary representation of the respective biosignal sample in decimal format.
Assume that we convert decimal samples to binary using IEEE754 double-precision floating-
point standard. Hence, the length of the binary block of a sample is l = 64. The binary
matrix has p rows and 64 columns. n rows need to be selected from p available rows. In our
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Figure 2.2: Overall View of the extraction and reconstruction procedure
proposed method, we embed a secret bit in the mantissa part of a binary block. Total 52
columns from columns 13 to 64 of the binary matrix are eligible for inserting bits. Therefore,
total 52p possible locations are there. Hence, the number of ways n rows can be selected from












(p− n)! × 52 (2.4)
Therefore, the probability of making a successful guess (i.e. cracking probability) for the secret









(p− n)! × 52
(2.5)
Giving an example, we have a cover biosignal with p = 2000 samples and a secret message with









(2000− 1024)! × 52
(2.6)
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Therefore, the probability of cracking our proposed biosignal steganography method by an
attacker is very less.
2.3.6 Embedding Capacity
The embedding capacity is the volume of data that can be embedded in a cover medium using
a steganography method. For a biosignal steganography method, the maximum embedding
capacity (capacitymax) is determined by the following equation:
capacitymax = p.bem, (2.7)
where p is the total number of samples in a cover biosignal, and bem is the number of bits that
can be embedded per sample.
As Hamming Code based error correction technique can correct only 1-bit error per code-
word, maximum 1-bit of the secret message can be embedded as an error in a biosignal sample.
Hence, we can embed the maximum 1 timesp = p bits in the cover biosignal using this method.
In other words, the maximum capacity of our proposed biosignal steganography method based
on hamming code is capacitymax = p.
2.4 Lossless Biosignal Steganography Method using Extended
Golay Code
In this section, we discuss our proposed biosignal steganography method using Extended Golay
Code based error correction technique. The key objective of our proposed method is to develop
a lossless or reversible biosignal steganography technique. Additionally, our method considers
imperceptibility and robustness. We use biosignal data (e.g. ECG, PPG, etc.) as cover medium
and patient profile data as secret message in this section.
There are two phases of the proposed biosignal steganography method: embedding secret
message and extracting secret message. The embedding phase embeds the secret message into
biosignal data as error using Extended Binary Golay Code based error correction technique
and produces stego biosignal data. On the other hand, extraction phase extracts the secret
message from stego biosignal data and reconstructs cover biosignal data.
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We assume that we have a cover biosignal C with p samples. A Sample is a floating point
number in decimal format. Formally, C can be denoted as C = {ci|1 ≤ i ≤ p}, where ci is the i-
th sample. We have a secret message M with q bits and denoted as M = {mi|1 ≤ i ≤ q}, where
mi is the i-th bit in secret message. The generator matrix (G) and parity check matrix (H) are
constructed by data owner based on equations (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10) prior to the embedding
phase. At first, we briefly introduce the Extended Golay Code based error correction approach
in following sub-section. Later, the embedding and extraction phases are described in detail.
2.4.1 Extended Binary Golay Code
A binary Golay code [82] is one of the linear error-correcting codes proposed by Marcel J.
E. Golay in 1949. Golay code was used for the missions of launching the Voyager 1 and 2
spacecrafts towards Jupiter and Saturn in 1977, respectively. The code was used for encoding
and decoding scientific data of the aforementioned missions. There are two forms of binary
Golay code: perfect binary Golay code and extended binary Golay code. The perfect binary
Golay code (G23) is a [23, 12, 7] code. The G23 has codewords of length 23. On the other hand,
extended binary Golay code (G24) is a [24, 12, 8] code. The G24 encodes 12 bits message into
24 bits codewords with a distance 8. Both G23 and G24 can correct 3 bits or fewer errors and
detect up to 7 bits of error. In this article, we use extended binary Golay code for embedding
and extracting secret message for biosignal data. Therefore, we discuss only the extended
binary Golay code in the following sub-section.
In order to explain the Extended Binary Golay code-based error correction method, we
assume that we have a 12 bit message (M) that is going to be transmitted from sender to
receiver. Let, there can be a maximum 3 bits error in M . Error correction procedure using
the binary extended Golay code consists of three steps: 1) construction of generator matrix
and parity check matrix, 2) encoding and 3) decoding. Both sender and receiver agree on the
generator matrix and parity check matrix prior to the communication. The encoding is done
at the sender side, and decoding is done at the receiver side. The aforementioned steps are
discussed below.
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2.4.1.1 Construction of Generator Matrix and Parity Check Matrix
The generator matrix (G) of G24 is a 12× 24 binary matrix that can be denoted as:
G = [I12 | A], (2.8)
where, I12 is a 12 × 12 identity matrix, and A is a 12 × 12 binary matrix such that A = At.
The At is the transpose matrix of A. In order to construct A, two vectors are used. The first
vector is a 1×11 random binary vector u, and the other vector is a 1×11 binary ones vector J .
The fist eleven rows of the matrix A (Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ 11) is obtained from u by circularly shifting
(i− 1) bit(s) of u to left and putting 1 at the twelfth column. Ai-th row of A can be denoted
as and denoted as: Ai =
∣∣∣ ∆i−1(u) 1 ∣∣∣, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 11 and ∆i is circular shifting operator
that performs (i− 1) circular shift to the left on u. The twelfth row of the matrix A is derived
from J and can be denoted as: A12 =
∣∣∣ J 0 ∣∣∣. Overall, the 12× 12 matrix A can be denoted
as :
A =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∆i(u) 1J 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , 1 ≤ i ≤ 11 (2.9)
The generator matrix G is a self-dual [82]. Hence, the parity check matrix (H) is defined as:
H = GT , (2.10)
where GT is the transpose of the matrix G.
2.4.1.2 Encoding
In this step, sender encodes M and generates a codeword (W ) as follows:
W = M ·G mod 2. (2.11)
Here, W is a 1× 24 binary vector that represents the codeword. W is sent to the receiver.
2.4.1.3 Decoding
This step decodes the received codeword (W ) and retrieves message M . The decoding process
guarantees that the original and retrieved messages are the same (i.e., M = M). We assume
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that the receiver has a parity check matrix (H) before the decoding process. There are several
steps in the decoding process. Firstly, a syndrome (s) is computed first as:
s = W ·H mod 2, (2.12)
where s is a 1 × 12 binary vector. Secondly, an error pattern (e) is determined. In order to
determine e, the weight of s, denoted as wt(s), is calculated. wt(s) is the number of 1’s in s.
The value of e depends on the following conditions:
Condition 1. If wt(s) ≤ 3 then e can be represented as:
e =
[
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | s
]
Condition 2. If wt(s) > 3, and for some i = 1, 2, . . . , 12 the wt(s + Ai mod 2) ≤ 2 (A is
obtained from Equation 2.9) then e can be represented as:
e =
[
(s+Ai mod 2) | Ii
]
where, Ri =, and Ii is the i-th row of 12× 12 identity matrix.
Condition 3. If wt(s) > 3, and for all i = 1, 2, . . . , 12 the wt(s + Ai mod 2) > 2 (A is
obtained from equation 2.9) then a second syndrome (s2) is calculated as:
s2 = s ·A mod 2,
where s2 is a 1× 12 binary vector. If wt(s2) ≤ 3 then e can be represented as:
e =
[
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 | s2
]
Condition 4. If wt(s) > 3, and for some i = 1, 2, . . . , 12 the wt(s + Ai mod 2) > 2 (A is
obtained from equation 2.9) then a second syndrome (s2) is calculated as: s2 = s ·A, where s2
is a 1× 12 vector. If wt(s2) > 3 and for some i = 1, 2, . . . , 12 the wt(s2 + Ai mod 2) ≤ 2 then
e can be represented as:
e =
[
Ii | (s2 +Ai) mod 2
]
where, Ii is the i-th row of 12× 12 identity matrix.
Secondly, the corrected codeword is generated using the following equation:
W = (W + e) mod 2, (2.13)
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Figure 2.3: Overall View of Embedding Procedure
where W is the 1× 24 binary vector of corrected codeword.
Finally, the transmitted message is retrieved from the first 12 elements of W . The retrieved
message M can be denoted as:
M = {Wk | 1 ≤ k ≤ 12}.
2.4.2 Embedding Phase
In the embedding phase, the secret message (M) is embedded into cover biosignal (C) to
produce stego biosignal (C). Embedding phase contains several steps. Steps of the embedding
phase are described below in detail.
At the first step, C with p samples in decimal format is converted to a binary matrix (E) for
encoding purpose. In order to do this, C is converted to a binary matrix Cb by converting each
biosignal samples into a binary block according to IEEE754 double-precision floating-point
format [90]. According to IEEE754 double-precision floating-point format, a decimal number
is represented using 64 bit binary block. From there, the length of a row of Cb is l = 64 and the
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dimension of Cb becomes p × l. A binary string is constructed by sequentially concatenating
all of the rows of Cb. Length of the concatenated binary string becomes pl. Next, the binary
string is converted to a matrix E of k columns, where k is the length of information bits of
code. As the length of information bits of code in extended binary Golay code is 12, we set
k = 12. If (pl) is fully divisible by k then the number of rows of E is equal to bplk c. Otherwise,
the number of rows of E becomes (bplk c+ 1). Mathematically, E can be defined as:
E = {eij |1 ≤ i ≤ RE , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, eij ∈ {0, 1}}, (2.14)
where RE is the number of rows of the matrix E and denoted as:
RE =

bplk c, if k | (pl)
bplk c+ 1, if k 6 | (pl)
(2.15)
At the second step, a matrix of codewords E is generated by encoding first bpl/kc rows of E
using extended binary Golay code. Each row of first bpl/kc rows of E is passed to an encoding
function (~) for generating corresponding codeword of E. Here, ~ performs the encoding using
Equation 2.11. The encoding operation can be depicted as follows:
ei = ~(ei, G) = (ei ·G) mod 2, (2.16)
where ei is the i-th codeword in E. The ei is defined as: ei = [n, k, d], where n is the number
of bits (n = 24), k is the information bits (k = 12) and d is the distance (d = 8) in ei. Overall,
E can be expressed as:
E = {eij |1 ≤ i ≤ bpl/kc, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, eij ∈ {0, 1}} (2.17)
At the third step, the parity matrix S is generated. As G = [I12|A] (see Equation 2.8), the
first k columns of each row of E are information (or secret message) bits and next (n− k) bits
are parity bits. The parity matrix S is a sub-matrix containing the last (n− k) columns of E.
Hence, S is a matrix with plk rows and (n − k) columns. A row st of S can be expressed as
st = {ek+1, ek+2, . . . , en−1, en}, where 1 ≤ i ≤ plk .
At the fourth step, embedding locations of secret bits are determined. Our embedding
procedure permits at most 3 bits to be embedded per biosignal sample as extended binary
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Golay code can correct upto three errors in a codeword. Hence, M is fragmented into multiple
segments each of containing 3 or less bits. The set of segments of M can be named as U and
represented as: Ui = {uij |1 ≤ i ≤ σ, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3}, where σ is the number of segments. The value
of σ depends on the number of bits (q) in M . If q is divisible by 3 then σ = bq/3c. Otherwise,
σ = bq/3c + 1. Next, σ number of random locations are identified in Cb by generating a
pseudu-random sequence (X(α)) of integers. Here, α is the pseudo-random sequence generator
seed. X(α) can be represented as: X(α) = {x1, x2, . . . , xσ}. For each xi-th row of Cb, select
three columns. In order to do this, find a set (Yi) of three random numbers between 13 and
64 for selecting three locations of mantissa part of double-precision binary block. The set Yi
is denoted as: Yi = {yij |1 ≤ i ≤ σ, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, 13 ≤ yij ≤ 64}. The random column selection
depends on the value of uij of Ui. If the value of uij = 0, then yij points to a random location
between 13-th and 64-th columns of xi-th row of Cb that has ’1’. Conversely, yij points to a
random location in xi-th row of Cb that has ’0’ if the value of uij = 1. The location Cb[xi, yij ]
determines the embedding location of uij . At the fifth step, the secret message M is embedded
as error in the binary matrix of cover biosignal Cb at locations identified in Step 4 and stego
biosignal is generated in this step. Initially, a secret message bit uij is embedded in Cb[xi, yij ].
Next, every row of Cb is converted to floating-point decimal number to get stego biosignal C.
Here, C contains exactly same number of biosignal samples which is equal to p. Formally, C
can be denoted as C = {Ci|1 ≤ i ≤ p}, where Ci is the i-th sample of stego biosignal. Fig.
2.3 illustrates the overall view of embedding procedure. Algorithm 3 represents the embedding
procedure of secret message into cover biosignal to generate stego biosignal.
2.4.3 Generation of Stego Key
A stego key SK is generated after embedding secret message into cover biosignal. The SK is
a tuple < q,H, S, α > where:
• q is the length of a secret message.
• H is the parity check matrix of Golay Code
• S is the plk × (n− k) parity matrix obtained from matrix E
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Algorithm 3: Embedding a Secret Message into Biosignal
Input: Cover biosignal C with p samples, secret message M with q bits, length of
information bits k in code, generator matrix G, seed for generating
pseudo-random sequence α
Output: Stego biosignal C with p samples
1 begin
2 Convert C into a binary matrix Cb with a dimension p× l. Next, convert p× l matrix
Cb into
pl
k × k matrix E.
3 Generate a matrix of codewords E such that
E = {eij |1 ≤ i ≤ RE , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, eij ∈ {0, 1}}, where RE = bplk c (if k divides pl) or
RE = bplk c+ 1 (if kdoes not devides pl), and ei = ~(ei, G) = (ei ·G) mod 2.
4 Obtain pl × (n− k) parity matrix S from the last (n− k) columns of E.
5 Generate a set of segments U such that Ui = {uij |1 ≤ i ≤ σ, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3}, where
σ = bq/3c (If q is divisible by 3) or σ = bq/3c+ 1 (If q is not divisible by 3). Next,
select q number of random locations in Cb. A random location Cb[xi, yij ] is
determined based on a pseudo-random sequence X(α) = {xi|1 ≤ i ≤ q} where α is
seed. For each xi, find Yi = {yij |1 ≤ i ≤ σ, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, 13 ≤ yij ≤ 64}. If the value of
uij = 0, then yij points to a random location between 13-th and 64-th columns of
xi-th row of Cb that has ’1’. Conversely, yij points to a random location in xi-th row
of Cb that has ’0’ if the value of uij = 1. The location Cb[xi, yij ] determines the
embedding location of uij .
6 Each uij ∈ U is embedded at Cb[xi, yij ] derived in Step-4. Next, convert each row of
Cb into decimal and produce stego biosignal C = {ci|1 ≤ i ≤ p}.
7 end
• α is the seed of the pseudo-random-sequence function
2.4.4 Extraction of Secret Message and Reconstruction of Biosignal
Secret message M is extracted, and cover biosignal C is reconstructed from stego biosignal C
in this phase. The extraction and reconstruction phase use stego key SK for this purpose.
Similar to the embedding phase, extraction and reconstruction phase has multiple steps. Steps
of extraction and reconstruction phases are described below in detail.
At the first step, C with p samples in the decimal format are converted to a binary matrix
E
′
for encoding. Initially, Each sample in C is converted to a binary matrix Cb using the same
procedure as mentioned in the first step of embedding phase. Hence, Cb becomes a p× l binary
matrix (l = 64). A binary string is constructed by sequentially concatenating all of the rows of
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Cb. Length of the constructed binary string becomes pl. Next, the binary string is converted
to a matrix E
′
of k columns. As the length of information bits of code in extended binary
Golay code is 12, we set k = 12. If (pl) is fully divisible by k then the number of rows of E
is equal to bplk c. Otherwise, the number of rows of E becomes (bplk c+ 1). Mathematically, E
′
can be defined as:
E
′
= {e′ij |1 ≤ i ≤ RE , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, e
′
ij ∈ {0, 1}}, (2.18)
where RE is the number of rows of the matrix E and denoted as:
RE =

bplk c, if k | (pl)
bplk c+ 1, if k 6 | (pl)
(2.19)
At the second step, encoded matrix E′ is generated containing secret message bits as errors.
Initially, plk × n − k parity matrix S is obtained from SK and augmented to E
′
. As a result,
pl
k × n encoded matrix E′ is obtained. E′ can be represented as:
E′ = [E
′ | S ] = {e′ij |1 ≤ i ≤
pl
k
, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, e′ij ∈ {0, 1}} (2.20)






bplk c, if k | (pl)
bplk c+ 1, if k 6 | (pl)
(2.21)
The parity check matrix (H) is taken from SK. Next, each syndromei is checked for error
by determining error pattern according to decoding conditions stated in Section 2.4.1.3. After
that, each e
′
i is corrected using Equation (2.13). Initially, the codeword with error is corrected.
After that, the corrected codeword is XOR-ed with codeword with error to determine bit
locations. At the same time, an error is corrected by altering the bit from 0 to 1 or 1 to
0. Here, X represents the binary vector of extracted secret message bits. The first bit of X
denotes the first secret bit that is extracted, the second bit of X denotes the second secret bit,
and so on. The length of X becomes q after extracting all secret message bits that is equal to
Lossless Biosignal Steganography Method using Extended Golay Code 48
the length of the original secret message. Nevertheless, X contains the permuted secret bits
and requires a reverse permutation for obtaining the original secret message.
At the fourth step, a pseudo-random sequence (R) is generated with p elements using pseudo-
random sequence generator seed (α). α is taken from SK. A new empty vector X is created.
Next, the j-th bit of X is inserted into location of X pointed by the j-th element of R (i.e.
Xj = Xrj , where 1 ≤ j ≤ p). Later, X is converted to a binary string M . Here, M is our
extracted secret message.
At the fifth step, the cover biosignal is reconstructed from corrected matrix of codeword E′ .
The first k columns of plk × n matrix E′ are converted to a p× l matrix Cb. Each row of Cb is
the binary representation of a biosignal sample. Convert each row of Cb to decimal according
IEEE754 double-precision floating-point format and store it to a matrix Cex. Here, Cex is our
reconstructed cover biosignal. Our proposed method reconstructs the cover biosignal without
any error. Therefore, our proposed method is a reversible biosignal steganography method. Fig.
2.4 illustrates the overall view of extraction procedure of secret message and reconstruction
of cover biosignal. Algorithm 6 represents the extraction procedure of secret message and
reconstruction procedure of cover biosignal.
2.4.5 Security Strength
In this section, we discuss the security strength of our proposed biosignal steganography
method. The security strength determines how secured the proposed method is. For this
purpose, we calculate the cracking probability of the proposed steganography method. Crack-
ing probability can be defined as the probability of an attacker’s success in revealing the secret
message for a specific algorithm. We assume that the number of samples in cover biosignal
and the number of bits in secret message are known to the attacker.
Let, the number of samples is p in cover biosignal, and the number of bits in secret message
is n. Here, n ≤ 3p as maximum 3-bits can be embedded per sample. The cover biosignal
sample is converted to a binary matrix where each row corresponds to a binary representation
of the respective biosignal sample in decimal format. Assume that we convert decimal samples
to binary using IEEE754 double-precision floating-point standard. Hence, the length of the
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Algorithm 4: Extracting secret message from stego biosignal and recon-
struction of cover biosignal
Input: Stego Biosignal C with p samples, Stego Key SK
Output: Secret message M with q bits, reconstructed biosignal Cex with p samples
1 begin
2 Convert C into a binary matrix Cb with a dimension p× l. Next, convert p× l matrix
Cb into
pl
k × k matrix E
′
.
3 Encoded matrix E
′
with a dimension plk × n is generated by appending plk × n− k
parity matrix S at the end of E
′
obtained in Step-1.




by obtaining a syndrome string vj = e
′





ij is stored in X and e
′
ij is altered. X is permuted secret message bits.
5 Generate a pseudo-random sequence R = {ri|1 ≤ i ≤ q}. Create a vector
X = {xi|1 ≤ i ≤ q}, and store each xi ∈ X at xi-th index of X. Next, convert X to a
binary string M that is our retrieved secret message.
6 Convert E
′
to a p× l matrix Cb, and convert each row of Cb into decimal to store in a
matrix Cex. The Cex is reconstructed biosignal.
7 end
binary block of a sample is l = 64. The binary matrix has p number of rows and 64 numbers of
columns. n rows need to be selected from p available rows. In our proposed method, we embed
a secret bit in the mantissa part of a binary block. Total 52 columns from columns 13 to 64 of
the binary matrix are eligible for inserting bits. Therefore, the number of possible embedding
locations can be 52 × ×p = 156p . Hence, the number of ways n rows can be selected from p












(p− n)! × 52 (2.22)
Therefore, the probability of making a successful guess (i.e., cracking probability) for the secret









(p− n)! × 52
(2.23)
Giving an example, we have a cover biosignal with p = 2000 samples and a secret message with
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Figure 2.4: Overall View of Extraction Procedure









(2000− 1024)! × 52
(2.24)
Therefore, the probability of cracking our proposed biosignal steganography method by an
attacker is very less.
2.4.6 Embedding Capacity
We determine the embedding capacity of this Extended Golay Code based biosignal steganog-
raphy approach using Equation 2.7 that is discussed in Section 2.3.6. The Extended Binary
Golay Code based error correction technique can correct 3-bits error per codeword. We have
p number of samples in cover biosignal that is converted to codewords. Maximum 3-bits bit of
the secret message can be embedded as an error in a biosignal sample. Hence, we can embed
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the maximum 3p bits in the cover biosignal. In other words, the maximum capacity of our
proposed biosignal steganography method is three times to the number of samples in cover
biosignal (i.e. capacitymax = 3p).
2.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we discuss key performance evaluation criteria that are used in steganography.
We need to answer the following questions for evaluating the performance of both of our
proposed methods to be considered as a lossless biosignal steganography method while fulfiling
other steganography performance criteria:
• Does the proposed method reconstruct cover biosignal completely after extraction of secret
message?
• Does the proposed method extract secret message without any error?
• How effective the proposed steganography method is? The effectiveness of a steganography
method represents its imperceptibility which is determined by the distortion rate of stego
biosignal in % after hiding secret message in the cover biosignal.
We introduce several performance evaluation criteria in this section and connect them with
the questions mentioned above. Later, we try to answer the questions in Section IV-B for
evaluating the performance of our proposed method.
2.5.1 Reversibility
The reversibility of a biosignal steganography method be the error rate in the reconstructed
biosignal with respect to cover biosignal after performing the extraction procedure. A biosignal
steganography method can be called as reversible if the error rate is exactly 0%.







where, e is the number of samples that are changed after reconstruction and p is the total
number of samples in a cover biosignal.
2.5.2 Reliability
The reliability of a stegnaography method is determined by checking if the embedded message
in the cover medium can be extracted without any error [22]. Bit Error Rate (Rateb) measures
the reliability which is the percentage of erroneous bits in the extracted message. The formula





where btotal is the total number of bits and berr is the number of erroneous bits in secret
message. A biosignal steganography method is reliable if Rateb = 0%.
2.5.3 Stego Data Effectiveness
The effectiveness of stego data can be measured by comparing the level of distortion in cover
biosignal and stego biosignal [22, 1]. The percent of root-mean-square difference (PRD) mea-
sures the level of distortion between two biosignals as follows [22, 1]:
PRD =
√∑p





where xi and x˜i are i-th samples of cover and stego biosignal, respectively; and p represents the
number of samples in both biosignals. The effectiveness of a steganography method represents
its imperceptibility. Lower the value of PRD of stego biosignal would be, the effectiveness or
imperceptibility of steganography would be higher.
2.6 Experimental Results
2.6.1 Datasets
We use three types of biosignals in our experiments to evaluate the efficacy of our proposed
steganography methods. The types include ECG, PPG, and EEG. We use ECG, PPG and
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EEG signal dataset from Physionet repository [91]. The Physionet repository is funded by the
National Health Institute (U.S.) and provides free access to their large collections of recorded
biosignals through their website.
In this section, we conduct several experiments for demonstrating the performance of both
of our proposed steganography methods. We choose patient personal information as the secret
message of different lengths. The length of the secret message is measured in bits. Our
experiment has the following main steps: (1) checking reversibility of the cover biosignal,
(2) checking the reliability of the secret message, and (3) checking the effectiveness of stego
data. Biosignals of variable lengths (i.e., number of samples) are used in our experiments. We
develop a Java-based application for executing our experiments using JDK 1.8. Experiments
are conducted in an Intel Core i7-4790 CPU 3.60 GHz Personal Computer with 8 GB RAM. We
demonstrate the experimentals results and discussion on the results in two seperate subsections
under this section.
2.6.2 Analysis on Experimental Results
2.6.2.1 Hamming Code based Lossless Biosignal Steganography
It is mentioned earlier that our Hamming Code based Lossless Biosignal Steganography algo-
rithm chooses three parameters r, k and n. We choose the value of r = 3. Hence, the value
of k and n becomes 4 and 7, respectively. The results of our experiments are summarized as
follows. (1) Table 2.2 shows the reversibility of our proposed steganography method for eight
different biosignals of variable lengths. (3) PRD results of stego and extracted signals for five
different biosignals are presented in Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. PRD is measured with respect to
the corresponding cover biosignal. (4) Table 2.6 presents BER of the retrieved secret message
(patient personal information in our experiment) after performing the extraction procedure.
The table shows BER for different secret messages that are hidden within ECG, PPG and EEG
signals. (5) Figure 2.8 illustrates three states of a biosignals: cover biosignal, stego biosignal
and reconstructed biosignal.
Table 2.2 exhibits that our proposed method has ErrRate = 0% in reconstructed biosignals
for ECG, PPG and EEG signals. Therefore, our proposed method is fully reversible or lossless
Experimental Results 54
biosignal steganography method. The level of distortion of stego and reconstructed signals are
measured in terms of percent of root-mean-square difference (PRD). The PRD of stego signals
generated by our proposed methods for ECG is < 0.01%, PPG is < 0.00001%, and EEG is
< 0.001%. Hence, the level of distortion between the original biosignal and corresponding
stego signal is very negligible. In other words, the values of PRD clearly presents that our
proposed steganography method has a negligible impact on the original biosignal (i.e. cover
biosignal). As a result, our proposed method provisions the privacy and authenticity of patient
secret information in a robust way. The PRD of reconstructed signals by our method is always
0% for all of the ECG, PPG and EEG signals. The result demonstrates the reversibility
of the proposed method as well. We can see from Table 2.6 that the BER of the retrieved
secret message is always 0%. Hence, the extraction process of our proposed steganography
method is reliable. In Figure 2.8(a), three types of cover biosignal are shown. Figure at the
top is the original ECG signal, the original PPG signal is in the middle, and the original
EEG signal is given at the bottom in Figure 2.8(a). The stego ECG, PPG, and EEG signals
are shown at the top, in the middle and at the bottom, respectively. Figure 2.8(b) exhibits
that the characteristics of the corresponding biosignal are maintained in the stego biosignals.
It is extremely difficult to distinguish between an original biosignal and it’s corresponding
stego biosignal. Hence, the imperceptibility of our proposed lossless biosignal steganography
approach is very high. Figure 2.8(c) presents the reconstructed biosignals in order: ECG, PPG
and EEG.
To the best of our knowledge, our proposed method is the first reversible biosignal steganog-
raphy method. However, the research work [22, 1] are closely related to our work. The work
in [22] hides patient sensitive information in ECG signal using wavelet transformation. Walsh-
Hadamard transformation is used to hide patient sensitive data within vivid biosignals (ECG,
PPG, and EEG) in the [1]. Both the work focus on privacy preservation and authenticity by
lowering the level of distortion in stego biosignal. However, the aforementioned works fail to
reconstruct the cover biosignal. PRD of reconstructed signal is < 1% for both approaches.
On the other hand, we focus on the reversibility of biosignal in our steganography method.
We propose a lossless or reversible biosignal steganography approach where mobile device’s
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of PRD in stego biosignals between our proposed method and the
work in [1] : (a) ECG signal, (b) PPG signal, and (c) EEG signal
identification is hidden as an error in biosignal samples. Hamming Code-based error correction
method is used to correct errors. Secret information is extracted and biosignal is reconstructed
after correcting the error. Earlier, we have demonstrated that our approach can retrieve secret
message without any error and reconstruct the biosignal in a fully reversible way. The PRD
of reconstructed biosignal in our proposed approach is 0% at all time. Thus, our approach
outperforms research works in [22] and [1]. As the work in [1] outperforms the work in [22]
in terms of PRD, we compare the PRD of stego biosignals for our proposed method with the
work in [1] (see Figure 2.5). The level of distortions in stego biosignals are very less (ECG is
< 0.01%, PPG is < 0.00001%, and EEG is < 0.001%) for our proposed method.
Therefore, stego biosignal can be used for normal tasks, such as diagnosis, without revealing
patient secret information. Moreover, our proposed method uses the stego key that is only
known by the sender (e.g. wearable sensors) and the receiver (e.g. hospitals). Our approach
uses pseudo-random functions to select tagging locations. As a result, cracking probability of
our proposed method is very less. Our proposed method performs matrix multiplication to
encode and decode biosignal. Hence, the run-time complexity of our approach is O(n2).
2.6.2.2 Extended Golay Code based Biosignal Stegnaogrpahy
The results of our experiments are summarized as follows. (1) Table 2.7 shows the reversibility
of our proposed steganography method for eight different biosignals of variable lengths. (2)
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Table 2.2: Error Rate (ErrRate) of Reconstructed Biosignal in the Proposed Steganography
Method for ECG, PPG and EEG Data (Secret message size, q = 608 bits)
ECG PPG EEG
Serial No. No. of Samples(p) ErrorRate(%) N0. of Samples(p) ErrorRate(%) No. of Samples(p) ErrorRate(%)
1 7000 0 2560 0 1000 0
2 6500 0 1800 0 1000 0
3 10000 0 1900 0 1000 0
4 5000 0 2000 0 1000 0
5 1000 0 1650 0 1000 0
6 10000 0 2200 0 1000 0
7 8000 0 1500 0 1000 0
8 7500 0 2500 0 1000 0
Table 2.3: The PRD Results for ECG Signal











Table 2.4: The PRD Results for PPG Signal











PRD results of stego and extracted signals for five different biosignals are presented in Tables
2.8, 2.9 and 2.10. PRD is measured with respect to corresponding cover biosignal. (3) Table
2.11 presents the BER of the retrieved secret message (patient personal information in our
experiment) after performing the extraction procedure. The table shows BER for different
secret messages that are hidden within ECG, PPG, and EEG signals. Finally, (4) Fig.-2.9
compares the PRD of our proposed method and the work in [1]. We denote our method as
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Table 2.5: The PRD Results for EEG Signal











GECC and the work in [1] as WHBS.
Table 2.7 exhibits that our proposed method has Rateerr = 0% in reconstructed biosignals
for ECG, PPG and EEG signals. Therefore, our proposed method is fully reversible or lossless
biosignal steganography method. The level of distortion of stego and reconstructed signals are












128 0 0 0
256 0 0 0
512 0 0 0
768 0 0 0
1024 0 0 0
Table 2.7: Error Rate (Rateerr) of Reconstructed Biosignal in the Proposed Steganography
Method for ECG, PPG and EEG Data (Secret message size, q = 608 bits)
ECG PPG EEG
Serial No. No. of Samples(p) ErrorRate(%) N0. of Samples(p) ErrorRate(%) No. of Samples(p) ErrorRate(%)
1 7000 0 2560 0 1000 0
2 6500 0 1800 0 1000 0
3 10000 0 1900 0 1000 0
4 5000 0 2000 0 1000 0
5 1000 0 1650 0 1000 0
6 10000 0 2200 0 1000 0
7 8000 0 1500 0 1000 0
8 7500 0 2500 0 1000 0
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Figure 2.6: Three states of biomedical signals: (a) original signal, (b) stego signal, and (c)
reconstructed signal
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2.7: Comparison of reconstructed biosignals with respect to original biosignals: (a) orig-
inal vs reconstructed ECG, (b) original vs reconstructed PPG, and (c) original vs reconstructed
EEG.
measured in terms of percent of root-mean-square difference (PRD). Fig.-2.7 shows a visual




Figure 2.8: Comparison of imperceptibility of stego biosignals with respect to original biosignals
for 608 and 1024 bits secret messages. (a) original vs stego ECG (608 bits), (b) original vs
stego PPG (608 bits), (c) original vs stego EEG (608 bits), (d) original vs stego ECG (1024
bits), (e) original vs stego PPG (1024 bits), and (f) original vs stego EEG (1024 bits).
Table 2.8: The PRD Results for ECG Signal











signals using our proposed method.
The PRD of stego signals generated by our proposed methods for ECG is < 0.01% (see
Table 2.8), PPG is < 0.00001% (see Table 2.9), and EEG is < 0.001% (see Table 2.10). Hence,
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Table 2.9: The PRD Results for PPG Signal











Table 2.10: The PRD Results for EEG Signal
























128 0 0 0
256 0 0 0
512 0 0 0
768 0 0 0
1024 0 0 0
the level of distortion between the original biosignal and corresponding stego signal is very
negligible. In other words, the values PRD clearly presents that our proposed steganography




Figure 2.9: Comparison of distortions or PRDs (in %) of stego biosignals. PRDs when secret
data with different lengths are embedded: (a) ECG Stego signals (608 bits), (b) PPG Stego
signals (608 bits), (c) EEG Stego signals (608 bits), (d) ECG Stego signals (1024 bits), (e)
PPG Stego signals (1024 bits), and (f) EEG Stego signals (1024 bits).
our proposed method provisions the privacy and authenticity of secret patient information in
a robust way. Figure 2.8 visually illustrates the imperceptibility of our proposed method for
randomly chosen ECG, PPG, and EEG signals and two different secret messages of size 608
and 1024 bits.
We can see from Table 2.11 that the Rateb of retrieved secret message is always 0%. Hence,
the extraction process of our proposed steganography method is reliable.
To the best of our knowledge, our proposed method is the first reversible biosignal steganog-
raphy method. However, the research work [22, 1] are closely related to our work. The work
in [22] hides patient sensitive information in ECG signal using wavelet transformation. Walsh-
Hadamard transformation is used to hide patient sensitive data within vivid biosignals (ECG,
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PPG, and EEG) in the [1]. Both the work focus on privacy preservation and authenticity by
lowering the level of distortion in stego biosignal. However, the aforementioned works fail to
reconstruct the cover biosignal. PRD of the reconstructed signal is < 1% for both approaches.
On the other hand, we focus on the reversibility of biosignal in our steganography method.
We propose a reversible biosignal steganography approach where secret patient information is
hidden as the error in biosignal samples. Extended Binary Golay Code-based error correction
method is used to correct errors. Secret information is extracted, and biosignal is reconstructed
after correcting the error. Earlier, we have demonstrated that our approach can retrieve secret
message without any error and reconstruct the biosignal in a fully reversible way. The PRD
of reconstructed biosignal in our proposed approach is 0% at all time. Thus, our approach
outperforms research works in [22] and [1]. PRD comparisons of the method WHBS [1] and
GECC (our proposed method) are shown in Figure 2.9 for ECG, PPG and EEG signals. It is
shown in Figure 2.9, distortion rates in stego biosignals are very less (ECG is < 0.01%, PPG is
< 0.00001%, and EEG is < 0.001%). Therefore, stego biosignal can be used for normal tasks,
such as diagnosis, without revealing secret patient information. Our proposed method uses a
stego key that is only known by the sender (e.g., wearable sensors) and the receiver (e.g., hospi-
tals). Our approach uses pseudo-random functions to select embedding locations. As a result,
cracking probability of our proposed method is very less. Our proposed method performs the
linear computation to encode and decode biosignal. Therefore, the run-time complexity of our
approach is O(n).
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, the first research question has been addressed to develop a lossless steganogra-
phy method for numerical data based on Error-correcting codes (ECC). Existing steganography
approaches for numerical data are irreversible and cannot be used for preserving the privacy of
data in the edge computing. This chapter presents two approaches for lossless steganography
approaches for numerical data that is time-series data originated from sensors. As numerical
data, we have used different types of biosignals, such as ECG, EEG, and PPG. In the first
approach, the Hamming Code based ECC was used to hide a single bit of sensitive information
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randomly within an element of the numerical time-series data. In the second approach, the
Extended Golay Code based ECC is used to hide three bits of sensitive information within an
element of the numerical time-series data for improving the data hiding capacity. Hamming
code and Extended Golay Code based error correction techniques were used for correcting er-
rors to reconstruct the biosignal in the first and second methods, respectively. At the time of
error correction, the secret bits are retrieved from the error bits. The pseudo-random sequence
was used to increase the security of the proposed methods by decreasing the cracking prob-
ability. Our approaches demonstrated the lossless characteristics or reversibility by means of
0% error rate and PRD in the reconstructed biosignal. Additionally, 0% BER in the retrieved
secret message justified that our approach was reliable. Overall, we can state that our proposed
biosignal steganography methods overcome research challenges raised by numerical data hiding
techniques.
Chapter 3
Lossless Steganography for Textual
Data
Textual data is a prevalent data type that is produced by several smart city applications (e.g.,
social networks and online blogs) and healthcare researches. In order to provide realtime
services to users, textual data can be stored at the edges of the network. We presented lossless
steganography approaches for numerical data in Chapter 2 that can be used to provide privacy
in the edge computing. As it is mentioned earlier, steganography approaches are data type-
specific, steganography methods discussed in the previous chapter are not applicable to textual
data. Therefore, we present a lossless steganography approach for textual data in this chapter
with regards to the second research question, as stated in Section 1.4.
To develop lossless steganography method for textual data, we choose two types of textual
data: Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) sequence and normal text. Text-Based steganography is
challenging since a slight modification in text content can be easily discovered [64]. Hence,
the imperceptibility of text data is very poor. The DNA data, the key molecule in biology,
can be considered as a text data when converted into digital form. DNA structure encodes
all the information needed to create and describe the chemical machinery of living things
[92, 93]. Hence, DNA sequence plays a vital role in healthcare, especially in the identification
of Emerging Infectious Diseases (EIDs) [94] research.
A DNA sequence includes four nucleotides: adenine (A), thymine (T), cytosine (C), and
64
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guanine (G). When a DNA sequence is stored in digital format, it is a collection of multiple ’A’,
’T’, ’C’ and ’G’. Hence, the content of a DNA sequence looks like texts. Though DNA sequence
data contains English alphabets (’A’, ’T’, ’C’, and ’G’), the text steganography methods are not
applicable as DNA sequence only contains four characters. Hence, hiding secret information
within DNA data is easily detectable by an attacker. Furthermore, the experts have pointed
out that more than 99% of human DNA sequences are the same across the population [95].
Therefore, if a large number of nucleotides are modified or the length of the DNA sequence is
overextended, hackers can detect that the DNA sequence is different from the original sequence.
From that need, we proposed two different steganography methods for DNA and text data in
this chapter.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 describes the motivations and
contributions. Section 3.2 summarizes the related works on DNA and text steganography
approaches. The detail of our proposed DNA steganography approach in Section 3.3. Section
3.4 describes the text steganography approach. Section 3.5 and 3.6 presents experimental
evaluations and the results of proposed DNA and text steganography, respectively. Finally,
Section 3.7 summarizes this chapter.
3.1 Motivation and Contribution
Exiting methods on DNA steganography [42, 43, 44, 67, 68, 69, 70, 96] can be classified into
three major groups [97]: insertion based, substitution based and complementary rules based.
Insertion based DNA steganography methods [70, 96] divide the reference sequence and secret
message into multiple segments. Next, secret message segments are hidden inside the reference
DNA sequence segments without overlapping. The complementary pair method [67, 68] cre-
ates multiple segments from the secret messages. Complementary pairs for all of the segments
of secret messages are generated based on a complementary rule. The length of each pair is
longer than the longest complimentary pair in the selected sequence. Complementary pairs are
embedded within the DNA sequence for creating a stego DNA sequence. The same comple-
mentary rule is used to retrieve the secret message. The substitution method [43, 44, 68, 69, 70]
substitutes a DNA nucleotide base with a secret message bit. A specific complementary rule is
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used for the substitution. In all of the aforementioned DNA steganography methods, a sender
of the communication needs to send the original DNA sequence used in the hiding process with
the stego DNA sequence to the receiver. Hence, these approaches are un-blind. This reduces
system security as it can be revealed. Moreover, sending a reference DNA sequence is not prac-
tical for managing ownership of DNA sequence. Therefore, existing methods are not usable for
preserving the privacy of sensitive information related to DNA data in edge computing.
We summarize the main research motivations behind lossless DNA steganography technique
as follows:
• Correctness of DNA sequence data is very important in healthcare systems as the results
of the analysis of DNA sequence are used for diagnosis and prevention of diseases. Ex-
isting techniques fail to demonstrate a lossless DNA steganography approach without a
reference DNA sequence. Therefore, a lossless or reversible DNA steganography approach
needs to be proposed that is compatible with healthcare systems.
• Existing DNA steganography approaches require cover DNA sequence to send as refer-
ence. In other words, existing work on DNA steganography is not blind approaches. It is
impractical to send a DNA sequence as a reference to the user of edge computing based
smart healthcare systems. Hence, a blind DNA steganography technique is required.
• The security strength of a DNA steganography techniques should be higher so that an
adversary can not guess the hidden message within cover DNA sequence data.
We summarize the main research motivations behind lossless DNA steganography technique
as follows:
• Research works in [98, 99] converts the text files into digital images and embed secret
message by adjusting the spacing of letters, words, or lines. As a result, the text file
cannot be modified later.
• The work in [39] hides a secret message as an invisible character in Microsoft Word file.
The work is not applicable to other text formats. Moreover, embedding secret message
increases the size of the stego text file than a cover text file.
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• Few compression based techniques are proposed in [66, 64, 40, 41] that compress cover
text file before embedding. Imperceptibility of text cover file becomes very less if the
cover text file is compressed.
3.1.1 Contributions
The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
3.1.1.1 DNA Steganography
• A novel DNA sequence steganography method is proposed for providing privacy of user
sensitive information in the context of edge Computing based smart healthcare systems.
• A lossless DNA steganography scheme is proposed in this chapter that reconstructs the
original DNA sequence without any error.
• We propose a blind DNA steganography scheme for retrieving the secret information
from DNA sequence and reconstructing the original DNA sequence without any need of
reference DNA sequence.
• Cover DNA sequence is converted to a 2D matrix of nucleotides, and embedding locations
of segments of secret messages are determined based on pseudo-random sequences. The
number of the pseudo-random sequence is equal to (σ + 1), where σ is the number of
segments of secret message. Hence, predicting embedding locations becomes difficult by
an attacker.
• A set of parameters constitutes to form a stego key that is used by both embedding, and
extraction and reconstruction procedures. The stego key makes it difficult to retrieve
hidden information by guessing attack.
3.1.1.2 Text Steganography
• The Secret message is embedded as invisible characters. As a result, no alpha-numeric
characters in the stego text file are distorted. Therefore, the imperceptibility of the stego
text file becomes higher as the presence of secret message cannot be perceived.
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• Our proposed method successfully reconstructs the cover file after the extraction of the
secret message. Hence, our work is fully reversible or lossless.
• Sizes of the cover text file and stego text file are the same in our proposed method.
Therefore, the payload is zero in our method.
• The secret message is disguised using Huffman Code. Hence, the length of the secret
message is reduced and embedding capacity is improved.
3.2 Related Work
In the research literature, we discuss some of the key research works on DNA steganography
and text steganography approaches. Section 3.2.1 presents literature on DNA steganography
approaches. Research literature on text steganography are discussed in Section 3.2.2.
3.2.1 DNA Steganography
Research works in [42, 43, 44, 67, 68, 69, 70, 96] depend on sending the original DNA sequence
used in the hiding process with the faked one from the sender to the receiver. Hence, these
approaches are un-blind. Using un-blind DNA steganography approaches reduce system secu-
rity as the stego DNA sequence can be configured with the reference DNA sequence to reveal
sensitive secret information hidden within the stego DNA sequence. Works in [70, 96] expand
the original selected DNA reference sequence by dividing the secret message into segments and
insert each segment within the DNA reference sequence. This leads to an increase in the length
of the reference sequence.
Substitution based DNA steganography works are proposed in [43, 44, 68, 69, 70]. Large
parts of the original DNA reference sequence are substituted by the secret message in these
works. Additional information is also embedded within the reference sequence for the receiver
to be able to extract the secret message. This leads to high modification and attracts attention
to the secret message.
Research works in [42, 44, 68, 69, 70] hide the secret message in a DNA reference se-
quence without preserving the biological properties of the DNA sequence. It might satisfy the
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steganography purpose, but the modified DNA cannot be returned to a living organism due to
the missing something of its functionality after the hiding process.
The proposed steganography method in [44] increases the security but with sending many
data to the receiver to be able to extract the secret message. However, the size of data to be
sent is increased with the increment of the size of the secret message. As a result, the whole
secret message or part of it may be discovered by an intruder.
3.2.2 Text Steganography
Several text-based steganography schemes have been proposed to date. We describe some of
the recent research works related to text steganography approaches. Research works in [98, 99]
converts the text files into digital images first. Later, the secret message is embedded by
moderately adjusting the spacing of letters, words, or lines. The disadvantage of converting
text files into images is that the texts in the cover file cannot be modified further once converted
into images.
A degenerating document content-based text steganography method is discussed in [65].
Text segments are degenerated by inferior writing. Next, the document is revised using change
tracking in Microsoft Word documents. The secret message is embedded in the change tracking,
and the stego file is sent to the receiver. The receiver extracts the secret information by using
change tracking in Microsoft Word documents. The limitation of this approach is that a
large amount of editing rules needs to be stored. Moreover, the hiding capacity is very low.
Another document-based work in [39] that is referred as UniSpaCh. The work embeds secret
information in the Microsoft Word document. UniSpaCh considers a combination of inter-
word, inter-sentence, end-of-line, and inter-paragraph spacing to embed secret information in a
document. In UniSpaCh, a two bits combination of secret information is replaced by a Unicode
space character and embedded in the cover document. The mapping of bit combinations and
Unicode space characters are shared as a key prior to the communication. In order to improve
the security of the steganography method, the secret information is encrypted before data
embedding. However, this approach cannot be used for other text file formats. Additionally,
embedding secret messages increases the size of the stego text file than a cover text file.
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Compression based text steganographic methods are addressed in [66, 64, 40, 41]. The
work in [66] hides the secret message in the compression codes using the Lempel-Ziv-Welch
(LZW) method. This scheme embeds secret data in the LZW compression codes by reducing
symbol length. Another research work in [64] proposed a lossless text steganography method
by Huffman Compression Coding. A modified Huffman Coding, named variable Huffman
coding, is used in this work to generate codewords for symbols in the cover file. Secret data
is then embedded in the codewords. Research works in [40] and [41] use LZW and Huffman
code based compression techniques, respectively. Email is considered a cover medium. A
secret message is embedded in texts of the email body from the previously constructed text
database. Later, email is compressed to produce stego text. The aforementioned compression
based steganography methods compress the cover file to increase embedding capacity and
reduce transmission cost. However, the disadvantage of the compressing cover file is that the
imperceptibility of the stego file is very poor. As a result, the stego file becomes more prone to
attack. Moreover, codewords need to be recalculated if the content of the cover file is changed.
3.3 Lossless and Blind DNA Steganography
We describe our proposed lossless DNA steganography method for providing data privacy in
this section. A brief idea of the DNA sequence is provided in this section before discussing
the proposed methodology. The DNA sequence in text format that is generated by a DNA
sequencer is considered as cover DNA sequence in this methodology. Additionally, we refer to
the data owner’s secret information as secret message.
3.3.1 Preliminaries
The structure of DNA was first presented without error by Watson and Francis Crick in 1953.
They claimed that a DNA molecule contains two long polynucleotide chains. Each polynu-
cleotide chain in the DNA molecule is known as a DNA chain or DNA strand. The DNA
strand is made of simple subunits, known as nucleotides. Every nucleotide composed of a
sugar-phosphate molecule with a nitrogen-containing base. There are four types of bases that
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corresponds to four distinct nucleotides: adenine, guanine, cytosine, and thymine. The base
adenine is labeled as ‘A’, guanine is labeled as ‘G’, cytosine is labeled as ‘C’, and thymine is
labeled as ‘T’[93]. DNA sequencing is the process of representing the exact order of nucleotides
within a DNA molecule. DNA sequences can be stored as a computer-readable file format for
analysis. File formats for DNA sequences can be a plain sequence, FASTQ, EMBL, FASTA,
GCG, GCG-RSF, GenBank, and IG. The aforementioned file formats may contain only Inter-
national Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) characters (i.e., A, C, T, G). Other
characters are skipped during parsing by a DNA sequence analysis tool.
3.3.2 Notations
In this section we summarize the key notations that are used in our methodology. The key
notations are as follows:
• C: a vector representation of a cover DNA sequence. Each element of the vector is a
nucleotide.
• l: the number of nucleotides in cover DNA sequence.
• M : a secret message that is hidden inside cover DNA sequence.
• n: the length of M .
• C: a vector representation of a stego DNA sequence. Each element of the vector is a
nucleotide.
• l′ : the number of nucleotides in stego DNA sequence.
• H: 2D matrix representation of C.
• α: a pseudo-random sequence generator seed.
• F (α): pseudo-random sequence generator function to select random rows in H.
• P : a pseudo-random sequence generated by F (α). Each element ps ∈ P points to a row
of H.
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• G(ps): pseudo-random sequence generator function to select random columns of psth row
in H.
• Qps : a pseudo-random sequence generated by G(ps). Each element qi ∈ QPs points to a
column of psth row of H.
• (Eˇ): a one-time binary string.
• SR: a set of substitution rule
• Mx: the extracted secret message.
• Cx: Reconstructed DNA sequence.
3.3.3 Methodology
Assume that we have a cover DNA sequence C = {c1, c2, . . . , cl}, where l is the number of
nucleotides in cover DNA sequence. We have a secret message M in binary format. The secret
message M is denoted as M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn}, where n is the number of bits in M . A stego
DNA sequence C is generated by embedding M into C. The stego DNA sequence C is denoted
as C = {c1, c2, . . . , cl′}, where l
′
is the number of nucleotides in C and l < l
′
.
The proposed steganography scheme has two main steps: (1) data hiding procedure, and (2)
extraction and reconstruction procedure. The data hiding procedure hides secret message inside
cover DNA sequence (C) and produces stego DNA sequence (C). In this work, we use a set of
rules for hiding a secret message into a cover DNA sequence. We explain the hiding rules later
in this section. The extraction process extracts the secret message and reconstructs the cover
DNA sequence using the same set of rules that are used during the hiding procedure. Detail
discussions of the aforementioned steps of our proposed lossless DNA sequence steganography
are given in the following subsections.
3.3.3.1 Data Hiding Procedure
Bits of secret message are embedded in H in this procedure. At the first step, C is divided
into n segments. The length of a segment bl/nc. If l is not fully divisible, then the number
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of segments is (n + 1), where length of last segment is (l − n · bl/nc), where (l − n · bl/nc) <
bl/nc. We call the last segment as tail (T ). If (l − n · bl/nc) = 0, then T = ∅. Otherwise,
T = {cn·bl/nc+1, cn·bl/nc+2, . . . , cl−1, cl}. A 2D matrix H of nucleotides is created with n rows
and bl/nc columns. Here, x-th row of H is the x-th segment of C (1 ≤ x ≤ n) and y-th column




h11 h12 . . . h1·bl/nc





hn1 hn2 . . . hn·bl/nc

At the second step, M is fragmented into σ number of segments such that σ = n/b, where
b is the size of a segment and divides n (i.e., b|n). Here, the value of b is between 2 and
bl/nc, inclusive (i.e., 2 ≤ b ≤ bl/nc). Therefore, M can be represented in terms of segments as
M = M1 •M2 • . . . •Mσ.
At the third step, a one-time binary string (Eˇ) is generated. The objective of using Eˇ is
to increase the randomness of embedding procedure. The length of Eˇ is n-bit that is equal to
length of secret message (M). Eˇ is fragmented into σ segments: Eˇ = Eˇ1 • Eˇ2 • . . . Eˇσ.
At the fourth step, a pseudo-random sequence P with σ elements is created using a pseudo-
random sequence generator function F (α). Here, α is the seed of the function F for generating
P . Formally, P is denoted as P = F (α) = {ps|1 ≤ ps ≤ n, 1 ≤ s ≤ σ}. For each ps ∈ P ,
a pseudo-random sequence Qps with b/2 elements is created using a pseudo-random number
generator function G(ps). Here, ps is used as seed of the function G. Qps can be denoted as
Qps = {q1, q2, . . . , q b
2
}. An element qi(1 ≤ i ≤ b2) indicate qi-th column of ps-th row of H. An
overview of this step is represented in Figure 3.1.
At the fifth step, a substitution rule (SR) is created for embedding secret message into
H. According to the substitution rule, each type of nucleotide is assigned a unique two bit
binary code. An example of SR is presented in Table 3.1. In order to embed s-th segment
Ms(1 ≤ s ≤ σ) of M , multiple columns from ps-th row of H are selected pointed by Qps . Next,
an empty set R is created. The set R is called payload. The b/2 number of nucleotides of
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columns of ps-th row of H pointed by Qps are appended in R. Afterwards, a b-bit codeword
(Ws) is generated by substituting nucleotides of columns pointed by Qps of ps-th row of H by
their corresponding binary codes. Later, Ws is produced using following function:
Ws = f(Ms,Ws, Eˇs) (3.1)
where, f is the embedding function and f(Ms,Ws, Eˇs) = Ms ⊕Ws ⊕ Eˇs. Here, ⊕ is exclusive-
OR (XOR) operator. Every two bits of Ws is substituted by corresponding nucleotide and a
string of nucleotides is obtained. Subsequently, qi-th nucleotide of ps-th row in H is replaced
by qi-th nucleotide of W s. As a result, Ms is embedded in ps-th row of H. After repeating
the aforementioned steps of the fourth step for all of the σ segments, M is embedded in H.
Additionally, we get the payload R with (σ · b2) nucleotides. As the value of σ is nb , the number
of elements in R is (nb · b2) = n2 (i.e., |R| = n2 ).
At the final step, H is transformed into a vectorH1D of nucleotides by appending consecutive
rows of H starting from the first row till n-th row. Finally, append R and T with H1D to obtain
C. Here, C is the stego DNA sequence. The steps of obtaining C is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
The length l
′
of C becomes: l
′




2) = l +
n
2 .
Algorithm 5 and 6 summarize our proposed data hiding procedure in a formal way. Al-
gorithm 5 represents how secret message is hidden into cover DNA sequence. Cover DNA
Sequence (C) with l nucleotides, Secret message (M) with n bits, one-time Key (Eˇ), pseudo-
random Sequence generator seed (α) and block size (b) are used as input for Algorithm 5.
A Set of Codewords (CW ) is the main outcome of Algorithm 5. In addition, the algorithm
produces intermediate results, such as 2D-matrix H, Payload and tail, that are used as input
for Algorithm 6. Steps for generating stego DNA sequence from set of codewords are formally
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Figure 3.1: Hiding Phase of Embedding Procedure: (a) illustrates nucleotide selection for the
row pointed by an element p2 of pseudo-random sequence Pα and pseudo-random sequence Qp2 ,
(b) demonstrates how codeword is generated from selected nucleotides in (a) using substitution
rule, and (c) represent how combined codeword is used to produce stego DNA sequence and
payload (R).
presented in Algorithm 6. The set of codewords, 2D-matrix H, Payload and tail are passed
to Algorithm 6 as input. Output of the algorithm is stego DNA sequence C.
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Figure 3.2: Stego DNA Sequence (C) Generation Phase of Embedding Procedure
3.3.3.1.1 Generation of Stego Key
A stego key K is constructed at the end of embedding procedure in order to extract secret
message and reconstruct cover text file. Formally, stego key is defined as a tuple: K =<
M, l, b, α, SR, Eˇ >, where
• M is the secret message,
• l is the length of cover DNA sequence,
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Algorithm 5: Hiding Secret Message into Cover DNA Sequence and Generate A Set
of Codewords
Input: Cover DNA Sequence (C) with l nucleotides, Secret Message (M) with n bits,
One-time Key (E), Pseudo-random Sequence generator seed (α), Block Size
(b)
Output: A Set of Codewords (CW )
1 begin
2 Get 2D-Matrix H from C with n rows and b lnc columns
3 if l is divisible by n then
4 tail = ∅
5 else






by fragmenting M and E into nb segments, respectively
9 Generate a Pseudo-random Sequence P using α with nb elements such that
P = {pi|1 ≤ pi ≤ n, 1 ≤ i ≤ nb }
10 for i = 1 to nb
11 Generate a Pseudo-random Sequence Q using Pi with
b
2 elements
12 Payload = ∅
13 for j = 1 to b2
14 if (H[Pi][Qj ] = A) then
15 binCode = concatenate(binCode,”01”)
16 else if (H[Pi][Qj ] = C) then
17 binCode = concatenate(binCode,”10”)
18 else if (H[Pi][Qj ] = G) then
19 binCode = concatenate(binCode,”11”)
20 else if (H[Pi][Qj ] = T ) then
21 binCode = concatenate(binCode,”00”)
22 end if
23 Insert value at H[Pi][Qj ] to current location of Payload
24 end for




• b is the length of a segment of the secret message,
• α is the seed for generating pseudo-random sequence,
• SR is the dynamic substitution rule of nucleotides,
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Algorithm 6: Generation of Stego DNA sequence
Input: 2D-Matrix H, Set of Codewords (CW ), Payload, tail
Output: Stego DNA Sequence C
1 begin
2 for i = 1 to CW.length
3 for k = 1 to (cwi.length)/2
4 from = k;
5 to = k + 1;
6 if (subString(cwi, from, to) = ”01”) then
7 H[Pi][Qk] = A
8 else if (subString(cwi, from, to) = ”10”) then
9 H[Pi][Qk] = C
10 else if (subString(cwi, from, to) = ”11”) then
11 H[Pi][Qk] = G
12 else if (subString(cwi, from, to) = ”00”) then
13 H[Pi][Qk] = T
14 end if
15 k = k + 1;
16 end for
17 end for
18 Convert H into 1D-Array C by appending each row of H sequentially
19 Append payload to the end of C
20 Append tail to the end of C to get stego DNA sequence C
21 end
Figure 3.3: Illustration of the stego key size
• Eˇ is the one-time binary string.
The size of the stego key mainly depends on α and Eˇ. In general, the α is a large positive
integer. The size of Eˇ depends on the size of M . As stated earlier, the size of Eˇ is equal to
the size of M . In our proposed method, we replace a nucleotide with a two-bit binary code.
Hence, the SR contains eight bits for four nucleotides. The other parameters are standard
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integer values. Therefore, each of them is 32 bits long. An illustration of the stego key is
provided in Figure. 3.3. Here, we choose M as a 1024 bit message, α is a 64 bit integer and Eˇ
as a 1024 bit binary string. Therefore, the total size of the stego key becomes 2184 bits.
3.3.3.2 Extraction and Reconstruction Procedure
Unlike embedding procedure, extraction procedure follows several steps. Assume that the re-
ceived stego DNA sequence is C. Sender privately shares the stego key K =< l, n, b, α, SR, Eˇ >
with receiver. At the first step, fragment of stego DNA sequence that contains hidden message
(Ce), tail (T ) and payload (P ) are obtained. From C, (b lnc · n) number of nucleotides from
the beginning are parsed to obtain Ce. Next, tail (T ) and payload (R) are obtained. In order
to obtain T , find the length of T first. Let, the length of stego DNA sequence (C) is l
′
. If
(l − n · b lnc) = 0, then T = ∅. Otherwise, T contains last (l
′ − n · b lnc) number of nucleotides
of C. Formally, T = {c(l′−(l−nk)), c(l′−(l−nk))+1, . . . , cl′−1, cl′}. Payload R can be obtained by
removing from (b lnc · n+ 1)-th to (l
′ − (l − nk)− 1)-th nucleotides of C.
At the second step, Ce is divided into n segments. The length of a segment is k such that
k = b lnc. A 2D matrix H of nucleotides is created with n rows and k columns. Here, x-th row
of H is the x-th segment of Ce(1 ≤ x ≤ n) and y-th column of x-th row is y-th nucleotide of
the x-th segment (1 ≤ y ≤ k). H can be represented as follows:
H =

h11 h12 . . . h1k





hn1 hn2 . . . hnk

At the third step, payload (R) is fragmented into σ segments such that σ = n/b, where b is
the length of a segment of secret message M . Hence, R can be denoted as R = R1•R2•. . .•Rσ.
As according to dynamic substitution rule (SR), a nucleotide is coded with two binary bits.
Therefore, number of nucleotides in one segment Rj(1 ≤ j ≤ σ) is b/2. Here, Rj can be
denoted as Rj = {Rj1, Rj2, . . . , Rj· b
2
}.
At the fourth step, a pseudo-random sequence P with σ elements is created using a pseudo-
random sequence generator function F (α). Here, α is the seed of the function F for generating
Lossless and Blind DNA Steganography 80
P . Formally, P is denoted as P = F (α) = {ps|1 ≤ ps ≤ n, 1 ≤ s ≤ σ}.
At the fifth step, secret message is retrieved and cover DNA sequence is reconstructed. For
this purpose, a pseudo-random sequence Qps with b/2 elements are generated for each ps in
P . A pseudo-random sequence generator function G(ps) is used. Here, ps is used as seed of
the function G. Qps can be denoted as Qps = {qs1, qs2, . . . , qs b
2
}. An element qi(1 ≤ i ≤ b2)
indicate qi-th column of ps-th row of H. An empty set Mx is created to hold extracted secret
message. Next, Eˇ is fragmented into σ segments: Eˇ = Eˇ1 • Eˇ2 • . . . Eˇσ. In order to extract
secret message, two b-bit codewords (Ws1) and (Ws2) are generated. The Ws1 is generated by
substituting nucleotides of columns pointed by Qps of ps-th row of H. On the other hand, Ws2
is generated by substituting nucleotides of s-th segment of R (i.e. Rs). Next, s-th segment of
secret message Ms is obtained as follows:
Ms = e(Ws1,Ws2, Eˇs) (3.2)
where, e is the extraction function and e(Ws1,Ws2, Eˇs) = Ws1 ⊕Ws2 ⊕ Eˇs. Here, ’⊕’ is XOR
operator. Ms is appended to Mx. In order to reconstruct ps-th row H, the nucleotide denoted
by qi of ps-th row (i.e. qsi) is replaced by i-th nucleotide of s-th segment of R (i.e. Rsi).
Finally, we get the extracted secret message Mx = M1 •M2 • . . .Ms(1 ≤ s ≤ σ).
At the last step, transform H into sequence of nucleotides Cx by appending consecutive
rows of H starting from the first row till n-th row. Next, append T with Cx. Hence, final cover




= nk+ |T |. If, T = ∅,
then l
′′
= nk + 0 = n · ln = l. Otherwise, l
′′
= nk + (l − nk) = l.
The steps of secret message extraction from stego DNA sequence and reconstruction of
cover DNA sequence are summarized in Algorithm 7. Stego DNA sequence (C) with length ls,
substitution rule (SR), one-time Key (Eˇ), pseudo-random sequence generator seed (α), block
Size (b), length of secret message (n) and length of cover DNA sequence (l) are provided as
input to Algorithm 7. The algorithm gives extracted secret message Mx and reconstructed
cover DNA sequence Cx as output.
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Algorithm 7: Extraction of Secret Message from Stego DNA Sequence and Recon-
struction of Cover DNA Sequence
Input: Secret Message (Mx), Cover DNA sequence (Cx)
Output: Airport taxi trip dataset Ax[...]
1 begin
2 Get the first b lnc nucleotides from C and construct 2D-Matrix H
3 Get tail as last (ls − n · b lnc) of C if l is not divisible by n. Otherwise, tail = ∅
4 Get nucleotides from (b ln · n+ 1c)-th to (ls − (l − nk)− 1)-th location of C to get
Payload
5 Fragment Payload into nb segments and create a set R such that
R = {ri|1 ≤ ri ≤ n, 1 ≤ i ≤ nb }





= {e′i|1 ≤ e
′
i ≤ n, 1 ≤ i ≤ nb }
7 Generate a Pseudo-random Sequence P using α with nb elements such that
P = {pi|1 ≤ pi ≤ n, 1 ≤ i ≤ nb }
8 Create an empty string Mx
9 fori = 1 to nb
10 Get binary string rbini of ri by converting each nucleotide of ri into binary
according to substitution rule (SR)
11 Generate a Pseudo-random Sequence Q using Pi as seed with
b
2 elements such
that Q = {qj |1 ≤ j ≤ b2}
12 For each j = 1 to b2 , convert the nucleotide at H[pi][qj ] to binary using
substitution rule (SR) and appending to a codeword cwj
13 Get a message block mBlocki by performing XOR operation among cwj , E
′
i , and
rbini , and append mBlocki to Mx




16 Mx is the extracted secret message
17 Convert H into a string Cx of nucleotides by concatenating each row of H
sequentially
18 Append tail to the end of Cx
19 end
3.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security strength of our proposed blind and reversible DNA
steganography method. For this purpose, we calculate the cracking probability of the proposed
steganography method. Cracking probability can be defined as the probability of the attacker’s
success in revealing the secret message for a specific algorithm. We investigate the cracking
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probability of our proposed method. We assume that the lengths of DNA sequence and secret
message are known to the attacker.
Let, the length of cover DNA sequence is l and secret message is n. The cover DNA sequence
is converted to a 2D matrix with n number of rows and b lnc numbers of columns. Let, the size
of a block of secret message is b such that 2 ≤ b ≤ n and b|n. The value of b is unknown to
attacker. Hence, the attacker may find the possible values of b. Possible values of b is equal
to the number of divisors of n. The number of divisors of n can be denoted as d(n). Hence,
b ∈ {b1, b2, . . . , bd(n)}. For any value of b, we get nb number of message blocks. Therefore,





















and derived as follows:
Y =




b ln − 1c!
2!(b ln − 1c − 2)!
(3.4)
We can calculate the number of ways a message of length n can be embedded in n×b lnc matrix
of DNA sequence from eq. (1) and (2) as follows:











b ln − 1c!
2!(b ln − 1c − 2)!
]
(3.5)
As the length of the secret message is n, there are 2n possible secret messages are available.
Hence, the number of possible solution to find secret message is W = Z.2n
Therefore, probability of making successful guess (i.e. cracking probability) for the secret





2! (b ln − 1c − 2)!









Therefore, the probability of cracking our proposed DNA steganography scheme by an attacker
is very less.
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3.5 Performance Analysis and Experimental Results
We discuss several metrics that are used for evaluating performance of our proposed DNA
steganography method in this section. Additionally, we demonstrate our experimental results
in this section.
3.5.1 Performance Analysis
We claim our proposed DNA steganography method is a reversible and blind DNA steganog-
raphy method. We need to answer the following questions to evaluate the performance of our
proposed method considering blindness and reversibility, respectively:
• Does the proposed method require any reference DNA sequence?
• Does the proposed method reconstruct cover DNA sequence fully after extraction of secret
message?
In extraction procedure, we discuss that our proposed method does not require any reference
DNA sequence. Therefore, we can claim that our proposed method is a blind DNA steganog-
raphy method. The reversibility of a steganography method can be measured by the error rate
in the reconstructed DNA sequence with respect to cover DNA sequence after performing the
extraction procedure. A DNA steganography method can be called as reversible or lossless if
the error rate is exactly 0%. The error rate (ErrRate) measures the rate of errors in recon-
structed DNA sequence. More clearly, error rate is a ratio between the number of nucleotides
that are changed after reconstruction of cover DNA sequence by removing secret message, and
total number of nucleotides in the cover DNA sequence. The error rate (ErrRate) is measured





where, err The number of nucleotides that are changed after reconstruction and l is the total
number of nucleotides in cover DNA sequence.
In addition to aforementioned performance evaluation metrics, we use steganography perfor-
mance metrics such as hiding capacity and Expansion Rate (ER). We define the hiding capacity
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(or simply capacity) of a DNA steganography method as the number of nucleotides that can be
used for embedding secret message bits. In our proposed method, the DNA sequence of length
l is divided into n segments, where n is the number of bits in secret message. If l is not fully
divisible, then the number of segments is (n+ 1), where length of last segment is (l−n · bl/nc)
and (l − n · bl/nc) < bl/nc. We call the last segment as tail (T ). Tail is not used for data
embedding. Only (n · bl/nc) nucleotides are used for data embedding. Hence, the capacity of
the proposed method can be represented by the following formula:
Capacity = n · bl/nc, (3.8)
The unit of hiding capacity is bit per nucleotide (bpn).
The expansion rate (ER) is a ratio between the difference of lengths (i.e number of nu-
cleotides) of stego DNA sequence and cover DNA sequence, and length of cover DNA sequence
[42]. We represent ER in (%). In our proposed method, the length of stego DNA sequence,
l
′
= (l + n2 ). Hence, the formula of ER can be illustrated as follows:
ER =














where, l is the number of nucleotides in cover DNA sequence and n is the number of bits in
secret message.
3.5.2 Experimental Results
A set of experiments is conducted to evaluate the performance of our proposed blind and
reversible DNA steganography method. Experiments are conducted in an Intel Core i7-4790
CPU 3.60 GHz Personal Computer with 8 GB RAM. Eight DNA sequences (see Table 3.2) are
used as cover DNA sequences in our experiments. Used DNA sequences are publicly available
and can be obtained by accessing the NCBI (National Center for Biotechnology Information)
database [100]. A JAVA Standard Edition (JSE) based software is developed to run experiments
on the aforementioned sample data.
Performance Analysis and Experimental Results 85
Table 3.2: Sample DNA Sequences that are used as Cover Medium
Locus Description No. of Nucleotides
AC153526 Mus musculus 10 BAC RP23-383C2 200,117
AC166252 Mus musculus 6 BAC RP23-100G10 149,884
AC167221 Mus musculus 10 BAC RP23-3P24 204,841
AC168874 Bos taurus clone CH240-209N9 206,488
AC168897 Bos taurus clone CH240-190B15 200,203
AC168901 Bos taurus clone CH240-18511 191,456
AC168907 Bos taurus clone CH240-19517 194,226
AC168908 Bos taurus clone CH240-195K23 218,028
We demonstrate the reversibility of our proposed method for all of the DNA samples men-
tioned in Table 3.3 and 3.4. We calculate the error rate (ErrRate) using Eq. 3.7. Initially,
we choose a fixed size secret message (i.e., n = 2000) and hide the secret message in different
DNA sequences. We exhibit results of experiments for the fixed size secret message in Table
3.3. Results show that the error rates of our proposed method are 0% for all of the DNA
sequences. Later, we take secret messages with different sizes and hide them in a particular
DNA sequence (locus = AC153526). We present experiment results for this scenario in Table
3.4. Results show that the error rates are always 0% regardless of the secret message size and
number of nucleotides of DNA sequences. Therefore, we claim that our proposed method is
fully reversible.
Table 3.3: The Error Rate of Proposed Method (Fixed secret message size, n = 2000 bits)









Table 3.5 demonstrates the capacity of our proposed scheme for aforementioned eight DNA
sequences using Eq. 3.8. Capacity is measured using Eq. 3.8. We use a secret message (M)
of size n = 2000 bits. From the result, we can see that capacity is more than 99% for most of
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Table 3.4: The Error Rate of Proposed Method (Fixed DNA sequence, locus=AC153526,
number of nucleotides = 200, 117)










Table 3.5: The Capacity of Proposed Method for Different DNA Samples (Secret Message size,
n = 2000bits)
Locus Number of Nucleotides (l) Capacity Capacity in %
AC153526 200,117 200000 99.94%
AC166252 149,884 148000 98.74%
AC167221 204,841 204000 99.58%
AC168874 206,488 206000 99.76%
AC168897 200,203 200000 99.89%
AC168901 191,456 190000 99.23%
AC168907 194,226 190000 97.82%
AC168908 218,028 218000 99.98%
Table 3.6 demonstrates the expansion rate (ER) of our proposed scheme for eight sample
DNA sequences mentioned above. Eq. 3.9 is used for calculating the ER. The expansion rate
of our proposed method depends on the size of the cover DNA sequence. Considering size of a
secret message (M) of size n = 20000 bits, we find maximum expansion rate is 0.6%.
The execution time of the proposed data hiding and data extraction algorithms are presented
in Table 3.7. We demonstrate the execution time in seconds for different DNA samples. We
hide a 2000 bits secret message (i.e. n = 2000 bits) in each of the DNA sample. From the
results, we can infer that the execution time depends on the size of the DNA sample if the
secret message size remains constant. Overall, the execution times are very less.
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Table 3.6: The Expansion Rate (ER) of Proposed Method (Secret Message size, n = 2000bits)









Table 3.7: The Execution Time of Proposed Algorithm for Different DNA Samples (Secret
Message size, n = 2000 bits)
Locus Number of Nucleotides (l) Execution Time (sec)
Data Hiding Data Extraction
AC153526 200,117 0.019 0.018
AC166252 149,884 0.014 0.012
AC167221 204,841 0.020 0.018
AC168874 206,488 0.021 0.019
AC168897 200,203 0.019 0.017
AC168901 191,456 0.017 0.015
AC168907 194,226 0.017 0.015
AC168908 218,028 0.024 0.023
A comparison of the proposed method is shown in Table 4.2 with two very closely related
works, [101] and [68]. It is shown in the comparison that our proposed method is lossless
and blind without depending on the public DNA database. However, the other two methods
[101] and [68] depend on the public DNA database. The cracking probability of our proposed
method is very less compared to the other two methods. Hence, the security of our proposed
method is very high. Our proposed method preserves the characteristics of a DNA sequence
like the other two methods. The data hiding capacity of our method is almost equal to the
length of a DNA sequence. On the other hand, the capacity is always one-third of the length
of a DNA sequence in methods [101] and [68]. Hence, the capacity of our method is better
than the works in [101] and [68]. The methods in [101] and [68] incur no expansion in a cover
DNA sequence. However, our proposed method has an expansion rate equal to n2l%, which
is very negligible. Moreover, the expansion in the cover DNA sequence is unrecognizable as
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Table 3.8: A comparison of the proposed method with closely related works
Criteria Our Method Method in [101] Method in [68]
Lossless Yes Yes Yes






















Capacity n.b lnc l3 l3
Expansion Rate n2l 0 0
our proposed method does not depend on the public DNA database. Therefore, the expansion
does not affect the method’s security.
3.6 Lossless and Highly Imperceptible Text Steganography
Approach
We discuss our proposed lossless text steganography approach in this section. We use the text
file as our cover medium. We assume that we have a text file H that has many characters.
Formally, H can be denoted as H = {h1, h2, . . . , hp}. A secret message M contains m binary
bits and denoted by M = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}. Our proposed scheme has three main steps: (1)
encoding secret message, (2) embedding encoded message into a cover text file, and (3) ex-
tracting encoded secret message and reconstruction of the cover text file. The aforementioned
steps of our proposed method are described in the following subsections.
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Figure 3.4: Generated Huffman Tree for Binary Secret Message
3.6.1 Encoding Secret Message
We use Huffman coding [102] to encode secret message M . Steps of encoding M are described
below:
• Step-1: Identify set of unique symbols S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} in M and corresponding
frequencies F = {f1, f2, . . . , fn}, where n is the number of unique symbols in M . In
order to do this, choose a positive integer d that divides the number of bits m in M
(i.e.,d|m) and 2 ≤ d ≤ m2 . Here, d determines the number of bits in a symbol. Therefore,
maximum value of n is 2d.
• Step-2: Sort elements si of S in increasing order according to their occurrence frequencies
fi in F , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• Step-3: Remove the two least frequent elements from S and make each element a leaf
node. Next, create a new node as a parent node of the two leaf nodes with a frequency
computed by summing the frequencies of its two child nodes. Two binary bits, 0 and 1,
are then assigned to the left edge and right edge of the new node, respectively.
• Step-4: Insert the new created node and its frequency into set S and F , respectively.
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• Step-5: Repeat Steps 2-4 until the root node is obtained. Hence, the Huffman tree is
generated.
• Step-6: Each symbol si is assigned a unique binary string (codeword) by traversing
the Huffman tree from the root node to each leaf node after constructing the Huffman
tree. Formally, the set of codewords is denoted by W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn}, where n is
the number of symbols as well as codewords. A coding Table T is obtained that can be
expressed as T =< S,F,W >.
• Step-7: Substitute the original symbols by corresponding codewords according to T
obtaining an encoded secret message Me = {me1,me2, . . . ,mek}, where mei is a bit of
encoded secret message (1 ≤ i ≤ k) and k is the number of bits of encoded secret message
(k < m).
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The length of the binary secret message is m = 120. Let, the number of bits in a symbol
of the secret message is d = 4. Here, d|m and 2 ≤ d ≤ m2 . Hence, the maximum num-
ber of unique symbols is 24 = 16. The set of unique symbols in binary secret message is
S = {0000, 0001, 0010, 0011, 0100, 0101, 0110, 0111, 1000, 1001, 1010, 1111}. Here, the number
of unique symbols in the given binary secret message is |S| = 12. The set of frequencies of
symbols in S are F = {4, 3, 3, 5, 5, 1, 2, 3, 1, 1, 1, 1}. The resulting Huffman tree for the binary
secret message is shown in Figure 3.4. Next, the codeword is obtained for each symbol in S
from the Huffman tree, and a coding table T is generated. The coding table T is presented
in Table 3.9 containing symbols in the binary secret message, their corresponding codewords
that are obtained from the Huffman tree and frequencies. Now, each symbol of the binary
secret message is replaced by the corresponding codeword stated in T . For example, the sym-
bol ’0100’ is replaced by ’111’, ’0001’ is replaced by ’001’, and so on. As a result, we get the
following encoded secret message for the given secret message:
11100101100010011111100100011100100000110100101011111000011111111010001010101
110001110101110101110001
The encoded secret message has 101 bits, i.e. k = 101. Therefore, encoding the binary
secret message using Huffman coding reduces secret message size.
3.6.2 Embedding Secret Message
The obtained encoded secret message Me is embedded in cover text file H to generate stego text
file H. Formally, H is denoted as H = {h1, h2, . . . , hp}, where p is the number of characters in
H. The steps of embedding secret message are stated below:
• Step-1: Copy all the characters of H into H.
• Step-2: Find a set E that contains indexes of SPACE characters in H. Formally, E is
denoted as E = {ej |1 ≤ j ≤ t, 1 ≤ ej ≤ p, hej = SPACE} . Here, t is the total number of
SPACE characters in H.
• Step-3: A pseudo-random sequence R with k elements is generated using a pseudo-
random sequence generator seed τ . The value of an element of R must be between 1 and
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Figure 3.5: Relationship among H, H
′
, E, R and Me
p. Formally, R is denoted as R = {ri|1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ ri ≤ p}. Here, ri refers to an index
of E (i.e., 1 ≤ ri ≤ j, 1 ≤ j ≤ t).
• Step-4: Each mei is embedded at ejth index of H such that 1 ≤ ri ≤ j, 1 ≤ j ≤ t.
Instead of embedding a secret bit directly, an invisible character is embedded. Assume
that we have two invisible characters: α and β. In order to embed a secret bit mei, an
invisible character replaces a SPACE character at hej using the following rule:
Hej =

α, if mei = 0
β, if mei = 1
, (3.10)
Finally, the stego text file H is obtained.
3.6.3 Generation of Stego Key
A stego key k is constructed at the end of the embedding procedure in order to extract the
secret message and reconstruct the cover text file. The stego key includes coding table (T ),
number of bits in the encoded secret message (k), seed (τ) for generating pseudo-random
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sequence and values of two invisible characters α and β. Formally, K is defined as a tuple:
K =< T, k, τ, α, β >.
3.6.3.1 Example 2
Consider that we have a text file H. We plan to embed encoded secret message Me within H.
Let, number of bits in Me is k = 101. The content of H is copied to another file H. Next, a
set E is generated containing the indexes of space characters in H. Assume that number of
spaces in H is 185 (i.e., t = 185). Hence, The number of elements of E is |E| = 185. A pseudo
random sequence R with 101 elements is generated using a seed τ = 119. Here, elements of
R range between 1 and 185. An element of R refers to an index of E. For example, the first
element of R refers to the 19th index of E, the second element of R refers to the 7th index of
E, and so on. Next, a bit mei of encoded secret message Me is to be embedded in H. The
first bit ‘1’ of encoded secret message is to be embedded at the index denoted by the 19th
element of E. Consider, 19th element of E contains a value 761. Therefore, the first encoded
secret bit 1 should be embedded at index 761 of H. Relationship among H, H, E, R, and
Me is illustrated in Figure 3.5. Instead of embedding a binary bit, we replace a binary bit
by an invisible character according to a rule specified in Equation (3.10). Consider that we
select SPACE and NULL as two invisible characters, i.e., α = SPACE and β = NULL. If a
bit of the encoded secret message is ‘0’, then SPACE character of H at a location according
to pseudo random sequence is replaced by SPACE. On the other hand, SPACE character of
H at a location according to pseudo random sequence is replaced by NULL If a bit of the
encoded secret message is ‘1’. Performing the operation for all of the encoded secret bits, H
becomes the stego text file. After generating the stego file, a stego key K =< T, k, τ, α, β > is
constructed as K =< T, 101, 119, SPACE,NULL >.
3.6.4 Extracting Secret Message and Reconstruction of Cover text file
The objective of this procedure is to extract the secret message from stego text file H =
{h1, h2, . . . , hp}, where p is the number of characters in H. Additionally, cover text file H is
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reconstructed in this procedure. Extraction of secret message and reconstruction of H requires
stego key K. The steps are discussed below:
• Step-1: Find a set E that contains the locations of invisible characters in H. Formally,
E is defined as E = {ej |1 ≤ j ≤ t, 1 ≤ ej ≤ q, hej = α ∨ hej = β}. Here, t is the total
number of α and β.
• Step-2: A pseudo-random sequence R with k elements is generated using seed τ . R is
denoted as R = {ri|1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ ri ≤ q}. Here, ri refers to an index of E.
• Step-3: Create a set Me = {me1,me2, . . . ,mek} of length k to hold the extracted encoded
bits of secret message.
• Step-4: Check ejth character of H (i.e., hej) where j = ri, and insert ‘0’ or ‘1’ at mei
based on the following rule:
Hej =

0, if hej = α
1, if hej = β
, (3.11)
• Step-5: Substitute ejth character of H by SAPCE character if hej = α.
• Step-6: Repeat Step 4-5 for each ri ∈ R to obtain encoded secret message Me and
reconstruct cover text file. H is the reconstructed cover text file.
• Step-7: Create an empty set M to hold decoded secret message bits.
• Step-8: Each codeword is identified in Me and decoded using the coding table T . Each
decoded symbol is added to M . Finally, binary secret message M is obtained.
3.6.4.1 Example 3
Assume that we have stego key K =< T, k, τ, α, β > as K =< T, 101, 119,SPACE,NULL >.
A set E is created that contains indexes of invisible characters α = SPACE and β = NULL.
The number of elements of E is |E| = 185. Subsequently, a pseudo-random sequence R with
k = 101 elements is created using seed τ = 119. Here, R is similar to the pseudo-random
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sequence that is generated during embedding procedure due to same seed τ = 119 . Elements
of R range between 1 and 185. An element of R refers to an index of E . Next, a set Me
with k = 101 elements is created for holding encoded secret bits. Assume that first element of
R is 19. Hence, the character at a location of H that is pointed by the 19th element of e is
checked, and embedded bit is retrieved using Equation 3.11. If the character is SPACE then
add ‘0’ to the first index of Me . Add ‘1’ to the first index of Me if the character is NULL, and
replace NULL character by SPACE character. Same procedure needs to be followed for every
element of R. As a result, we get a set of encoded secret message Me and reconstructed cover
text file H where H = H. Afterwards, an empty set M is created. Next, each codeword in Me
is identified and decoded using coding table T (see Table 3.9). Finally, we get M as binary
secret message.
3.6.5 Experimental Results and Performance Analysis
A set of experiments are carried out to evaluate the performance of our proposed text steganog-
raphy approach in terms of three parameters: embedding capacity (EC), bit error rate (BER)
and imperceptibility. In particular, EC measures bit rate that are the size of secret messages
relative to the size of the cover text file [103]. EC is calculated as follows:
EC =
bits of secret message
bits of cover text file
(3.12)
BER of the extracted secret message is a measure that determines the correction capabilities
of a steganography approach. BER is the ratio (in percentage) between the number of bits
that are extracted correctly and the number of bits of original secret message [104]. BER can
be defined as follows:
BER =
bits retrieved with error
total bits
× 100 (3.13)
Imperceptibility of a steganography method determines the level of perception of the pres-
ence of secret message inside a file [31]. The imperceptibility of text-based steganography is
higher if relative changes of characters between the cover and stego text files are lower. Exper-
iments are performed on Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 CPU @ 3.60GHz personal computer with
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8 GB RAM. Software for the proposed method is developed in Java programming language.
A large text file is chosen as a cover text file from URL: http://www.textfiles.com. Different
sizes (in bits) of secret messages are examined to evaluate the performance of our proposed
approach.
In Table 3.10, embedding capacity (EC) before and after encoding the secret message has
been demonstrated. The size of our sample cover file is 148416 bits. We examine the embedding
capacity of our proposed method for multiple secret messages with different lengths. It is found
that embedding capacity is improved after encoding the secret message.
Table 3.11 illustrates values of bit error rate (BER) of our proposed method for different
secret messages. It is found that BER is 0% for each secret message.
In Figure 3.6, it is demonstrated that the presence of secret message in stego file cannot be
perceived. Figure 3.6(a) and 3.6(b) represent cover text file and stego text file, respectively.
Hence, the imperceptibility of our proposed method is very high.
Table 3.10: Embedding Capacity of Proposed Method (Cover File Size 148416 bits)
SecretMessage Size(in bits) EncodedSecretMessageSize (in Bits) EC (%)BeforeEncoding EC (%)AfterEncoding
184 154 0.12 0.1
1048 861 0.70 0.58
2296 1874 1.54 1.26
3168 2581 2.13 1.73
5152 4160 3.47 2.80
6152 4946 4.14 3.33
Table 3.11: Bit Error Rate of Proposed Method







It is worthwhile mentioning that the size of the cover file and stego file in our proposed
steganography method are the same. Therefore, our steganography method has no payload.
Additionally, the percentage of characters of the cover file that is successfully reconstructed
after extraction of secret messages and the number of characters in the cover file is always the
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.6: Demonstration of Imperceptibility of Proposed method. (a) Cover Text File, and
(b) Stego Text File.
Figure 3.7: Reversibility of Proposed Method
same (see Figure 3.7). Hence, our proposed text steganography method is fully reversible.
In Figure 3.8, our proposed method is compared with other most relevant research works. A
comparison is performed in terms of imperceptibility and payload incurred. Research works in
the literature [66, 64, 40, 41] compress cover file to produce stego file. Hence, imperceptibility
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becomes very poor. On the other hand, our proposed method used a compression coding
technique to reduce the length of the secret message. Therefore, the imperceptibility of our
proposed method is very high. The work in [39] hides the secret message as an invisible
character within words, sentences, and paragraphs. The size of the stego file is larger than the
cover file that results in the payload. In contrast, our proposed method has 0% payload.
Figure 3.8: Comparison of proposed method with existing work with respect to Imperceptibility
and Payload
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented lossless steganography methods with regard to textual data
that considers text documents and DNA sequences. Regarding the second research question,
the DNA steganography method was presented addressing the limitations of existing un-blind
DNA steganography approaches. In our proposed steganography method, secret information
of the data owner was embedded into a DNA sequence for ensuring privacy. A set of secret
keys were used for embedding secret information within DNA sequences. The set of secret
keys, called stego key, were generated by edge devices and distributed among data consumers
using a secured channel. With the help of stego key, authorized data consumers can extract
hidden secret information related to DNA sequence when required. The key contribution of
our proposed method is the ability to fully reconstruct the cover DNA sequence without any
reference DNA sequence from the public DNA database. This feature makes it usable in privacy
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preservation. The experimental results justified that our proposed method is lossless, blind,
and secured with higher capacity and low expansion rate. With respect to the third research
question, we proposed a lossless and highly imperceptible text steganography technique in the
latter part of this chapter. Huffman coding based compression of secret message and hiding
compressed secret bits as invisible characters do not affect the texts in the cover text file.
Therefore, our proposed method is highly imperceptible. From the experimental results, it
was demonstrated that the proposed method improved hiding capacity, incurred no payload to
the stego file. Our proposed text steganography scheme can be called a lossless steganography
method as it successfully retrieved secret information and reconstructed cover text file without
any error.
Chapter 4
Privacy Preserving Search over
Stego Data
In Chapter 2 and 3, we discussed lossless steganography techniques for numerical and textual
data, respectively. Proposed methodologies can be used to hide sensitive information related to
data collected from different realtime applications, and stego files are produced. A database of
stego data is created and stored in the edge data centers. One of the main challenges of storing
a stego database in the edge data centers is searching for a specific stego file or a set of stego
file in the edge networks without revealing any sensitive information that satisfies the given
search condition. Giving an example in the context of a smart healthcare application, a data
consumer (e.g., a doctor) wants to retrieve a healthcare document of a particular patient from
the edge data centers. In order to preserve the privacy of the patient’s sensitive information,
the search keywords should not be sent in cleartext form to the edge data centers.
In this chapter, we introduce a framework for searching over the stego document on the
edge computing for the first time with regard to the fourth research question stated in Section
1.4. The framework is capable of preserving strict system-wise privacy in the edge computing
paradigm. We choose the healthcare applications as a running example for our proposed
framework. In our framework, a data owner is a healthcare provider. Initially, the data owner
produces a stego database containing several stego documents. Stego documents in the stego
database embed related patients’ sensitive information. As our main focus is presenting a
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privacy-preserving search mechanism, we do not discuss the stego data generation process in
this chapter. The work discussed in Chapter 2 and 3 can be used as examples of hiding patient
sensitive information in health data.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 describes the motivations and
contributions of this chapter. Section 4.2 summarizes the related works in the area. The
system model for privacy-preserving search over stego data on the edge computing is presented
in Section 4.3. The search model for keyword-based search is described in Section 4.4. Section
4.5 presents the model for the range search. The experimental evaluations and the results of
the proposed methodologies are illustrated in Section 4.6. Finally, Section 4.7 summarizes this
chapter.
4.1 Motivations and Contributions
A trivial solution is downloading all the stego documents at the data consumer’s side and search
for the desired document. The trivial solution is impractical due to the massive amount of
bandwidth and computing requirements. Aside from eliminating the local storage management,
storing data in the edge data centers serve no purpose unless they can be easily searched
and utilized. Thus, exploring privacy-preserving search service over stego cloud data is of
paramount importance. Privacy-preserving search is a very active research area [59, 105, 106,
58, 107, 108]. Proposed method in the literature are developed for seraching on encrypted data.
Nevertheless, privacy-preserving search techniques over encrypted data are not applicable for
privacy-preserving search over stego data due to fundamental differences between stego and
encrypted data.
In this study, we limit the search operation to keyword-based search and range search of
numeric data. A user may search for a particular stego file containing one or more keywords.
A user may also search for stego files that are within a given range. In this research, we build
two models for both keyword-based and range search. In the first model, a data owner builds
a secure search index for the stego database. The secure search index contains encrypted stego
file names and hashes of corresponding hidden keywords. Next, the data owner sends both the
stego database and secure search index to the cloud. An authorized data consumer sends a
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search query as a hash string to the edge data center. The search query may contain single or
multiple keywords. In the case of multiple keywords, keywords are concatenated, and a hash
string is generated. The hash string is generated by the data consumer using a backdoor. The
backdoor is secret information that is used during the hash generation [109]. It allows the
data consumer to generate the same hash string for the search keywords that were generated
by the data owner during search index construction. The edge data center tries to find the
given hash string in the secure search index and retrieves the corresponding encrypted file
name. In our second model, the data owner builds a secure search index that supports range
search for the stego database. We use the concept of order-preserving encryption (OPE) [85]
for building search index that supports range queries. The secure search index contains an
encrypted identifier of stego files and hidden searchable keywords. The data owner outsources
both the stego database and secure search index to the edge data center. An authorized data
consumer sends a search query as an encrypted string to the edge data center. The search
query contains minimum and maximum values of search attributes. The edge data center tries
to finds items on the given range in the secure search index and retrieves the corresponding
encrypted file name.
The search process does not leak any information to the edge data center. In our framework,
we have several assumptions. First, we assume that a data owner sends a stego database and
search index to the edge data center using a secure channel. The secure channel uses modern
cryptography techniques to guarantee communication security. Second, the edge data center is
untrusted. Hence, the edge data center executes a query privately. Third, the data consumer
is authorized to access stego data. Hence, the data owner shares secret credentials with the
data consumer to retrieve secret data from stego data via a trusted third-party.
The key contributions of this research are highlighted as follows:
1. We propose privacy-preserving search techniques over stego data in the edge data for the
first time.
2. We propose a framework for privacy-preserving search over the stego database. In this
framework, we develop a secure search index to facilitate the search of stego data without
any disclosure of sensitive information.
Related Work 103
3. We design a privacy-preserving query mechanism in this framework that takes a hash
string as input instead of plaintext, and performs a search in the cloud on the secured
search index.
4. We develop another privacy-preserving search approach to facilitate the range search of
stego data without any disclosure of sensitive information.
5. We conduct an experimental study that demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed
approach.
4.2 Related Work
In this section, we discuss some of the works closely related to our work. The objective of
the discussion is to provide a view on the privacy-preserving range search techniques on stego
documents. As no work has been done on the privacy-preserving range search technique for
stego data, we discuss the only work on privacy-preserving search over stego data in this section.
In addition, we discuss some key work on privacy-preserving search techniques for encrypted
data.
Traditional single keyword searchable encryption schemes [72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80,
110] usually build an encrypted searchable index such that its content is hidden to the server
unless it is given appropriate trapdoors generated via secret key(s) [111]. It is first studied
by Song et al. [72] in the symmetric key setting, and improvements and advanced security
definitions are given in Goh [73], Chang et al. [74] and Curtmola et al. [75]. The work [110]
solves secure ranked keyword search which utilizes keyword frequency to rank results instead of
returning similar results. However, it only supports a single keyword search. Boneh et al. [76]
present the first searchable encryption construction based on public-key based cryptography.
In this method, anyone with public-key can write to the data stored on the server, and only
authorized users with a private key can search. However, public-key based solutions are usually
computationally very expensive. Furthermore, the keyword privacy cannot be protected in the
public-key setting since they could encrypt keywords with public-key and then use the received
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trapdoor to evaluate this ciphertext. AS the aforementioned works are developed for searching
on encrypted data, are not applicable to a stego database.
Figure 4.1: System model of privacy preserving search over stego data on the untrusted edge
data centre
4.3 System Model
We consider a cloud computing environment that hosts an outsourced stego database, based
on which privacy preserving data sharing application can be built. Additionally, the system
allows data consumers to verify the authenticity of data source. There are four participants
in our system: data owners, data consumers, trusted key distributor (TKD) and edge data
center (CDC). We refer data owner as producer of the stego database. For instance, hospital
or clinic can be data owner. A data owner collects health data from a patient and hides the
patient sensitive information within the health data (Di) for producing a stego health data
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(Di). In the rest of this paper, we use health stego data and health data interchangeably. A
set of secret information, called stego key (Ki) is used to produce Si from Di. Finally, the
data owner produces a stego database (DBS) of health stego data of n patients, and secured
searchable index (SI). A set SK of stego keys for DBS is generated as well. Here, SK can
be defined as: SK = {SK1, SK2, . . . , SKn}. The data owner stores DBS and a copy of SI
in edge data center (CDC). The set of stego keys SK is stored in a trusted key distributor
(TKD). The CDC stores DBS and SI, and performs search operation on stego data in SI for
data consumers. The CDC receives a search query (Q) as a hash string and returns a stego
health data Si as response. The TKD is an entity that is trusted by all the participants in the
system. In our system model, we assume that all the communications with TKD is secured.
A data consumer wants to access a stego data for a specific patient, and can send a search
request (i.e., query) in a private manner over to CDC. The data consumer receives a stego
health data Si as response if exists in stego database. The overall system model is illustrated
in Figure 4.1.
4.4 Privacy Preserving Keyword Search for Stego Data
In this section, we discuss our proposed privacy-preserving keyword search technique for stego
Data.
4.4.1 Threat Model
We assume that edge data center (CDC) in our system model is honest-but-curious [112, 113].
In other words, a CDC satisfies following properties: (1) the CDC provides storage facility
of stego data without modifying or destroying stored data, and (2) the CDC endeavours to
acquire sensitive information of patients from the stored documents, data consumers’ queries
and search outcomes.
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of the Stego Database DBS construction process.
4.4.2 Design Goals
The system design of privacy preserving search over stego data in edge data center should
achieve the following main security and performance goals.
• Index and Query Privacy: The main security objective of this system is to prevent
the CDC from learning any useful information about the patient related to stego data
in stego database (DBS), searchable index (SI) and data consumers’ queries. However,
the CDC can gain knowledge from the search result in order to make the search faster
for future search operations. Index privacy refers to the confidentiality of SI, and query
privacy refers to the protection of data consumers’ queries.
• Multi-attribute Keyword Search: To design a search approach which allows a data
consumer to insert multiple keywords. Each keyword indicates an attribute of a patient’s
sensitive information hidden within the patient’s stego document. The search approach
should be able to return the desired stego document based on the input attributes.
• Scalability: A new stego document should be added or an unused stego file should be
removed without changing the security setup.
• Efficiency: Aforementioned goals should be obtained with low computation and com-
munication overhead.
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4.4.3 Construction of Stego Database
In this task, a data owner generates a stego database DBS . The DBS is a set of n number
of stego data, i.e., DBS = {Si|1 ≤ i ≤ n}. A stego data Si is generated by embedding SI-th
patient’s secret information Mi within the patient’s medical data Di. The embedding operation
Em takes Di, Mi and SKi as arguments and generates Si. Here, SKi is the stego key. The
generation of stego data can be expressed as:
Si = Em(Di,Mi, SKi). (4.1)
In this framework, the secret message Mi is a set of k attributes: < mi1,mi2, . . . ,mik >.
An attribute mik denotes a sensitive data related to the SI-th patient and searchable by
an authorized user. Giving examples, patient ID, name, date of birth, address, and contact
number are patient’s sensitive data. The Mi contains values of the aforementioned attributes
for the SI-th patient. Figure 4.2 illustrates the stego data construction process. Proposed
lossless steganography approaches discussed in Chapter 2 and 3 can be considered as examples
of stego data generation.
4.4.4 Building Secure Search Index
The data owner constructs a secured search index SI in this task. The search index SI is
a matrix. A row of the matrix consists of an encrypted file name and hash of searchable
attributes of a stego file. The file name is generated by encrypting a file’s actual identifier with
the data owner’s secret key. The hash values are generated using an efficient hash function
[109]. As a result, cloud can only see the encrypted file name and the hash values of searchable
attributes.
The construction of SI involves the following steps:
1. Generating vectors of hash values: The data owner generates n number of vectors
for n number of stego data in DBS . A vector Vi contains hash values of all possible
combinations of mi. For k attributes in a secret message Mi, there are 2
k − 1 possible
combinations of attributes. Assume that, a secret message contains only two attributes:
patient ID and name. The values of these two attributes for the first patient are: P1001
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and Alice. The number of possible combinations are: 22 − 1 = 3. The combinations are
as follow:
< P1001 >,< Alice >,< P1001, Alice >
Next, hash values are generated for all combinations of mi using an efficient hash func-
tion H. The efficient hash function H can informally be defined as an irreversible and
efficiently computable function which compresses a message of any length to a message
of fixed length [109]. The generation of Vi from Mi using a secure hash function h is
illustrated in Figure 4.3.
Definition 4.1 Hash Function. A hash function is a pair of efficient algorithms H =
(KGen,F). The hash function H associates with key space K, message space M, and
hash space G, such that:
• δ ← KGen(λ): KGen is an algorithm that generates and outputs a hash key δ ∈ K
on the input of a security parameter λ.
• H ← F(δ,m): F is an algorithm that outputs a hash value H ∈ G on the input of
a hash key δ ∈ K and a message m ∈M.
The hash value of j-th combination of Mi can be represented as:
δ ← KGen(λ),
H ← F(δ, ci,j),
Hi,j = H(KGen,F), (4.2)
where:
• H is the cryptographic hash function
• ci,j is the j-th combination of Mi
• Hi,j is the generated hash value of ci,j
Privacy Preserving Keyword Search for Stego Data 109
Hash values are generated for all combinations of secret attributes using the hash function
in (4.2). The vector Vi is denoted as:
Vi = {Hi,j |1 ≤ j ≤ 2k − 1}. (4.3)
Figure 4.3: An illustration of generating Vi from Mi using a secure hash function h
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Hn,1 Hn,2 . . . Hn,2k−1
 (4.4)
An illustration of generating Vi from Mi is provided in Fig. 4.3.
2. Secure naming of stego Data: The objective of this step is naming each stego file in
a secure way. The secure naming makes stego data names non modifiable. To make it
clear, the name of a stego data is generated by the data owner using data owners secret
key. Hence, only a data owner can generate the names of his/her stego data. The data
owner can verify the names of outsourced stego data anytime by regenerating the name
and matching. The data owner uses a secret key based encryption function Enc() for
generating the secure name of SI-th stego data in the stego database. The generation of
the secure can be depicted as follows:
CPl,i = Enc(Pl,Mi,KPl), (4.5)
where:
• Pl is the data owner’s unique ID
• Mi is the secret message of SI-th stego data
• KPl is the the data owner’s secret key
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• CPl,i is the secure name of SI-th stego data of the data owner.
All of the secure stego data names of the data owner having ID Pl are stored in a n× 1








The SI-th stego document is named as CPl,i in the stego database DBS . In order to add
a new stego document, the encrypted name of the stego document needs to be computed
according to 4.12. The name should be appended in C. A row of the vector C is deleted
and rows are re-organized for removing a stego document from the DBS . Any stego
document that has no reference in C is deleted from the DBS at a later time. In this
way, the scalability is achieved.
3. Construction of privacy preserving search index : A privacy preserving search
index SIPl of the data owner having ID Pl is a n × 2k matrix. The SI-th row of the
matrix SIPl contains the secure name CPl,i and vector of hash values Vi of the SI-th
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 (4.7)
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Change Management. If the value of any of the attributes in the stego document Si is to
be changed, the data owner regenerate Si buy embedding new set of secret attributes within
Di original document. Additionally, the new encrypted file name CPl,i for Si is produced.
Moreover, the hash vector Vi is generated using the same hash key δ. At the end, i-th row of
SI is changed by the [CPl,i Vi] in the copy of the cloud.
If any new stego document is to be added, then the data owner generate a new stego
document. Let, the new stego document is denoted as Sn+1 , where n is the number of current
stego documents. Additionally, the new encrypted file name CPl,n+1 for Sn+1 is produced.
Moreover, the hash vector Vn+1 is generated using the hash key δ. At the end, (n+ 1)-th row
of SI is added with [CPl,n+1 Vn+1] in the copy of the cloud, and Sn+1 is added in DBS .
The i-row of SI of the copy of the cloud and Si from DBS is simply removed to delete Si.
4.4.5 Construction of the Backdoored Hash Generation Function
A backdoored hash function is a function H that takes a secret key as input and generates a
hash value similar to the hash value generated by the hash function H [109]. The data owner
builds the backdoored hash generation function H associated with the hash function H. The
backdoored hash function is used to generate a hash of the search keywords at the end user’s
side.
Definition 4.2 Backdoored Hash Generator. The function H = (BDHGen,F) is called a
backdoored hash generator function associated with key sapce K, message space M, and a
hash space G, such that:
• B ← BDHKGen(λ): BDHKGen is called a backdoor generator function associated
that generates a backdoor B ∈ K on input of a security parameter λ.
• H ← F(B,m): F is an algorithm that outputs a hash value H ∈ G on the input of a
backdoor B ∈ K and a message m ∈ M such that H = H. Here, H is the hash value
generated by H = (KGen,F).
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4.4.6 Privacy Preserving Query for Searching Stego Data
A privacy preserving query PPQ(H) is an operation that is initiated by an end user and
executed by the cloud. The query PPQ(H) takes a hashvalue as an input and returns a stego
data Dout as output. The PPQ(H) has the following steps:
• Step-1: An end user generates a hash value H for a search keyword m using a backdoor
B. For k number of attributes, there can be maximum 2k − 1 combinations of search
keywords. The set of all possible combinations A is denoted as: A = {a1, a2, . . . , a2k−1}.
Therefore, a search keyword m is an element of A (i.e., m ∈ A).
• Step-2: The end user initiates a query PPQ(H). The query is executed by the cloud.
During the execution, the cloud matches the hash value H in the search index SIPl .
Assume that the cloud finds an element Hi,j(1 ≤ i ≤ n, 2 ≤ j ≤ 2k) in SIPl , where SIPl
is a n × 2k matrix, and SI and j denotes the row and column index of Hi,j in SIPl ,
respectively. Therefore, there exists a stego data for the search keyword.
• Step-3: The cloud considers CPl,i as the searched stego document’s name and sets
Dout = DBS [CPl,i], where DBS [CPl,i] is the stego document with a name CPl,i.
• Step-4: The cloud sends Dout to the end user as output of the PPT (H).
• Step-5: If the cloud does not find any match (H /∈ SIPl), then returns NULL.
4.4.7 Performance Analysis
We analyze the performance of our proposed framework in this section. We analyze the per-
formance from the aspects of semantic privacy of both search index and query operation,
functionality and efficiency, and scalibility.
4.4.7.1 Privacy of search index.
The search index SI consists of two things: encrypted file names and hashes of search keywords.
Traditional symmetric key encryption schemes, such as advanced encryption schem (AES) [114]
and data encryption standard (DES) [115], can be used to produce encrypted file name. The
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security strength of the aforementioned symmetric key encryption is very high. In general, the
security of a symmetric key encryption lies on the length of the secret key. We assume that
a secured key would be used for the generation of the encrypted file names. The data owner
generates all of the encrypted file names before sending the stego database and search index.
Moreover, the data owner never shares the symmetric key with the cloud. Hence, it is provably
impossible for the cloud to determine the relation between a encrypted file name and a stego
file.
4.4.7.2 Privacy of query operation.
We assume that the hash values are generated using a secured hash generation function such
as SHA-256. In each row of SI, there are 2k − 1 hash values for k number of searchable
keywords. Cloud has no clue about the keywords hidden inside a stego document. In the
privacy preserving query operation, the data consumer generates a hash string of the query
word(s). The hash value is generated using a backdoor B ⊂ K. The consumer collects B
from the trusted key distributor TKD using a secure channel. The generated hash value is
send as query to the cloud for searh execution. Plaintext search keyword is never send to the
cloud. The cloud searches received keyword within the set of hash values V in SI. Hence, our
proposed query operation is executed in a private manner. Overall, the privacy is preserved in
our proposed framework.
4.4.7.3 Functionality and efficiency.
Enabling multi-attribute keyword search is one of our design goals. In our model, we stated
that each stego document has k hidden attributes and possible number of combinations is
2k − 1. The SI contains the hash of 2k − 1 combinations. Therefore, it is guaranteed that a
valid search keyword, either single or multi-attribute, will always be found in our model. The
build time of SI depends on the number of secret attribute k. Hence, the runtime complexity
of building SI is O(k).
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4.4.7.4 Scalibility.
The scalability depends on the number of operations required for making any changes in the
SI and DBS . Our proposed framework requires 2
k number of operations in SI to change
single or multiple secret attributes. Here, 2k − 1 operations are required for hash generation
and single operation for updating encrypted name of the stego file. For adding a new stego
file, the proposed framework requires equal number of operations in SI as of changing a secret
attribute value. Therefore, the number of operations to make any change is always 2k.
4.4.8 Experimental Results and Discussion
The key contribution of this paper is building a search mechanism for stego database that
preserves the privacy during search. We conduct a set of experiments for evaluating perfor-
mance of our proposed privacy preserving search technique for stego data in untrusted cloud.
As we discuss the semantic privacy strength and scalibility of our proposed search technique
in Section 4.5.4.5, we focus on the efficiency in our experiments. We consider three evaluation
criteria in our experiments: (i) times required for generating stego database, (ii) times required
for building search index, and (iii) times required for searching a stego document in the search
index.
4.4.8.1 Experimental Setup
In order to setup the environment of our experiments, we build a stego database containing
stego biomedical signals. We collect biosignal (e.g. ECG, PPG and EEG signal) dataset from
Physionet repository. The Physionet repository is funded by the National Health Institute
(U.S.) [91]. PhysioNet provides free access through their website to their large collections of
recorded biomedical signals. We implement the method stated in [22] of hiding patient sensitive
information within biomedical signal. We generate 5, 000 stego files for our stego database.
Each file is 10 seconds long with 250 Hz frequency. In other words, there are 2500 records in
a biosignal file. We randomly hide different number of secret attributes in sample biomedical
signals for generating stego biomedical signals. We take different number of stego biomedical
signals for conducting each experiment. For generating encrypted names of stego files, we use
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advanced encryption standard (AES) with 128-bit key. We use SHA-256 hash algorithm for
generating the hash values in our experiment. We develop JAVA based programs to run our
experiment. The JAVA Development Kit (JDK) 1.8 is used to write JAVA codes. We run our
experiments on 3.40 GHZ Intel Core i7 processor and 8 GB RAM operated under Windows 7
operating System.
Figure 4.4: Comparison of times for generating stego database (DBS) in kilo seconds for
different number of stego documents in thousand.
Figure 4.5: Comparison of times for building search index (SI) in milliseconds for different
number of stego documents in thousand.
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of times in milliseconds for searching a stego document in the search
index SI for different number of stego documents in thousand.
4.4.8.2 Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of our proposed framework in terms of time cost of different
operations: stego database generation, building search index and average search time. In order
to observe stego database generation time, we build databases of different sizes for different
number of secret attributes (k = 2, 3, 4, 5). Figure 4.7 demonstrates the comparison of time for
generating stego databases. The number of stego documents are generated in thousands (i.e.
×1000). Execution times are shown in kilo seconds. All of the files in our stego database are of
equal size. Therefore, results show that times for generating stego databases increase linearly.
We build search indexes for different number of secret attributes (k = 2, 3, 4, 5) and database
sizes. Figure 4.8 illustrates the comparison of time for building search indexes. The number
of stego documents are generated in thousands (i.e. ×1000). The results show that times for
generating stego databases increase linearly. According to the results, time for building search
indexes increase in a linear fashion.
Figure 4.9 illustrates the comparison of time for searching a stego document in different
search indexes SIs. We search keywords for different number of secret attributes (k = 2, 3, 4, 5)
and database sizes. The number of stego documents are generated in thousands (i.e. ×1000).
We execute the experiments 100 times for each search index and same number of keywords.
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We take the average time of the executions. The results show that times for searching a stego
document in a search index is dominated by the size of the secret attributes in the stego
database. As the number of secret attributes increases, the combination of search keyword
increases. Hence, the search time increases. The number of elements in each sub-index (i.e.
each row of the search index) is fixed for a value of k, and the required time for building each
sub-index is fixed as well. Therefore, the search time increases almost linearly.
4.5 Privacy Preserving Ranged Search for Stego Data
In this section, the privacy-preserving range search method is discussed.
4.5.1 Symmetric Order-Preserving Encryption
The order-preserving encryption (OPE) is mainly used to secure database applications. The
OPE allows the database system to store data as ciphertexts and make comparisons between
the ciphertexts to find out the result of a query. The result generates the same outcomes as
if it had operated on the corresponding plaintexts. Thus, the database can still build efficient
indexes on the encrypted input for answering range queries quickly in the same way as on
plaintext data. The work in [85] was the first attempt to introduce the notation of OPE and
proposed a theoretical scheme to address it. The first formal cryptographic model and its
construction were suggested by Boldyreva et al. in [116]. The work in [116] meets the notion
of ROPF-CCA security, which implies it is indistinguishable from random order-preserving
function. It is based on the LazySample algorithm that samples a random order-preserving
function (ROPF) by recursively applying hypergeometric distribution (HGD). In this paper,
we use the OPE scheme presented in [116]. Hence, we present a brief overview of the OPE
scheme [116] in the following subsections.
An order-preserving encryption (OPE) scheme with plaintext-space D and ciphertext space
R is a tuple of algorithms SE = (K, Enc,Dec) where:
• The randomized key-generation algorithm K outputs a key K.
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• The deterministic encryption algorithm Enc on inputs a key K and a plaintext m outputs
a ciphertext c.
• The deterministic decryption algorithm Dec on inputs a key K and ciphertext c outputs
a plaintext m.
In addition to the usual correctness requirement that Dec(Enc(K,m)) = m for every plain-
text m and key K, we require that m1 ≤ m2 if and only if Enc(K,m1) ≤ Enc(K,m2) for
plaintexts m1,m2 ∈ D and every key K.
4.5.2 Preliminaries
We consider a cloud that stores an outsourced stego database, based on which privacy-preserving
data sharing application can be built. Additionally, the system allows data consumers to verify
the authenticity of the data source. There are four participants in our system: data owners,
data consumers, trusted key distributor (TKD) and edge data center (CDC). We refer data
owner as the producer of the stego database. For instance, a hospital or clinic can be the data
owner. A data owner collects health data (HDi) from a patient. HDi has multiple attributes
related to the patient. Assume that there are k sensitive attributes of a patient that are hidden
inside HDi and a stego health data (SDi) is produced for ensuring the privacy of a patient.
A set of secret information, called stego key (Ki) is used to produce SDi from HDi. In the
rest of this paper, we use health stego data and health data, and secret data and sensitive data,
interchangeably.
The set A of sensitive attributes can be represented as A = {A1,A2, . . . ,Ak}. Sensitive
attributes can be either text or numeric. For example, text attributes include patient name,
address, etc. Patient unique ID and age can be considered as numeric attributes. Let, N is
the set of numeric attributes which can be represented as N = {N1,N2, . . . ,Nk}, N ⊂ A and
k < k.
Finally, the data owner produces a stego database (DBS) of health stego data of n stego
health data, and secured searchable index (SI). A set SK of stego keys for DBS is generated
as well. Here, SK can be defined as: SK = {SK1, SK2, . . . , SKn}. The data owner stores
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DBS and a copy of SI in edge data center (CDC). The set of stego keys SK is stored in a
trusted key distributor (TKD). The CDC stores DBS and SI, and performs search operation
on stego data in SI for data consumers. The CDC receives a search query Q as a hash string
and returns a set of stego health data as response. The TKD is an entity that is trusted by all
the participants in the system. In our system model, we assume that all the communications
with TKD is secured. A data consumer who wants to access a stego data for a specific patient,
and can send a search query Q in a private manner over to CDC. In our model, we assume
that a Q is a range query. In other words, the user sends a minimum and maximum values
of an attribute as encrypted string. The CDC performs query on secured searchable index
(SI) for the Q without having any knowledge on attribute values and returns a set of stego
documents Opt = {Opt1,Opt2, . . . ,Optt} if data exists in stego database for Q, where Optj
is a stego data of an stego document in DBS . The Opt = ∅ if no stego data exists in stego
database for Q. Figure 4.1 illustrates the overall system model. A summary of key symbols
used in this article is presented in Table 4.1.
4.5.3 Design Goals
The design goals of our proposed privacy-preserving search system for stego data in the edge
data center should include the followings:
• Multi-Keyword range Search: To design a range search approach which allows a data
user to insert multiple keywords with range values. Each keyword wi indicates a numeric
attribute of a patient’s sensitive information, wi ∈ N , hidden within the patient’s stego
document. The search approach should be able to return a set of desired stego documents
based on the input attributes and their range values.
• Index and Query Privacy: The main security objective of this system is to prevent
the CDC from learning any useful information about the patient related to stego data
in stego database (DBS), searchable index (SI) and data consumers’ queries. However,
the CDC can gain knowledge from the search result in order to search faster for future
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Table 4.1: The summary of symbols
Symbol Description
OPE Order-Preserving Encryption scheme
D Plaintext-space
R Ciphertext-space
K Key generation algorithm
Enc Deterministic Encryption algorithm
Dec Deterministic Decryption algorithm
SE Tuple of algorithms (K, Enc,Dnc)
K the key produced by K
m the plaintext
c the ciphertext
TKD Trusted Key Distributor
CDC edge data center
HDi ith health data
k number of attributes in a patient’s sensitive data
SDi Stego data for HDi
SK Stego key for SDi
A set of k attributes {A1,A2, . . . ,Ak}
N set of k numeric attributes {N1,N2, . . . ,Nk},N ⊂ A, k < k
DBS Stego database, a set of n stego health data {SD1, SD2, . . . , SDn}
SI Secure Searchable Index
SK Set of n stego keys {SK1, SK2, . . . , SKn}
Q Privacy preserving search query
Opt Set of l stego documents {Opt1,Opt2, . . . ,Optl} returned as output by Q
Em Embedding function
Mi Secret message to be embedded in HDi using Em to produce SDi,
is a set of values of k attributes {mi1,mi2, . . . ,mik} where 1 ≤ i ≤ n
mij An element in Mi where 1 ≤ j ≤ k
M i Set of values of k numeric attributes in Mi, {mi1,mi2, . . . ,mik}
search operations. Index privacy refers to the confidentiality of SI, and query privacy
refers to the protection of data consumers’ queries.
• Scalability: A new stego document should be added or an unused stego file should be
removed without changing the security setup.
• Efficiency: Aforementioned goals should be obtained with low computation and com-
munication overhead.
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4.5.4 Proposed Privacy Preserving Range Search Over Stego Database
We discuss a framework for our proposed privacy-preserving range search over stego database
in this section. Initially, we discuss our stego database construction task. Later, we present
our actual framework for privacy-preserving range search over stego database.
4.5.4.1 Construction of Stego Database
In this task, a data owner generates a stego database DBS . The DBS is a set of n number
of stego data, i.e., DBS = {SDi|1 ≤ i ≤ n}. A stego data SDi is generated by embedding
ith patient’s secret information Mi within the patient’s health data HDi. The embedding
operation uses a function Em that takes HDi, Mi and SKi as arguments and generates SDi.
Here, SKi is the stego key for SDi. The generation of stego data can be expressed as:
SDi = Em(Di,Mi, SKi). (4.8)
In this framework, the secret message Mi is a set of values of k attributes: {mi1,mi2, . . . ,mik}.
Here, Mi denotes a sensitive data related to the ith patient and searchable by an authorized
user. A value mij(1 ≤ j ≤ k, 1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a type of jth attribute Aj ∈ A. Assume that
Mi is a set of values of k numeric attributes such that Mi ⊂ Mi. A value mij ∈ Mi is a
type of jth numeric attribute Nj ∈ N . Hence, range search is possible on the jth column
of SD. Giving examples, patient ID, name, age, date of birth, address, and contact number
are patient’s sensitive data. The Mi contains values of the aforementioned attributes for the
ith patient. Patient ID and age are numeric types. Hence, a range search is possible on the
columns containing Patient ID and age.
4.5.4.2 Overview of the Framework
Our proposed range search over stego database consists of four algorithms (KeyGen, BuildIndex,
TrapdoorGen and Query). In the following texts, we consider operations for only single data
owner. Additionally, we focus on single attribute range search. We discuss our algorithms in
details below.
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• KeyGen: The algorithm KeyGen generates two secret keys, KA and KO, for a data
owner. Here, KA is the key for a symmetric key encryption scheme SE (e.g. AES) and
KO is the key for symmetric order-preserving encryption scheme SOPE similar to the
one discussed in Section 2.
• BuildIndex(DBS ,KA,KO): Based on the stego database DBS , data owner builds a
searchable index SI that contains encrypted file identifiers generated using SE and en-
crypted values of numeric attributes generated using SOPE . After generating SI, SD is
outsourced to the cloud server. A new stego file can be generated and an corresponding
searchable index entry can be generated independently.
• TrapdoorGen: The algorithm TrapdoorGen generates a trapdoor T for the a user who
wants to search a stego document. T contains the required information IT for range
query generation.
• Query(Q): The algorithm Query takes a privacy preserving query string Q as input and
returns a set of stego documents Opt = {Opt1,Opt2, . . . ,Optt} if data exists in stego
database for Q, where Optj is a stego data of an stego document in DBS . The Opt = ∅
if no stego data exists in stego database for Q.
4.5.4.3 Building Secure Search Index for Range Search
The data owner constructs a secured search index SI in this task. The search index SI is
a matrix. A row of the matrix consists of an encrypted file name, and encrypted values of
numeric attributes.
The construction of SI involves the following steps:
1. Generating vectors of encrypted values: The data owner generates n number of
vectors for n number of stego data in DBS . A vector Vi contains encrypted values of all
numeric attributes of Mi. For k numeric attributes in a secret message Mi, there are k
elements in Vi.
Order preserving encrypted values are generated for all numeric attributes of Mi using an
symmetric order preserving encryption scheme SOPE . The order preserving encrypted
Privacy Preserving Ranged Search for Stego Data 123
value of jth attribute mij of Mi can be represented as:
Eij = SOPE(mij ,KO), (4.9)
where:
• KO is the key for SOPE
• Eij is the generated order preserving encrypted value of mij
Order preserving encrypted values are generated for all attributes using the hash function
in (4.15). The vector Vi is denoted as:
Vi = {Eij |1 ≤ j ≤ k}. (4.10)
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2. Secure naming of stego Data: The objective of this step is naming each stego file in
a secure way. The secure naming makes stego data names non modifiable. To make it
clear, the name of a stego data is generated by the data owner using a secret key KA.
Hence, only a data owner can generate the names of his/her stego data. The data owner
can verify the names of outsourced stego data anytime by regenerating the name and
matching. The data owner uses a secret key based symmetric key encryption scheme
SE for generating the secure name of ith stego data in the stego database DBS . The
generation of the secure name can be depicted as follows:
CDOwn,i = SE(Own,Mi,KA), (4.12)
where:
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• Own is the data owner’s unique ID
• Mi is the secret message of ith stego data
• KA is the the data owner’s secret key
• CDOwn,i is the secure name of ith stego data in DBS of the data owner.
All of the secure stego data names of stego documents generated by the data owner









In order to add a new stego document, the encrypted name of the stego document needs
to be computed according to 4.12. The name should be appended in CD. A row of the
vector CD is deleted and rows are re-organized for removing a stego document from the
DBS . Any stego document that has no reference in CD is deleted from the DBS at a
later time. In this way, the scalability is achieved.
3. Construction of privacy-preserving range search index : A privacy preserving
range search index SI of the data owner is a n × k matrix where k is the number of
numerical attributes in a secret message. The ith row of the matrix SI contains the














Privacy Preserving Ranged Search for Stego Data 125
∴ SI =

CDOwn,,1 E11 E12 . . . E1k






CDOwn,n En1 En2 . . . Enk
 (4.14)
Change Management. If the value of any of the attributes in the stego document SDi is
to be changed, the data owner regenerates SDi buy embedding a new set of secret attributes
within Di original document. Additionally, the new encrypted file name COwn,i for SDi is
produced. Moreover, the vector Vi of encrypted values is generated using the same key KO.
In the end, ith row of SI is changed by the [COwn,i Vi] in the copy of the cloud.
If any new stego document is to be added, then the data owner generate a new stego
document. Let, the new stego document is denoted as SDn+1 , where n is the number of
current stego documents. Additionally, the new encrypted file name COwn,n+1 for SDn+1 is
produced. Moreover, the vector Vn+1 of encrypted values is generated using the key KO. At
the end, (n + 1)-th row of SI is added with [COwn,n+1 Vn+1] in the copy of the cloud, and
SDn+1 is added in DBS .
The irow of SI of the copy of the cloud and SDi from DBS is removed to delete SDi.
4.5.4.4 Privacy Preserving Range Query for Searching Stego Data
A privacy preserving query is an operation that is initiated by an end user and executed
by the cloud. The algorithm Query(Q) takes a query string Q and sends to edge data
center CDC. The CDC performs query on secured searchable index (SI) for the Q with-
out having any knowledge on attribute values and returns a set of stego documents Opt =
{Opt1,Opt2, . . . ,Optt} if data exists in stego database for Q, where Optj is a stego data of an
stego document in DBS . The Opt = ∅ if no stego data exists in stego database for Q. The
algorithm Query outputs a privacy preserving query Q. The algorithm Query(W, T ) has the
following steps:
• Step-1: An end user generates key KO from the trapdoor T using the algorithm
TrapdoorGen. Next, the user generates encrypted values of minimum (MIN) and max-
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imum (MAX) values of search range using SOPE as follows:
EMIN = SOPE(MIN,KO)
EMAX = SOPE(MAX,KO) (4.15)
Here, EMIN and EMAX are the encrypted values of MIN and MAX, respectively.
• Step-2: The end-user generates a string W. that consists of three search parameter
{Nj , EMIN , EMAX}. Here, Nj is the name of the attribute to be searched, EMIN is the
encrypted minimum value, and EMAX is the maximum value of the range. The string
W is sent to and executed by the cloud. During the execution, the cloud uses a search
algorithm SearchExec and locates one or more entries in the search index SI. Next,
CDC retrieves corresponding encrypted file names and stores in a set C of n (n ≤ n)
elements.
• Step-3: The cloud considers an element Ci of C as the searched stego document’s name
and sets Opti = DBS [Ci], where DBS [Ci] is the stego document with a name Ci.
• Step-4: The cloud generates a set of stego documents Opt = {Opt1,Opt2, . . . ,Optn}.
Next, Opt is sent to the end user as output of the Q. If the cloud does not find any match
for the query Q in the search index SI, then returns Opt = ∅.
4.5.4.5 Performance Analysis
We analyze the performance of our proposed framework in this section. We analyze the per-
formance from the aspects of semantic privacy of both search index and query operation,
functionality and efficiency, and scalability.
4.5.4.5.1 Privacy of search index
The search index SI consists of two things: encrypted file names and encrypted searchable
attributes. State-of-the-art symmetric key encryption schemes, such as advanced encryption
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scheme (AES) [114] and data encryption standard (DES) [115], can be used to produce en-
crypted file names. However, the searchable attributes are encrypted with Order Preserving
Encryption (OPE) scheme to support range search. The security strength of the State-of-the-
art symmetric key encryption schemes is very high. In general, the security of the symmetric
key encryption lies in the length of the secret key. We assume that a secure key would be
used for the generation of the encrypted file names. The data owner generates all of the en-
crypted file names before sending the stego database and searches index. Moreover, the data
owner never shares the symmetric key with the cloud. Hence, it is provably impossible for
the cloud to determine the relationship between an encrypted file name and a stego file. In
our framework, we use a OPE scheme presented in [116]. Authors of [116] use pseudo-random
functions (PRFs) or permutations (PRPs) to ensure that no attacker can find the plaintext
of a ciphertext deterministically. The PRF used in [116] has the same domain and range of
the message space. Since order-preserving functions are injective, it also makes the security
notion stronger.
4.5.4.5.2 Privacy of query operation
In our proposed framework, the query Q consists of the name of the searched attributes and
encrypted minimum and maximum values of the attributes. The encrypted minimum and
maximum values of the attribute is generated by the user using the same SOPE algorithm
and secret key. The secret key is never transmitted to the cloud. Hence, the cloud has no
clue about the plaintext values of minimum and maximum values (i.e., range) of the searched
attribute. Moreover, the cloud searches files in the encrypted search index SI based on the
given query. A plaintext search keyword is never sent to the cloud. The search process works
as follows. Initially, the cloud searches received keyword within the set of encrypted values in
SI. Next, a set of encrypted file names are retrieved that falls within the given range. Finally,
corresponding stego files are sent to the user. As the cloud searches based on the encrypted
text, query operation is executed secretly and privacy is preserved in our proposed framework.
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4.5.4.5.3 Functionality and efficiency
Enabling multi-attribute keyword search is one of our design goals. In our model, we stated
that each stego document has k hidden attributes and possible number of numerical attributes
is k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ k. The SI contains k number of searchable attributes. Therefore, it is
guaranteed that a valid search keyword, either single or multi-attribute, will always be found
in our model. The build time of SI depends on the number of secret attribute k. Hence, the
runtime complexity of building SI is O(k).
4.5.4.5.4 Scalibility
The scalability depends on the number of operations required for making any changes in
the SI and DBS . Our proposed framework requires k number of operations in SI to change
multiple secret numeric attributes. Here, the maximum k operations are required for generating
encrypted attributes and single operation for updating the encrypted name of the stego file.
For adding a new stego file, the proposed framework requires an equal number of operations
in SI as of changing a secret attribute value. Therefore, the maximum number of operations
to make k number of changes is always (k + 1).
4.5.5 Experimental Results and Discussion
The main contribution of this paper is building a range search mechanism for stego database
that preserves privacy during the search. We conduct a set of experiments for evaluating the
performance of our proposed privacy-preserving search technique for stego data in untrusted
cloud. As we discuss the semantic privacy strength and scalability of our proposed search
technique in Section 4.5.4.5, we focus on the efficiency in our experiments. We consider three
evaluation criteria in our experiments: (i) times required for generating stego database, (ii)
times required for building the search index, and (iii) times required for searching a stego
document in the search index.
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4.5.5.1 Experimental Setup
In order to setup the environment of our experiments, we build a stego database containing
stego biomedical signals. We collect biosignal (e.g. ECG, PPG and EEG signal) dataset from
Physionet repository. The Physionet repository is funded by the National Health Institute
(U.S.) [91]. PhysioNet provides free access through their website to their large collections
of recorded biomedical signals. We implement the method stated in [22] of hiding patient
sensitive information within the biomedical signal. We generate 500 × 103 stego files for our
stego database. Each file is 10 seconds long with 250 Hz frequency. In other words, there
are 2500 records in a biosignal file. We randomly hide a different number of secret attributes
in sample biomedical signals for generating stego biomedical signals. We take a number of
stego biomedical signals for conducting each experiment. For generating encrypted names of
stego files, we use advanced encryption standard (AES) with 128-bit key. We develop a single-
threaded JAVA based programs to run our experiment. The JAVA Development Kit (JDK)
1.8 is used to write JAVA codes. We run our experiments on 3.40 GHz Intel Core i7 processor
and 8 GB RAM operated under Windows 7 operating system.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.7: Demonstration of execution times required for generating stego database (DBS) in
seconds for: (a) different number of stego documents and fixed number of sensitive attributes
(k = 25), and (b) different number of stego documents and variable number of secret attributes
(k = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25).
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4.5.5.2 Experimental Results and Analysis
We evaluate the performance of our proposed framework in terms of time cost of different
operations: stego database generation, building search index and average search time. In order
to observe the stego database generation time, we build databases of different sizes. We
consider a variable number of sensitive attributes to hide in stego documents. The number
of stego documents is generated in a few hundred thousand. Execution times are shown in
seconds. All of the files in our stego database are of equal size.
Figure 4.7(a) demonstrates the execution time required to generate stego databases with
different number of stego files containing fixed number of sensitive attributes (k = 25). Figure
4.7(b) demonstrates the execution time to generate stego databases with different number
of sensitive attributes (k = 5, 10, 20, 25) while keeping the number of stego files fixed (n =
100 × 103). In Figure 4.7(a), results show that execution time increases almost linearly when
the number of files in DBS increases. The execution time becomes almost 5 times higher if we
increase the the number of files in DBS by 5 times.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.8: Demonstration of execution times required for generating search index (SI) in
seconds for: (a) different number of stego documents and fixed number of sensitive numerical
attributes (k = 25), and (b) variable number of secret attributes (k = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25) and
same number of stego files (n = 100X103).
Figure 4.8(a) illustrates the execution time required to generate search index (SI) with
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Figure 4.9: Query execution times in seconds for range search of stego documents in the search
index SI for different number of search attributes and fixed number of stego files in DBS
(n = 100× 103).
different number of stego files containing fixed number of sensitive attributes (k = 25). On
the other hand, Figure 4.8(b) presents the execution time to generate search index (SI) with
different number of sensitive numeric attributes (k = 5, 10, 20, 25) while keeping the number of
stego files fixed (n = 100× 103). In both cases, results show that the execution time increases
almost linearly. The required times to build SI increase if the number of sensitive numeric
attributes increases (see Figure 4.8(b)).
Figure 4.9 illustrates the execution time for searching a stego document in different search
indexes SIs. We search keywords for a different number of search attributes (1, 2, 3, 4, and
5) and fixed database size with 100 × 103 stego documents. We execute the experiments 100
times for each search index and the same number of keywords. We take the average time of
the executions. The results show that times for searching a stego document in a search index
is dominated by the size of the secret attributes in the stego database. As the number of secret
attributes increases, the search time increases almost exponentially.
4.6 Discussion
Our proposed framework is the first attempt at developing a privacy-preserving search tech-
nique for stego data in the untrusted cloud data center. Hence, we cannot compare the per-
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formance of our work with any other work. The work discussed in Section 4.4 introduces a
privacy-preserving search mechanism on the stego data that does not support range queries.
Therefore, we present a comparison between the work in Section 4.4 and 4.5 in Table 4.2 based
on the capability of the range search, size of the search index, and a maximum number of
operations for an update operation in a row of the search index. In Table 4.2, we use n and x
to represent the number of files in the stego database and attributes that are involved in the
search index SI, respectively. Firstly, the comparison shows that the work in Section 4.4 does
not support range query. Secondly, our proposed method has very few numbers of entries in
SI compared to the method in Section 4.4. In addition, our method requires significantly less
number of operations than the work Section 4.4 for updating a row in SI.
Table 4.2: Comparison with existing work
Proposed Search Method Range Size Maximum Operations
Search? of SI for an Update
Keyword Search in Section 4.4 No n(2x − 1) 2x
Range Search in Section 4.5 Yes nx x+ 1
Overall, our framework takes reasonable time for generating stego databases, search indexes,
and query operation. We assume that the size of files are equal, and the number of search at-
tributes is the same for each file. The performance of the proposed framework mostly depends
on the size of the stego database and the number of secret attributes linearly for generating
stego database and search index. However, the search time depends on the number of search
attributes exponentially. We consider only stego databases in our proposed search mecha-
nism. Therefore, we do not show any performance comparison between our proposed search
techniques on the stego database and existing search techniques on the encrypted database.
4.7 Summary
In summary, we propose a privacy-preserving search framework for stego data in this chapter
where we also discuss a system model of our framework. Additionally, we briefly discuss a
threat model and outline specific design goals. The key contribution of this framework is the
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construction of a secure search index for both keyword-based search and range search over the
stego database. In the keyword-based search methods presented in Section 4.4, We build the
search index by generating hash values of sensitive attributes. The hash function supports
a backdoor that allows a data consumer to generate the same hash value for some keywords
that are generated by the data owner. Our search index contains 2k − 1 hash values for each
stego document. Therefore, the time complexity of building the search index is O(k), which
is very efficient. However, this method does not support the range query of numerical at-
tributes of secret information. In Section 4.5 therefore, we propose a privacy-preserving range
search approach for stego data. The key contribution of this approach is the construction of a
secure search index for a stego database that supports range queries using a symmetric order-
preserving encryption scheme (SOPE). We build the search index by generating encrypted
values of numerical patient sensitive attributes. Despite being encrypted, the ciphertexts pre-
serve orders of corresponding plaintext values. We establish a private link between a stego
document and a row of the search index by generating an encrypted file name. A secure sym-
metric key-based encryption scheme, such as AES, is used. The encrypted file name is stored
in the search index, as well. A data consumer generates the hash string or encrypted search
query based on the need at their side. Therefore, the edge data center neither knows the query
string nor the sensitive information within stego data. Moreover, it is not possible for the edge
data center to determine the relationship between the search string and the stego file in the
stego database. Our experimental results demonstrate the efficiency of our framework.
Chapter 5
Privacy Preserving Service
Computation in Edge Computing
With reference to the fifth and sixth research question, this chapter aims to develop a frame-
work for privacy-preserving service computing. With the increasing number of edge devices,
there is a plethora of potential computational infrastructure available for providing end-users
with new functionality and improved services. In an edge-based service ecosystem, cloud ser-
vices can be offloaded from the cloud layer to the edge layer [117]. The edge layer contains
several edge devices that are tagged with specific functionality in the edge network. One or
more edge devices are abstracted as atomic edge services based on their functionality. End-
users take advantage of dynamically available, local, and remote computational infrastructure
offered by the edge computing. Additionally, service providers not to have their services ex-
plicitly rewritten or reconfigured for each end-user service request and with minimal end-user
intervention.
In order to provide better services, the cloud provider needs to deploy as many edge de-
vices as possible. However, deploying many edge devices is not cost-effective from the cloud
provider’s point of view. Hence, the cloud provider can crowdsource [118] edge devices. An
owner of an edge device can register their edge devices as a service to the cloud by taking some
incentives and becomes an edge service provider (ESP). The crowdsourcing is benefited from
both the cloud provider and ESP’s point of view. By crowdsourcing edge services, the cloud
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provider does not need to worry about the deployment of edge devices. On the other hand,
the ESP can earn some extra money by executing cloud services at its edge device.
The availability of multiple edge service providers and their edge services introduces the
service selection and composition problem [119]. Given the probable lack of having a single
service node perform all the required functionality, service composition is a mainstream direc-
tion for solving such an issue. A solution towards service composition is to merge and manage
the available capabilities of edge devices to reach the common goal (i.e., composed service).
The edge service composition is an active research area [119, 120, 121, 122]. The composition
of edge services is challenging due to the dynamic nature of edge devices. Moreover, there
may multiple candidates satisfying the requirements for composite services with different QoS
values. A QoS-aware service selection process should be run to determine the best composite
service among the candidates for ensuring an optimal experience for end-users. From this per-
spective, we focus on modeling atomic edge services, the composition of atomic edge services
based on the functional dependencies, and quality-of-services (QoS).
As we have mentioned in previous chapters, the security of the edge devices is a concern.
Hence, service composition tasks can be biased to give benefits to a particular service provider.
In this chapter, we propose a privacy-preserving QoS-aware service composition framework for
edge computing using fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [20, 50]. More specifically, we use
Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) [123] FHE scheme for encrypting QoS values. The
service selection process is performed by the edge data centers on encrypted QoS values to
ensure service providers’ privacy. We use the service selection approach that is presented in
[124]. The service selection tasks on encrypted QoS data introduces computational overhead.
Therefore, we design a MapReduce [125] based parallel task distribution model for reducing the
computational overhead of our proposed privacy-preserving service selection framework. We
conduct several experiments to evaluate the performance of our proposed privacy-preserving
service composition framework using a synthetic QoS dataset.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.1 describes the motivations and con-
tributions of this chapter. Section 5.2 presents a literature review on privacy preservation in
service computing. Section 5.3 presents preliminary concepts that are used in this chapter.
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Figure 5.1: Privacy threat in edge based QoS-aware edge service computation
An edge service composition model based on the functional dependency is described in Section
5.4. The proposed privacy-preserving service composition framework is described in Section
5.5. Experimental results and evaluation are demonstrated in Section 5.6. Finally, Section 5.7
summarizes this chapter.
5.1 Motivations and Contributions
5.1.1 Motivations
In this chapter, we consider mobile edge devices based video surveillance and real-time data
analytics system [126, 127] as our application scenario. Consider that a security enforcement
department of a state government wants to perform an automatic number plate recognition
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(ANPR) [128, 129] for reducing driving offenses in real-time. The offenses may include improper
parking in a double row, bus lanes or parking areas regulated, identifying the location of
stolen vehicles, etc. Assume that the ANPR needs to be done in a particular region that
is at a close proximity to the data source. An IoT device (e.g., security camera) works as
a data source that captures the image of a car’s number plate and sends it for automatic
number plate recognition and car identification. Performing real-time automatic number plate
recognition and car identification is a delay-sensitive task. Therefore, real-time video data
analysis is required at the point of data collection. In our scenario, the cloud offloads the
service composition tasks to the edge nodes owned by the cloud. There are three types of
edge nodes: service composer, QoS database, and service monitor. The quality-of-service
(QoS) database stores the QoS values of edge services. The service monitor monitors the
performance of edge services and stores the quality-of-service (QoS) data in the QoS database.
The service composer composes edge services based on the requirements. We claim that the
service composition tasks can be manipulated by an attacker. The attacker can compromise the
edge node that is responsible for storing the QoS database. This is possible as the edge nodes
are located at the edge of the network. The attacker can temper the QoS data to influence the
QoS aware service selection tasks during the service composition tasks. Figure 5.1 illustrates
the privacy issues in the edge-based service ecosystem.
In this research, we identify two key research challenges of QoS-aware edge service compu-
tation in the context of edge computing. First, the modeling of the composition of dynamic
edge services is challenging. The reason behind this is that the edge service is dynamic in
nature. An edge service abstracts the functionality of edge devices that are associated with
the service. The edge devices are spatially distributed. Hence, each edge service is tagged with
location information. The composition of two edge services is dependent on the functionality
and spatial information of edge service. For example, two services that are in the same location
but there is no functional dependency between them are not composable. If two services have
a functional dependency and they are not in the same location, they cannot be composed.
Therefore, a composition model is required for the edge service composition based on the func-
tionality and location. Second, the privacy of edge services during service selection is required.
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For instance, each edge service has some QoS information that is crucial during the QoS-aware
service selection. During the composition, the edge services are selected based on their QoS
values to optimize the service composition tasks. In the edge-based service ecosystem, service
composition is performed by edge nodes. Edge nodes are susceptible to security attacks. For
example, an attacker can compromise an edge node and manipulate the QoS data prior to the
service composition tasks. Therefore, a privacy-preserving edge service composition model is
required.
The summary of the research challenges in edge service composition is as follows:
• The modeling of composition of dynamic edge services is challenging due to the functional
dependencies and spatial differences. Therefore, a composition model is required for the
edge service composition based on the functionality and location.
• Edge nodes are susceptible to security attacks. An attacker can compromise an edge
node and manipulate the QoS data prior to the QoS-aware service composition tasks.
5.1.1.1 Contributions
In this research, our contribution is two-folds. Firstly, we propose a semantic edge service
composition model that considers the functional relationships among edge services and spatial
characteristics of edge services during composition tasks. We define the key concepts of the
proposed composition model. Additionally, we describe the semantic relationships of services
that are the key concepts of the proposed model. We assume that the system provisions
several services related to automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) [128] of vehicles as
service. For example, optical character recognition (OCR) service, database search service,
storage service, message forwarding service, etc. The OCR service (Socr) takes car’s number
plate image and identifies the car’s registration number. The database search service (Ssdb)
takes the car registration number and searches it within the database to get car details. The
storage service (Sdb) stores one or multiple segments of the database. The forwarding service
(Sf ) forwards an input data, such as car’s number plate image and registration number, to Socr
and Ssdb, respectively. Each service is provided by a single or group of edge devices in the edge
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network. To make it more clear, a service is an abstraction of the functionality of one or more
edge devices. We call service as atomic edge service (S). The functionality of S is determined
by the functionality of its corresponding edge device(s). For instance, if an atomic edge service
Si is associated with a set Ei of edge device where each edge device eij ∈ Ei has the same
functionality fk, the functionality of Si is fk. Our proposed composition model dynamically
discover the semantic relationship among edge services.
Secondly, we propose a privacy-preserving edge computing-based service framework. The
framework uses a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)[20] based privacy-preserving approach.
We use Brakerski–Gentry–Vaikuntanathan (BGV) [123] FHE scheme for encrypting QoS values
in our proposed framework. The service selection process is performed by the edge nodes in
the edge computing environment on encrypted QoS values to ensure service providers’ privacy.
We use the service selection approach that is presented in [124]. The service selection tasks on
encrypted QoS data introduces computational overhead. Therefore, we design a MapReduce
[125] based parallel task distribution model for reducing the computational overhead of our
proposed privacy-preserving service selection framework.
The contributions of this paper are highlighted as follows:
1. We propose a semantic edge service composition model that considers the functional
relationships among edge services and spatial characteristics of edge services during com-
position tasks.
2. A novel privacy preserving service selection framework using Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan
(BGV ) FHE scheme is presented.
3. A MapReduce based parallel task distribution model is designed and implemented to
deal with the involved computational overheads.
4. A comprehensive evaluation of the proposed framework is presented. Experimental re-
sults demonstrate that the proposed privacy-preserving service selection framework works
efficiently when compared to the results obtained using plaintext QoS values.
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5.2 Related Work
In this section, we review some of the key research related to our work. We divide the related
work into two groups. The first group contains the research on edge service composition or
orchestration. The second group is on the privacy preserving approaches in the traditional
service computing.
5.2.1 Edge Service Composition
The research work in [119] address the problem of building and managing service specific over-
lays for media delivery in cloud networks using mobile edge devices. The proposed solution uses
a mathematical cooperation operator to turn the service specific overlays (SSO) composition
problem expressed as workflow nets into algebraic representations. In turn, the minimal cost
cooperative path from the workflow net is determined such that it guarantees the delivery of
the requested composite media services to clients.
The authors in [130] introduced a solution to model the many-to-many mobile cloud service
composition problem, where multiple mobile cloud edge nodes pool their resources to compose
a service requested by a mobile client. A theoretical model is presented to describe the service
composition topology reconfiguration process based on a series of decisions. Three algorithms
are proposed to solve the service composition process, each suitable for a different scenario. The
work omits experimental evaluations to showcase the advantages of applying such a composition
technique in cloud environments.
The authors in [131] introduced an orchestration mechanism to enable the re-use and se-
lection of service components across different composite services in distributed edge clouds.
Clients requesting a particular composite service would select one of the available service com-
ponents. Since it is unlikely that all components of a composite service are available in a single
cloud edge, session slots are used as a service availability metric to allow sharing of service
components among clients.
The paper in [132] addressed the matching problem between edge servers and users in
a multi-edge and multiusers scenario. They utilized auction theory to model the matching
relationship between service providers and consumers.
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The work in [120] proposes an optimized service cache policy by taking advantage of the
composability of services to improve the performance of service provision systems.
The none of the aforementioned research work functional dependencies among edge services
and spatial characteristics of edge services during service composition. Moreover, the privacy
preservation is not considered at all in these models.
5.2.2 Privacy preserving approaches in traditional service computing
To the best of our knowledge, only few works have investigated privacy issues in service selection
[133, 134] and composition [135, 136, 137, 138]. The role of privacy in service composition has
been investigated in [137], where only services requiring the disclosure of less sensitive informa-
tion and offered by trusted providers are selected in the composition. Users’ privacy concerns
are often addressed by providing automated techniques for matching provider’s privacy poli-
cies with customer’s preferences [136, 138, 139, 140, 141]. The most prominent solution for
policy matching is P3P (Platform for Privacy Preferences Project) [139]. P3P aims to assist
service providers in specifying their privacy practices on the Web, and users in matching such
practices against their preferences. In [140] service composition is the result of a negotiation
phase between user privacy preferences (describing the type of access to each piece of personal
information) and the Web service policy statement (specifying which information is manda-
tory and which is optional to use a service). Here, the outcome of the negotiation indicates
what personal information the user should disclose to the service provider. However, these
techniques only focus on the relation between a server and a client.
Privacy-aware service selection is addressed in [134] which presents a comprehensive frame-
work to protect users’ and service providers’ privacy needs at selection time. Users’ criteria
are matched against Web services’ attributes in a private fashion such that both criteria and
service attributes are kept private. This approach mainly focuses on protection of service pro-
vision rules from unwanted disclosure, while our goal is to select the most privacy preserving
composition. Massacci et al. [133] present an approach to service selection based on the sen-
sitivity of data to be disclosed for the service provision. The research work in [135] propose
a privacy-preserving Web service composition and selection approach that makes it possible
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to verify the compliance between users’ privacy requirements and providers’ privacy policies.
Additionally, the work ranks the composite Web services with respect to the privacy level they
offer.
The aforementioned privacy preserving approaches do not fit in the edge service ecosystem
due to the fundamental differences between traditional services and edge services.
5.3 Preliminaries
We discuss some preliminary concepts that are used in this paper. The discussion includes the
overview of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme and Brakerski−Gentry− Vaikun-
tanathan (BGV) FHE scheme. The BGV is public-key cryptography based FHE scheme.
Additionally, we discuss the MapReduce model based distribution approach.
5.3.1 Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme
The fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme is a cryptographic approach introduced
by Gentry in his work [20]. The FHE scheme supports basic arithmetic computations on
encrypted data. Hence, the FHE is used as a privacy-preserving technique. The work in
[20] follows properties of ideal lattices [49]. FHE supports an unlimited number of arithmetic
operations. As a consequence of the work in [20], several homomorphic encryption schemes
are proposed based on three branches: lattice-based [50, 51], integer-based and learning with
errors (LWE) [52] or ring-learning-with-errors (RLWE) [53] based encryption. In spite of being
a potential cryptographic technique, some of the FHE schemes remain quite impractical for
real-world applications due to their computational overhead and the number of resources that
they require for computations.
Several FHE implementations are done as libraries for simplifying FHE operations. The
three most prospective efforts are: HElib [142], FHEW [143] and Microsoft’s SEAL [144].
Each of them is based on a different encryption scheme. The HElib uses BGV, FHEW is based
on FFTW, and SEAL uses FV. The FHEW is the smallest and fastest among all the libraries.
Nevertheless, it only supports boolean circuits currently. Therefore, arithmetic operations must
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Table 5.1: The summary of symbols
Symbol Description
F Set of functionality
f Number of functionality
Ffwd ∈ F Forwarding functionality
Fdb ∈ F Data storage functionality
Focr ∈ F OCR functionality
Fsdb ∈ F Search database storage functionality
S Set of atomic edge services
s Number of atomic edge services in S
Sj An edge service in S
Sfwd ∈ F The service that provides forwarding functionality
Sdb ∈ F The service that provides data storage functionality
Socr ∈ F The service that provides OCR functionality
Ssdb ∈ F The service that provides search database storage functionality
E Set of edge devices
ei An edge device in E
Qei Set of quality parameters of ei
QSj Set of quality parameters of Sj
m Number of edge devices associated with Sj
CSk A DAG representing kth composite service
Vk Set of edge services in CSk
p Number of atomic edge services in Vk




Edk Set of functional dependencies related to CSk
q Number of functional dependencies in Edk
SC Edge service schema which is the set of all CSk(1 ≤ k ≤ n)
C Composability matrix
R Set of all root services in SC
pk BGV public-key
sk BGV secret-key
x Number of positive QoS parameters
y Number of negative QoS parameters
U(CSi) The utility score of the i-th composite service CSi
Wl The weight of the l-th negative QoS parameter
Wk The weight of the k-th positive QoS parameter
Ql(Siq) The value of l-th negative QoS parameter of q-th
service Siq in CSi
Qk(Siq) The value of k-th positive QoS parameter of q-th
service Siq in CSi
Qmaxl ,Q
min
l The minimum and maximum values of l-th negative
QoS parameter of q-th SP , respectively
Qmaxk ,Q
min
k The minimum and maximum values of k-th positive
QoS parameter of q-th SP , respectively
SScorei The aggregated utility score of a service Si
CScorek The aggregated utility score of a composite service CSk
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be encoded as boolean circuits in order to be used. SEAL supports arithmetic and polynomial
evaluation over the integers and rational numbers. In general, SEAL takes the longest amount
of time to compute an encrypted polynomial. HElib is based on the Number Theory Library
(NTL) and supports arithmetic and polynomial operations over the integers. The HElib has
special tuning code to enhance performance. Moreover, HElib has the richest API compared
to other libraries. It speeds up the performance from 36 hours in homomorphic AES scheme to
3 hours [145]. Furthermore, HElib algorithms have variety of mathematical capabilities that
makes HElib better than other implementations. A comprehensive survey on practical FHE
schemes is shown in [146]. In this paper, we exploit the advantage of HElib implementation
to improve its mathematical capabilities to meet our analytic services requirements. We use
HElib library because it is a well-known published implementation and the most practical.
5.3.1.1 The BGV Fully Homomorphic Encryption Algorithm
Notation. Let λ denote the security parameter of the algorithm. If q is a prime (the modulus)
then we use the expression [·]q to denote reduction of the argument to the range [−q/2, q/2).
The symbol Z refers to the integers, while the symbol Z[x] denote all polynomials of a single
variable x with integer coefficients. If d is a power of two, then we refer to f(x) = xd + 1 as
the irreducible polynomial of degree d. The letter b will be used to denote a bit, while bw will
denote a string of b bits of length w. We use R to denote a ring, and Rn to denote the space
of ntuples of R elements; n is known as the dimension of the space Rn. The plaintext is m,
the ciphertext is c, and the secret key is s. Note that c ∈ Rn and also s ∈ Rn. Observe that
we use bold font to denote a vector of elements.
For the BGV algorithm we use R = (Z)[x]/f(x) where f(x) is the irreducible polynomial
defined above. In this construction n = 1. We use the notation Rq = R/qR. If v is a vector
in R then v[i] denotes the i–th element of v. If u is another vector in R then the notation
< u,v > is the dot product of these two vectors in R, which can be written as
∑n
i=1 u[i].v[i]
which is also a member of R. Since R is a polynomial ring, if r is a member of this ring then
‖ r ‖ is the Euclidean norm of r, that is, it is the square root of the sum of the squares of
the coefficients of r. The expansion factor γR is equal to max(‖ ab ‖ / ‖ a ‖‖ b ‖) where the
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maximum ranges over all a and b in R. Using the Cauchy–Schwartz inequality it is easy to
see that γR <=
√
d. If q is an odd prime, and therefore not a power of two, we may write
dlog(q)e = 1 + blog(q)c. Finally we use χ to denote any distribution over R.
BGV Algorithm. The BGV algorithm is parameterized by several quantities: the security
parameter λ, the modulus q, the exponent d, the dimension n (which is always 1 in our
implementation), and the ‘noise’ distribution χ. We add an additional parameter N , which is
the integer d(2n+ 1)log(q)e. For simplicity, we assume that the plaintext space for m is {0, 1},
although the more general case can also be handled easily.
The BGV algorithm has five components: initialization (E.Setup), secret key generation
(E.SecretKeyGen), public key generation (E.PubKeyGen), encryption (E.Enc) and decryp-
tion (E.Dec). We describe each of these components below:
• E.Setup(1λ, 1µ, bsel): In the general case we use the bit bsel to denote whether we are
using the ring of integers (d = 1) or the ring of polynomials (n = 1). For the purposes of
this description we always assume the latter, so that bsel = 1. The value µ denotes the
number of bits in the modulus q. We write params = (q, d, n,N, χ).
• E.SecretKeyGen(params): Choose s′ = χn and set the secret key sk = s← (1, s′[1], . . . , s′[n]) ∈
Rn+1q .
• E.PublicKeyGen(params,sk): Generate a matrix A′ ← RnNq uniformly, and also a
vector e← χN . Then set b← A′s′+2e. Then set the matrix A to be the (n+1) column
matrix consisting of b followed by the n columns of −A′. Observe that A · s = 2e. Set
the public key pk = A.
• E.Enc(params,pk,m): set the vector m ← (m, . . . , 0) which is in Rn+1q . Sample r ←
RN and then output the ciphertext c←m+AT r. Observe that c is an element of Rn+1q .
• E.Dec(params,sk,c): output m← [[< c, s >]q]2.
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Figure 5.2: The MapReduce processes for counting words in a text.
5.3.2 MapReduce Model
The MapReduce [125] is one of the most efficient programming models for big data solutions.
This programming model is developed for parallel and distributed execution of large-scale data-
intensive applications in clusters [147]. MapReduce consists of two basic elements: mappers
and reducers. Mappers work as map functions that are used for generating a set of intermediate
key/value pairs. On the other hand, reducers are shuffling or combining functions that merge
all of the intermediate values that are associated with the same intermediate key. The primary
advantage of the MapReduce algorithm is that operations are eligible to run in parallel on
different keys and lists of data if mappers and reducers are independent of each other.
There are three core functions of MapReduce: Map(), Combining()/Shuffling(), and Re-
duce(). However, the aforementioned core functions are decomposed as follows:
1. Prepare the input: Initially, the MapReduce system delegates map processors (or
worker nodes). Next, the system assigns the input key value K1 to each of the delegated
processors. Finally, MapReduce provides all of the input data associated with that key
value to each processor.
2. The Map() step: Each worker node executes the Map() function using local data and
stores the output to a temporary storage space. The code of Map() function is executed
exactly once for each K1 key value. Newly generated output are assigned new key values
Proposed Edge Service Model 147
K2 by a master node. The key values in K2 ensures that the redundant copies of input
data are processed only once.
3. The Shuffle() step: The output generated by the Map() step is sent to the reducer
processors and assigned key values in K2. All of the reducer processors are provided with
all of the map-generated data associated with that key value in a way so that all data
under one key are located on the same worker node.
4. The Reduce() step: Designated worker nodes process their corresponding group of
output data (per key) in parallel. The parallel execution is performed according to the
user-provided Reduce() code. Each function is run exactly once for each key value in K2
produced by the map step.
5. Produce the final output: The MapReduce system collects all of the outputs obtained
from Reduce() step and sorts them according to key values in K2 for producing the final
outcome.
Figure 5.2 shows the classical “word count problem” using the MapReduce model. As shown
in Figure 5.2, a process splits the data into a subset of chunks initially. These chunks are
processed by the mappers later. A shuffling process is initiated for combining key values under
the same worker node once the key/values are generated by mappers. The reduce functions
are used to count the words that generate a common output at the end. The final count value
is used as a result of the algorithm. The final output is a sorted list of word counts from the
original text input.
5.4 Proposed Edge Service Model
We first propose a model for Edge services. In this section, we present a formal model that
defines key concepts of our proposed service model. The key concepts include atomic edge
service, composite edge service and service schema. Table 5.1 summarizes the major notations
used in the rest of the paper.
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Assume that there are m edge devices in a network. A set F of f functionality are offered
by edge devices in the network. The set F can be represented as: F = {F1, F2, . . . , Ff}.
For instance, edge devices can provide functionality such as message forwarding, data storage,
optical character recognition, searching car details, etc. The functionality provided by an edge
devices that receives an image from the security camera can be named as forwarding (Ffwd).
The functionality of storing data in an edge network can be called as data storage (Fdb). The
optical character recognition task can be named as OCR (Focr). Searching car details in the
database can be called as search functionality and denoted as Fsdb.
An atomic edge service is an abstraction of the functionality of one or more edge devices
that perform similar operation in the edge network. Giving examples, edge devices that takes
an image from the security camera can be abstracted as forwarding service (Sfwd), edge devices
that stores data in an edge network are abstracted as data service (Sdb), the set of edge de-
vices that execute optical character recognition task can be abstracted as OCR service (Socr),
and the set of edge devices that execute search operation in database can be abstracted as
search service (Ssdb). The forwarding service, data service, OCR service and search service
are examples of atomic edge service. The set S of s atomic edge services can be denoted as
S = {S1, S2, . . . Ss}. An atomic edge service Si is associated with e edge devices with common
functionality from the set E of n edge devices in the network.
Definition 1. Edge Device, ei. An edge device ei is a tuple < eidi, loci, Fi, Q
e
i >, where:
• eidi is a unique ID for the ith edge device.
• loc = (lat, long) represents the current geographic location of ei. Here, lat and long are
the latitude and longitude of ei, respectively. We assume that ei is stationary in our
model.
• Fi is the functionality offered by ei and Fi ∈ F .
• Qei is the set of quality-of-service (QoS) parameters of ei. We discuss the QoS paprameters
later in this section.
Proposed Edge Service Model 149
Giving an example, a WiFi router can be considered as an edge device. An owner of the
WiFi router registers it in the cloud and gets an unique eid = 1001. At the time of registra-
tion, the lat = −37.8101 and long = 144.9626 of the WiFi router are recorded to obtain loc.
Let, the functionality of the edge device is registered as OCR (Focr). The cloud monitors the
edge devices and records the QoS parameter (e.g. availability, coverage, throughput, response
time, service time, cost, etc. ) values. The set Qei presents the QoS values of the edge device ei.




• sidj is a unique service ID.
• Ej = {eji|1 ≤ i ≤ m} denotes the set of m edge devices that are abstracted by the service
Si. Here, all of the edge devices in Sj have the same location and functionality.
• regj is the area covered by the edge devices of the service Sj .
• Fj represents the functionality of Sj that is inferred from the functionality of edge devices
abstracted by Sj .
• Qsj denotes the set of QoS parameters of the service Sj . The QoS values are aggregated
values obtained from the QoS values of edge devices in Sj .
Giving an example, an atomic edge service with a unique ID 101 can be denoted as S101.
The service S101 has two edge devices e1001 and e1002 that are located within each others cov-
erage area. Therefore, the reg101 of Si becomes the area covered by e1001 and e1002. Assume
that both e1001 and e1002 provide OCR functionality (i.e. Focr). Hence, the functionality of
S101 becomes Focr as well. The Q
s
101 captures the aggregated QoS values of e1001 and e1002.
For example, the throughput of S101 is computed as the summation of throughputs of e1001
and e1002. We discuss more about this later in this section.
A composite edge service is a collection of two or more atomic edge services. Giving an
example, the detail of a car from an image of the car’s number plate can be found using atomic
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Figure 5.3: An atomic edge service, Sj . Here, Fi is the functionality provided by the i-th edge
device eji of j-th atomic edge service Sj . All of the edge devices have same functionality in Sj
(i.e, e11.F1 = e11.F2 = . . . .. = e11.Fm).
edge services: data service, OCR service and search service. Therefore, the collection of these
atomic edge services can be called as a composite edge service C in the edge network. A com-
posite edge service Ci is constructed from the instances of atomic edge services that are required
to fulfill a particular requirement. The atomic edge services has functional dependencies. For
example, the ’search service’ (Ssdb) requires car registration number generated by the ’OCR
service’ (Socr) as input to find the car details. The search ’search service’ (Ssdb) uses ’data
storage service’ (Sdb) to find the car details. Hence, there is a functional dependency between
Ssdb and Socr, and Ssdb and Sdb. The dependencies can be presented as {Ssdb → Socr} and
{Ssdb → Sdb}. We use a directed acyclic graph (DAG) to represent the functional dependencies
among services. A node in the DAG is an atomic edge service. An edge indicates the functional
dependency. The figure 5.4 illustrates a typical composite service. The composite service can
be defined formally as follows:
Definition 3. Composite Edge Service, CSk. A composite edge service CSk = (Vk, Edk, rootk)
is a directed acyclic graph (DAG), where:
• Vk = {Skj |1 ≤ j ≤ p} represents a set of atomic edge services.
• Edk = {edkj |1 ≤ j ≤ q} denotes the denotes the functional dependencies between two
atomic edge services in the composite edge service CSk, denoted by edkj = (S, S
′
) is an
edge, where S ∈ Vk, S′ ∈ Vk, and S 6= S′ .
• rootk is the root of the graph that represents the composite edge service CSk. Here,
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rootk is the initial atomic edge service of CSk that represents the starting point. All
other atomic edge services in CSk are accessed from this service. In our scenario, rootk
can be a service that has message forwarding functionality and within the range of the
source camera (i.e Sj ∈ Vk, Sj .F = ffwd, and distance(Sj .loc, loc)range. Here, loc is
location of the source camera and range is the prefered range of the camera.
An Edge service schema (SC) is the collection of all composite edge services (CSs) and
composability matrix (C). Formally, SC can be defined as follows:
Definition 4. Edge service schema, SC. An edge service schema is defined as a tuple
SC = (CS1, CS2, . . . , CSn, C), where CSl(1 ≤ l ≤ n) is a composite edge service and C is
the composability matrix. We discuss about the composability matrix (C) in detail later in
this section.
Figure 5.4: A composite edge service
5.4.1 Functional dependency
The functional dependency between two atomic services should be determined dynamically. It
is determined based on the functionality of edge devices that are associated with the services.
Assume that S and S
′
are two atomic services. E and E
′
are the sets of edge devices that
are associated with S and S
′
, respectively. The functional dependency between S and S
′
are
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denoted as S → S′ , where S is the service that operates before S′ . The relationship S → S′ is
true if the following rules are satisfied:
• Rule-1: ∃ei ∈ S.E, ∃ej ∈ S′ .E′ | distance(ei, ej) ≤ range.
• Rule-2: ∀ei ∈ S.E ∀ej ∈ S′ .E′ | (ei.F = Focr ∧ ej .F = Fsdb) ∨
(ei.F = Fsdb ∧ ej .F = Fdb).
The Rule-1 checks if there exists at least one edge device ei in the service S and ej in the
service S
′
such that ei and ej are within the range of each other. Consider two atomic edge
services: S1 and S2. There are three edge devices associated with S1. The set of edge devices
of S1 is represented as: E1 = {e11, e12, e13}. There are two edge devices associated with S2.
The set of edge devices of S2 is represented as: E2 = {e21, e22}. The Rule-1 states that there
should be at least one pair of edge devices, one from E1 and another from E2, such that are
within the range of each other to have a functional dependency.
The Rule-2 checks two conditions: (1) all of the edge devices ei in the service S must have
the functionality Focr if the functionality of all of the edge devices ej in S
′
have the functionality
Fsdb, and (2) all of the edge devices ei in the service S must have the functionality Fsdb if the
functionality of all of the edge devices ej in S
′
have the functionality Fdb. Consider two atomic
edge services: S1 and S2. There are three edge devices associated with S1. The set of edge
devices of S1 is represented as: E1 = {e11, e12, e13}. There are two edge devices associated
with S2. The set of edge devices of S2 is represented as: E2 = {e21, e22}. According to the
first condition of Rule-2, S1 and S2 have functional dependency if the functionality of S1
and S2 are Focr and Fsdb,respectively. Formally, S1.F = FOCR and S2. The second condition
states that if the functionality of S1 is Fsdb then the functionality of S2 should be Fdb to have
a functional dependency between S1 and S2.
5.4.2 Composability and Composability Matrix
The term composability indicates whether two atomic edge services are composable. In our
model, two atomic edge services are composable if there exists a functional dependency between
them. The functional dependency between two atomic edge services can be determined by the
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rules stated in Section 5.4.1. The composability of two atomic edge services s and s
′
can be
denoted as: s . s
′
. The rule of comopsability can be represented as:
• Rule-3.3: ∃s ∈ S, ∃s′ ∈ S, s→ s′ | s . s′ = true.
The composability among of all of the services are captured and stored in a matrix C, called
as composability matrix. C is an n × n matrix where n is the number of services in the set S
of atomic services. An entry C[s, s
′
] of C is ’1’ if s→ s′ | s . s′ = true, ’0’ otherwise. Formally,





1 if s . s
′
= true
0 if s . s
′
= false
5.4.3 QoS Model for Privacy Preserving Service Selection Framework
There can be multiple services that offer the same functionality. In order to differentiate one
service from another, nonfunctional properties of services are considered. In general, nonfunc-
tional properties are known as Quality-of-Service (QoS) parameters. Values of QoS parameters
are used for optimization purposes [148]. The QoS model for Cloud Services formally defines a
set of quality parameters for cloud services. QoS parameters of services contribute differently
to evaluate the overall quality of services. There are some QoS parameters that improve the
overall quality of services if their values are higher. In contrast, some QoS parameters may
reduce the overall quality of service when their values are higher. In [148], ffive typical QoS
criteria are specified that are divided into two categories: negative quality and positive quality.
The specified QoS parameters are execution price, execution time, reputation, successful exe-
cution rate, and availability. We discuss the negative and positive quality parameters in detail
below:
• Negative quality : The negative quality indicates lower quality for its higher value. For
example, execution time and execution price are two negative quality. The execution
price gives the dollar amount required to execute a service. The execution price quality
can be obtained based on the service providers’ advertisement in the service description.
The execution time is measure of time required to execute a service. Execution time
Proposed Edge Service Model 154
is calculated as: ExecutionT ime = EndTime − StartT ime. The execution time is
calculated by the cloud itself.
• Positive quality : The positive quality indicates higher quality for its higher value. Suc-
cessful execution rate, reputation, and availability are few examples of the positive qual-
ity. The reputation of a service is a measure of the service’s trustworthiness. It mainly
depends on the ratio to which the actual provision of the service is compliant with its
promised one. The reputation is determined based on the ranking of the cloud users.
The successful execution rate depends on the ratio to which the number of successful
execution over to total number of times the service is invoked. The availability is the
probability that the service is accessible. Both successful execution rate and availability
are calculated by the cloud itself.
5.4.4 QoS-aware Service Selection Approach
Available services in a service pool with overlapping or identical functionality may have different
QoS values. Hence, a choice is required to determine which service matches most to a user’s
expectation. Most of the time, a combination of different services are required to fulfill a
user requirement. In other words, a composite service needs to be created from the set of
different type of services. Therefore, a service should be selected from each type in a way
such that the resulting composite service becomes the best composite service. We consider
that there are m types of services in the service system. A composite service is a collection
of m services having one service from each type. The QoS-aware service selection can be
defined as a process that selects a service from each type of services in SP such that the
resulting composite service becomes the best composite service from set of possible composite
service that mostly satisfies user requirement. To make it clear, only those services should be
selected that contribute to form the best composite service. A utility score is computed for each
candidate composite service using a utility function. A utility function is presented in [124]
to determine the desirability of a composite service. This utility function relies on Multiple
Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) and Simple Additive Weighting (SAW) technique [149].
Following the idea of QoS model of services presented in Section 5.4.3, we use the function for
Privacy Preserving Edge Service Composition Framework using Fully Homomorphic
Encryption 155
calculating the utility score of a composite service presented in [124]. The utility function can





















In (3), there are x negative criteria and y positive criteria. Moreover, U(CSi) represents the
utility value of a candidate composite service CSi, where CSi ∈ PCS. Wl is the weight of the
l-th negative quality criterion of associated with a user’s preference, and Wk is the weight of the







Ql(Siq) denotes the value of the l-th negative quality criterion of q-th service Siq in CSi.
Qk(Siq) denotes the value of the k-th positive quality criterion of q-th service Siq in CSi. Q
max
l
and Qminl are maximum and minimum values of its l-th negative quality criterion in q-th service
pool SPiq, respectively. They are computed by the participant services’ l-th negative quality
criterion in a certain way. Qmaxk and Q
min
k are the CSi’s maximum and minimum values of
its k-th positive quality criterion in q-th service pool SPiq, respectively. They are computed
by the participant services’ k-th positive quality criterion with a certain way. Therefore, an
objective function, i.e., Max(U(CSi)), is used for maximizing the user satisfaction expressed
as utility functions over QoS attributes.
5.5 Privacy Preserving Edge Service Composition Framework
using Fully Homomorphic Encryption
In this section, we discuss our privacy preserving edge service compostion framework. Initially,
we discuss our edge service composition algorithms for producing candidate composite services.
Next, we discuss our privacy preserving QoS-aware composite service selection algorithm.
5.5.1 QoS-aware Edge Service Composition
The edge service composition involves three algorithms: GenCompMatrix, GenServiceSchema,
and CompServSelection. We discuss the functionality of each algorithm in details below:
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Algorithm 8: Generate Edge Service Composability Matrix, GenCompMatrix
Input: Set of Services S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}
Output: Edge Service Composability Matrix, C
1 Procedure generateComposabilityMatrix(S)
2 begin
3 for each si, sj ∈ S, where si 6= sj
4 for some eik ∈ si and ejl ∈ sj
5 if checkComposability(eik, ejl) = true then








14 if withinRange(eik,ejl) = true then
15 if(efrom.f = Ffwd and eto.f = Focr) then
16 return true
17 else if (efrom.f = Focr and eto.f = Fdbs) then
18 return true






• GenCompMatrix: This algorithm generates an edge service composability matrix C.
The psedocode for this algorithm is shown in Algorithm 8. The matrix C takes the set
of all atomic services S and determines the composability of two services. Assume that
s and s
′
are two services such that s ∈ S, s′ ∈ S and s 6= s′ . If there exists a func-
tional dependency between s and s
′
(i.e. s → s′) then an entry, C[s, s′ ] = true, in C.
The entry, C[s, s
′
] = false, in C, conversely. The algorithm GenCompMatrix contains
two procedures: generateComposabilityMatrix() and checkComposability(). The check-
Composability() takes two edge devices, eik and ejk′ from two different services si and
sj , where eik ∈ si and ejk′ ∈ sj . Next, checkComposability() checks the composability
between the aforementioned edge devices. If eik and ejk′ are within the range of each
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Algorithm 9: Generate Edge Service Schema, GenServiceSchema
Input: Set of Services S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, Composability Matrix (C), Camera
location (loc)
Output: Edge Service Schema (SC)
1 Procedure genServiceSchema()
2 begin
3 SC = ∅;
4 R = ∅; // set of root services
5 for each si ∈ S




10 each si ∈ R
11 create a service graph Gi;
12 Gi.Vi = ∅;
13 Gi.Ei = ∅;
14 Gi.root = si;
15 add(Gi.Vi,si);
16 mark si unvisited in Gi.Vi
17 genCompositeService(Gi);
18 SC.add(Gi);




23 each sj ∈ Gi.Vi
24 (sj .isUnvisited() = true) then
25 Nj = getNeighbours(sj ,C);
26 mark sj visited in Gi.Vi;
27 each sk ∈ Nj
28 add(Gi.Vi,sk);
29 mark sk unvisited in Gi.Vi
30 // create an edge from sj to sk




35 end for end
other and satisfy any one condition of the functional dependencies, the two edge devices
are considered composable. Hence, the checkComposability() returns true. The gen-
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Algorithm 10: QoS-aware Composite Edge Service Selection, CompServSelection
Input: Set of Services S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, Service Schema SC
Output: Composite Edge Service CSopt with maximum score
1 Procedure selectCompService(S,SC)
2 begin
3 CSopt := null;
4 MaxScore := −∞;
5 for each CSi ∈ SC
6 CScorei := 0
7 for each sij ∈ CSi
8 CScorei+ = getServiceScore(sij);
9 end for
10 if CScorei ≥MaxScore then
11 MaxScore = CScorei;







19 SScorej := 0;
20 each ejk ∈ sj
21 EScorejk := 0;
22 Compute EScorejk using (5.1);




erateComposabilityMatrix() procedure takes the set S of atomic services and finds the
composability among services. In order to do this, the generateComposabilityMatrix()
takes two services si and sj , where si ∈ S, sj ∈ S, and si 6= sj , and finds if there exists at
least one edge device from both of si and sj if the edge devices are composable or not. If
, then si and sj are composable. The generateComposabilityMatrix() procedure invokes
checkComposability() procedure for the checking devices’ composability. If services si
and sj are composable, the entry C[si, sj ] becomes true (i.e. C[si, sj ] = true).
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• GenServiceSchema: This algorithm generates a service schema SC. Algorithm 9 repre-
sents the pseudocode of this algorithm. The service schema SC consists of several service
graphs with different root service. Each service graph is a possible composite edge service.
The GenServiceSchema has two procedures: genServiceSchema() and genCompositeSer-
vice(). The procedure genServiceSchema() takes set of services S, composability matrix
C, and the camera location loc as input. The procedure generates an edge service schema
SC as output. At first, the procedure identifies all the services within the range of the
camera having the functionality of message forwarding (i.e. S.f = Ffwd). At second, all
of the services with the forwarding functionality is stored in a set called R. Here, the R
is the set of all possible root services within the region of the camera. Next, for each ser-
vices si ∈ R, the procedure generates a directed acyclic graph (DAG) Gi. A graph Gi is
a touple: Gi = (Vi, Ei, rooti). Here, Vi is the set of vertices that contains the service IDs
of the services that are members of the graph Gi. Ei is the set of directed edges between
any two vertices of Gi. The rooti is the root service of the graph Gi. The procedure
sets each service si ∈ R as the root of Gi, and marks si as unvisited in Gi. Next, for
each Gi having only the root service, the procedure invokes another procedure genCom-
positeService() to build the service graph Gi. The genCompositeService() is a recursive
function that recursively finds the neighbors of all unvisited nodes (i.e. services) in the
graph Gi and creates edges between a service and its corresponding neighbors. When
neighbors are added in the graph for a node, that node is marked as visited. At last, the
procedure genCompositeService() adds the service graph Gi in the service schema SC.
Finally, the procedure genServiceSchema() returns the service schema SC when all of
the service graphs are constructed.
• CompServiceSelection: The algorithm finds the best composite service having the max-
imum utility score. The algorithm consists of two procedures: selectCompService() and
getServiceScore(). The procedure getServiceScore() computes the aggregated utility score
SScorei of a service si in a composite service. The selectCompService() procedure com-
putes the aggregated utility score CScorei for a composite service. The pseudocode is
presented in Algorithm 10.
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Algorithm 11: Privacy Preserving QoS-aware Composite Edge Service Selection,
PPCompServSelection
Input: Set of Services S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, Service Schema SC
Output: Composite Edge Service CSopt with maximum score
1 Procedure selectCompService(S,SC)
2 begin
3 CSopt := null;
4 MaxScoreE˜ := −∞;
5 for each CSi ∈ SC
6 CScoreE˜i := 0
7 for each sij ∈ CSi






11 MaxScoreE˜ = CScoreE˜i ;







19 SScoreE˜j := 0;
20 for each ejk ∈ sj
21 EScoreE˜jk := 0;
22 Compute EScoreE˜jk using (5.2);






5.5.2 Proposed Privacy Preserving QoS-aware Composite Service
Selection using Fully Homomorphic Cryptography
We present our proposed privacy preserving QoS-aware service selection approach in this sec-
tion. The key idea of our proposed technique is to select a set of component services from
service registry SR based on encrypted QoS values of services. We use BGV fully homomor-
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phic encryption (FHE) scheme as discussed in Sect. 5.3.1.1 for encrypting the QoS values of
service.
In order to maintain the privacy of services, service monitor encrypts QoS values using
BGV Homomorphic encryption scheme E˜ before storing into QoS repository. Firstly, ser-
vice monitor initializes encryption parameter using the component E˜.Setup(1λ, 1µ, bsel) of
E˜. The encryption parameter can be denoted as params = (q, d, n,N, χ). Secondly, a
secret key sk is generated using E˜.SecretKeyGen(params). Thirdly, A public key pk is
generated using E˜.PublicKeyGen(params, sk). Service monitor shares pk with service me-
diator for future computation. Finally, each evaluated QoS value Qij is encrypted using
E˜.Enc(params, pk,Qij). The encrypted value of j-th QoS parameter of i-th service is de-
noted as E˜(Qij). Each E˜(Qij) is stored in QoS repository.
Service mediator finds the best composite service based on user’s request. In general, mul-
tiple component services need to be selected to from different service pools to fulfill a user’s
request. Service mediator calculates utility score for different combinations of component ser-
vices based on encrypted QoS values available in QoS repository. In order to calculate utility
score based on encrypted QoS values, we need mathematical operations such as fully homo-
morphic addition (⊕), subtraction (	), multiplication (⊗), division () and homomorphic
summation (∑). The fully homomorphic summation operation is in fact a series of homo-
morphic addition. The utility function in (5.1) to calculate encrypted utility score E˜(U(CSi))
of composite service CSi can be represented using homomorphic operators as follows:







where, E˜(NSiq) is the function that computes encrypted negative utility score, and E˜(PSiq) is
the function that computes encrypted positive utility score of the composite service Si for all q
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E˜(Qmaxk )	 E˜(Qmink )
)
⊗Wk, (5.4)
Here, E˜(Ql(Siq)) denotes the encrypted value of the l-th negative quality criterion of q-th
service Siq in CSi. E˜(Qk(Siq)) denotes the value of the k-th positive quality criterion of q-
th service Siq in CSi. E˜(Q
max
l ) and E˜(Q
min
l ) are maximum and minimum values of its l-th
negative quality criterion in q-th service pool SPiq, respectively. E˜(Q
max
k ) and E˜(Q
min
k ) are
the CSi’s maximum and minimum values of its k-th positive quality criterion in q-th service
pool SPiq, respectively. The pseudocode for this part is depicted in Algorithm 11.
Figure 5.5: Privacy Preserving Service Selection based on a MapReduce Model
5.5.2.1 Privacy Preserving Composite Service Selection based on a MapReduce
Model
In this section, we describe a parallel processing approach for service selection tasks using vir-
tual machines (VMs) based on MapReduce model. Fig. 5.5 illustrates the structure of parallel
processing for service selection based on MapReduce model. The computational overheads
associated with fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is reduced by using distributing service
selection tasks. As a result, the performance of privacy preserving service selection is signif-
icantly enhanced while keeping the accuracy of service selection computations. We have two
main components in the MapReduce model: 1) A mapper where independent computational
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tasks of service selection can be distributed among a set of mappers (Virtual Machines (VMs)),
2) A reducer where the results from all of the mappers (VMs) are aggregated to accomplished
campsite service selection task and choose optimal utility score. In our model, we consider
implementing independent utility score computation function for each service type in a single
mapper. The reducers aggregate and compute final composite score for the service selection.
The MapReduce model based privacy preserving service selection algorithm is described in
Algorithm 12.
Algorithm 12: Distributed privacy preserving service selection tasks using MapRe-
duce model




3 Initialization : Maxk(E˜(UCSi )) := 0
4 for each Sij ∈ Sk, where Sk ⊂ S
5 find E˜(UCSi ) using (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4)
6 if (E˜(UCSi ) ≥Maxk(E˜(UCSi ))) then
7 Maxk(E˜(UCSi )) = E˜(UCSi )
8 end if
9 end for
10 output(key = k,value = Maxk(E˜(UCSi )))
11 end
12 Procedure reducer(key = k,value = Set of Maxk(E˜(UCSi )))
13 begin
14 Initialization : Max(E˜(UCSi )) := 0
15 for each k
16 if (Maxk(E˜(UCSi )) ≥Max(E˜(UCSi ))) then




20 return Max(E˜(UCSi ))
21 end
Privacy Preserving Edge Service Composition Framework using Fully Homomorphic
Encryption 164
5.5.2.2 Computational Complexity
Assume that there are total n number of services of m types. Total m number of services to
be selected taking one service from each type to build a composite service. For simplicity, let
us consider that the computational overhead of the BGV encryption scheme is constant as
the required times for encrypting all of the QoS values are almost similar. The computational
complexity of the conventional service selection task in a centralized system is O(nm), which
can be reduced by using MapReduce based task distribution. The computational complexity
of the MapReduce model comprises the complexity of mapper and reducer. Assume that there
are k virtual machines (VMs) available. Hence, the computational complexity of mapper for
the service selection process is O(nm/k). On the other hand, the computational complexity
of reducer having k VMs is O(log(k)). Overall, the complexity of the MapReduce based
distributed service selection model is O(nm/k + log(k)).
5.5.2.3 Analysis of Privacy Preservation
The security of our proposed privacy preserving framework depends on two things. Firstly, the
usage of a trusted third party (TTP ). In our framework, TTP is a party that is trusted by
everyone. Here, TTP can be considered as an entity similar to the certification authority in
the traditional network systems. Secondly, the usage of public-key cryptography based FHE
scheme (i.e. BGV encryption algorithm). TTP uses BGV FHE scheme to generate a key-
pair. The key-pair consists of two keys: public (pk) and secret (sk) key. TTP encrypts each
of QoS data by its pk and stores in the QoS repository in the cloud. TTP never discloses
its sk to anyone. However, pk of TTP is accessible by the cloud. The service mediator of
cloud performs the service selection tasks on the encrypted QoS data without knowing sk.
To make it clear, the service mediator can see only the encrypted QoS values and results
produced using them. According to the security assumption of public-key cryptography, it is
computationally unattainable to determine the secret key from corresponding public key. If the
security assumptions of BGV scheme holds, sk of TTP cannot be recovered from corresponding
pk. Therefore, our proposed framework is able to preserve the privacy during the service
selection process.
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5.6 Experimental Results and Discussion
We conduct a set of experiments for evaluating performance of our proposed privacy preserving
QoS-aware edge service composition framework. At first, we discuss our experimental setup.
Later, we show our experimental results and evaluate the performance of the results. It is
important to define the scope of our experiments. Authors in research work [120, 150] demon-
strate that edge computing significantly improves the time required for service composition
and provisioning. As our primary intention to develop a privacy preserving QoS-aware edge
service composition framework, we mainly demonstrate the performance comparison between
QoS-aware edge service compositon using plaintext QoS data and encrypted QoS data. In
our experiment, we encrypt the QoS data of edge devices using fully homomorphic encryption
(FHE) technique. We discuss the FHE tool in detail in the following subsection.
5.6.1 Experimental Setup
We have implemented the deploying algorithms in C++. Our experiments are conducted on
a Intel Core i5 machine with 8GB memory on Ubuntu 16.04 operating system. To the best
of our knowledge, there is no considerable service test case available in the public domain and
that can be used for experimentation purposes. Therefore, we evaluate the proposed approach
by using synthetic QoS data.
In order to implement Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), we use HElib[151]. The HElib
is a C++ based software library that implements fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). Cur-
rent version of HElib implements Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) scheme. Several
optimization approaches are used in this library to make homomorphic evaluation run faster.
The implementation mostly focuses on using Smart-Vercauteren ciphertext packing techniques
and the Gentry-Halevi-Smart optimization effectively. Nevertheless, current version of HElib
does not support arithmetic operations on floating-point numbers. The research work in [152]
proposes a floating-point operation using HElib. In our experiments, we use the implementation
of the work in [152] for performing arithmetic operations on floating-point number.
In our dataset, we have considered an area that is divided into 4 regions. Each region has
approximately 500 edge devices in different locations with three different functionality. The
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Table 5.2: A summary of methods used in experiments
Symbol Description
PT-QSC The QoS-aware edge service composition approach on plaintext QoS
data without MapReduce using single edge node.
PP-QSC The privacy preserving QoS-aware edge service composition approach
on encrypted QoS data without MapReduce using single edge node.
PP-QSC-MR The privacy preserving QoS-aware edge service composition approach
on encrypted QoS data without MapReduce using multiple edge node.
PP-QSC-MR-EN2 The privacy preserving QoS-aware edge service composition approach
on encrypted QoS data without MapReduce using 2 edge node.
PP-QSC-MR-EN4 The privacy preserving QoS-aware edge service composition approach
on encrypted QoS data without MapReduce using 4 edge node.
PP-QSC-MR-EN6 The privacy preserving QoS-aware edge service composition approach
on encrypted QoS data without MapReduce using 6 edge node.
PP-QSC-MR-EN8 The privacy preserving QoS-aware edge service composition approach
on encrypted QoS data without MapReduce using 8 edge node.
PP-QSC-MR-EN10 The privacy preserving QoS-aware edge service composition approach
on encrypted QoS data without MapReduce using 10 edge node.
functionality are ”OCR” (Focr), ”search” (Fsdb) and ”data storage” (Fdb). The location and
functionality of edge devices are uniformly distributed. The QoS values of edge devices are
generated using an interval: Qi ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that the weights of QoS attributes are
provided during the registration process by users as follows: WC = WA = 0.3, WR = 0.2, and
WSER = WT = 0.1. Here, WC , WA, WR, WSER, and WT denote weight of cost of execution,
availability, response time, service time and throughput, respectively.
For simplicity, we have abstracted two edge devices as an atomic edge service. Therefore,
there are roughly 250 atomic edge services within a region. In our model, we have considered
static dependency between two services. There are two types of dependencies: Focr → Fsdb and
Fsdb → Fsdb. Therefore, there exists two service dependencies: Socr → Ssdb and Ssdb → Ssdb.
Using the service dependecies, we build a composability matrix C. We assume that edge
devices are static in nature. Hence, C is static and it is predetermined prior to the service
composition tasks. Based on the composability matrix, we generate a service schema SC,
which is also static. At the runtime, the QoS parameters are collected from the edge node (i.e.
QoS database) that is responsible for storing QoS values of edge devices.
For evaluating the performance, we have two different copies of QoS databases as: plaintext
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and encrypted format. Initially, we run the privay preserving service composition approach on
plaintext QoS data. Later, we run the proposed method on encrypted QoS data. We observe
the performance of the following methods:
1. The QoS-aware edge service composition approach on plaintext QoS data without MapRe-
duce (PT-QSC) using single edge node.
2. The privacy preserving QoS-aware edge service composition approach on encrypted QoS
data without MapReduce (PP-QSC) using single edge node.
3. The privacy preserving QoS-aware service composition approach on encrypted QoS data
with MapReduce model (PP-QSC-MR) using multiple edge nodes. We implement
the PP-QSC-MR with different number of edge nodes (VMs): with 2 edge nodes (
PP-QSC-MR-EN2), with 4 edge nodes ( PP-QSC-MR-EN4), 6 edge nodes (PP-
QSC-MR-EN6), 8 edge nodes (PP-QSC-MR-EN8), and 10 edge nodes (PP-QSC-
MR-EN10).
Figure 5.6: The comparison of times required to generate encrypted QoS database among
methods without MapReduce (EQoSDbGen) and with MapReduce (EQoSDbGen-MR)
for different number of edge nodes.
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5.6.2 Experimental Results and Performance Evaluation
We run a set of experiments for evaluating the performance of our proposed privacy preserv-
ing edge service composition model. For each method stated in Section 5.6.1, we execute our
experiments 100 times and take the average results. We perform multiple experiments using
different methods: PT-QSC, PP-QSC, PP-QSC-MR-EN2, PP-QSC-MR-EN4, PP-
QSC-MR-EN6, PP-QSC-MR-EN8 and PP-QSC-MR-EN10. The summary of afore-
mentioned methods are presented in Table 5.2. Experimental results are used to evaluate the
followings:
1. Time required to generate the encrypted QoS database having different number of services
and QoS parameters.
2. Time required for single request to find the best composite service.
3. Time required for different number of requests to to find the best composite service.
4. Accuracy of finding the best composite service for different number of requests.
5. Time required for single request to to find the best composite service with variable number
of QoS parameters from fixed number of services in each service type.
Figure 5.6 illustrates the comparison of required times for generating the encrypted QoS
databases without MapReduce of EQoSGen and with MapReduce EQoSGen-MR for dif-
ferent number of virtual machines (VMs). We consider the number of VMs: 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10.
Results show that the required time to generate an encrypted QoS database increases if the
number of edge services increases. From the result, we can state that the required time reduces
by using MapReduce model with higher number of VMs.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the comparison of required times for edge service compositions of
PT-QSC, PP-QSC, PP-QSC-MR-EN2 PP-QSC-MR-EN4, PP-QSC-MR-EN6, PP-
QSC-MR-EN8 and PP-QSC-MR-EN10. We randomly choose different numbers of edge
services from each type of services. Initially, we run edge service composition approach on
plaintext QoS dataset using Algorithm 3 and observe the execution times. Later, we run our
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Figure 5.7: The comparison of times finding the best composite edge service for PT-
QSC, PP-QSC, PP-QSC-MR-EN2, PP-QSC-MR-EN4, PP-QSC-MR-EN6, PP-
QSC-MR-EN8, and PP-QSC-MR-EN10.
Figure 5.8: The comparison of scalability of PT-QSC, PP-QSC, PP-QSC-MR-EN2, PP-
QSC-MR-EN4, PP-QSC-MR-EN6, PP-QSC-MR-EN8, PP-QSC-MR-EN10.
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Figure 5.9: The comparison of execution times of the proposed framework for different number
of QoS parameters. The number of services from each type is 100.
proposed privacy preserving edge service composition approach on encrypted dataset without
MapReduce model for the same set of services using Algorithm 4. From Figure 5.7, we find
that PP −QSC takes much longer time compared to PT −QSC if the number of services in
each type is higher. The execution time increases exponentially when the number of services
in each type increases. The execution time of PP − QSC is almost 50 times greater than
that of PT −QSC on average. In order to compensate for the execution time of our proposed
framework, we run our experiment using the MapReduce model with 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 edge
nodes. Similar to the previous experiment, we randomly choose different numbers of services
from each type of services. The execution times for different numbers of edge nodes are shown
here. For our current experimental setup, we see that MapReduce models significantly improves
the performance of our proposed model. The execution times of PP −QSC get closer to that
of PT −QSC if the number of edge nodes is increased.
In Figure 5.8, we demonstrate the scalability of our proposed privacy preserving method.
We randomly select 100 services from each type of edge services for computing the time required
to compose services for PT-QSC, PP-QSC and PP-QSC-MR-EN with different number
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of edge nodes. From the results, we can state that the higher number of user requests at a
time increases the execution time of our proposed privacy preserving edge service composition
approach. However, the usage of MapReduce model significantly improves the performance of
our proposed method by reducing the required time.
Figure 5.9 shows the comparison of service selection times by our proposed privacy-preserving
framework with the different number of QoS parameters. The execution time is shown in sec-
onds. We consider three types of services and 100 randomly chosen services from each type
for this experiment. Results indicate that the execution time of our proposed model is very
less if the number of QoS parameters is less than or equal to 3. However, the execution times
increase exponentially if the number of QoS parameter is greater than 3. The execution time
reduces significantly when the MapReduce model is used.
5.7 Summary
In summary, we present novel privacy preserving QoS-aware edge service composition frame-
work using fully homomorphic encryption scheme in this paper. Our key novelty of this paper
is the privacy preservation of edge service QoS values during edge service composition process
in edge networks. We conduct several experiments in both centralized and distributed comput-
ing environment to evaluate the performance of proposed privacy preserving service selection
framework using synthetic QoS dataset. We use the MapReduce model for the distribution of
tasks with different number of virtual machines (VMs) hosted by edge nodes. Experimental
results show that the execution time for the computation on the encrypted dataset is larger
than that of plaintext dataset when performed in a centralized computing environment. How-
ever, our proposed MapReduce model significantly reduces the execution time of the privacy-
preserving edge service composition process. We have used the fully homomorphic encryption
scheme to encrypt QoS dataset that are stored in edge data centers. Due to encryption of QoS
dataset, the edge nodes have no useful information about QoS data. Therefore, our proposed




In this chapter, we present an overview of the research challenges and questions examined in
this thesis. The achieved research contributions are summarised, along with the core findings
and discussion. Moreover, we highlight the potential pathways that future research can follow
on from this thesis work.
6.1 Concluding remarks and discussion
The research aimed to build privacy-preserving models for data used in the edge comput-
ing based realtime smart applications. In order to ensure realtime services to users of smart
applications, data should be stored on the edge of the networks. As a result, an edge com-
puting based service ecosystem is formed. In this service system, users can request for sev-
eral services and multiple service providers providing services through multiple edge devices.
Service-related data are also stored on the edge of networks. From that inception, we propose
privacy-preserving methods of two types of data in this research. The first type includes data
produced by several smart applications such as smart healthcare, smart agriculture, smart
transport, and smart electricity grids. The second type of data includes Quality-of-Service
(QoS) data of services in the service system. We identified that the privacy preservation of
these data types would be different due to different use cases. If the privacy of data generated
by smart applications is revealed, it impacts directly on data owners. On the other hand, lack
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of privacy of service QoS data hampers service provisioning and impacts service providers.
The research presented in this thesis, therefore, focused on privacy-preserving methods sep-
arately for smart application data and service QoS data in this research. First, we presented
lossless steganography based privacy-preserving models for data generated from smart appli-
cations. We proposed only lossless steganography approaches for numerical and textual data
as existing steganography approaches for the aforementioned data types have limited usability
in the context of edge computing. Second, we addressed the issue of searching stego data, data
generated after applying steganography on actual data, without revealing sensitive information
to the edge data center during a search operation. Finally, we developed a privacy-preserving
model for edge service computation by facilitating service selection and composition tasks on
encrypted QoS data. We used Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) for building the privacy-
preserving edge service computation model.
In addressing six research questions, this thesis proposes a set of solutions to achieve the
privacy of data in edge computing based service systems for supporting realtime smart applica-
tions. The major contributions of this research were described in Section 1.6, which highlight
the limitations in existing literature discussed in Section 1.5. Lossless steganography based
privacy-preserving approaches for numerical and textual data were discussed in Chapter 2
and 3, respectively, which can be applied on data before sending to the edge data center for
storing. Chapter 4 described the method of searching stego data in the edge data center with-
out revealing any sensitive information. Chapter 5 presented a solution for privacy-preserving
edge service computation using Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) that allows a service
composer to find a composite service using encrypted QoS data.
6.1.1 Lossless Steganography for Numerical Data
The first research question was addressed in Chapter 2. The main objective of this chapter
was to develop a lossless steganography method using error-correcting code (ECC) that allows
tagging a data owner’s sensitive information within the numerical data of the data owner.
Existing steganography approaches for numerical data are irreversible and cannot be used for
preserving the privacy of data in the edge computing. This chapter presents two approaches for
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lossless steganography approaches for numerical data that is time-series data originated from
sensors. We used different types of biosignals, such as ECG, EEG, and PPG, as numerical
data. Error-correcting code was used to encode biosignal samples before tagging a secret
message. In the first approach, the Hamming Code based ECC was used to hide a single bit
of sensitive information randomly within an element of the numerical time-series data. In the
second approach, the Extended Golay Code based ECC is used to hide three bits of sensitive
information within an element of the numerical time-series data for improving the data hiding
capacity. Hamming code and Extended Golay Code based error correction techniques were used
for correcting errors to reconstruct the biosignal in the first and second methods, respectively.
At the time of error correction, the secret bits are retrieved from the error bits. The pseudo-
random sequence was used to increase the security of the proposed methods by decreasing the
cracking probability. Our approaches demonstrated the lossless characteristics or reversibility
by means of 0% error rate and PRD in the reconstructed biosignal. Additionally, 0% BER
in the retrieved secret message justified that our approach was reliable. Overall, we can state
that our proposed biosignal steganography methods overcome research challenges raised by
numerical data hiding techniques. Thus, our proposed steganography approaches enabled the
privacy preservation of smart application data in edge computing.
6.1.2 Lossless Steganography for Textual Data
Lossless steganography methods for textual data were illustrated in Chapter 3. Two types of
textual data, a text document, and DNA sequence were considered in the proposed methods
in this chapter. Regarding the second research question, the DNA steganography method
was presented. It was identified that existing lossless DNA steganography methods require
the cover DNA sequence as the reference for the extraction of secret information (un-blind
method). Otherwise, these methods fail to reconstruct the cover DNA sequence after extracting
the secret information. DNA steganography methods in the literature are not useful for privacy
preservation. Therefore as a solution, a lossless and blind DNA steganography method was
proposed. In our proposed steganography method, secret information of the data owner was
embedded into a DNA sequence to make secret information private. A set of secret keys were
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used for embedding secret information within DNA sequences. The set of secret keys was
generated by edge devices and distributed among data consumers using a secured channel.
Authorized data consumers can extract hidden secret information related to DNA sequence
when required. The significant contribution of our proposed method is the ability to fully
reconstruct the cover DNA sequence without any reference DNA sequence. This feature makes
it usable in privacy required systems. Our proposed method did not rely on the public DNA
database for the hiding and extraction of the secret message. Therefore, our proposed method
was a blind DNA steganography method. We conducted several experiments to demonstrate
the performance of our proposed method. The experimental result showed that the error
rate of our method was 0% that proved the reversibility of our method. Additionally, we
demonstrated the capacity and expansion rate of the proposed DNA steganography method.
The result showed that the capacity of our method was more than 99% in most of the cases,
with a maximum expansion rate of 0.6%. We presented the security analysis of our method
to show that the method was secured. Overall, we can state that our proposed method is the
first DNA steganography method that is lossless, blind, and secured with higher capacity and
low expansion rate.
With respect to the third research question, we proposed a lossless and highly imperceptible
text steganography technique in the following part of Chapter 3. We used the Huffman coding
technique to encode secret information before embedding it. As a result, the size of the secret
information was reduced. The secret information was embedded in the cover text file as invisible
characters without affecting the texts in the cover text file. Therefore, our proposed method is
highly imperceptible. From the experimental results, it was demonstrated that the proposed
method improved hiding capacity, incurred no payload to the stego file. In other words, the
sizes of the cover file and stego file were the same. Our proposed text steganography scheme
successfully retrieved secret information and reconstructed the cover text file without any error.
6.1.3 Privacy preserving search mechanism for stego data
Concerning the question of the fourth research question, a privacy-preserving search framework
for stego data was presented in Chapter 4. The framework included two privacy-preserving
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search methods. In the first method, a search index for the stego database was built by gen-
erating hash values of sensitive information that were hidden within stego files. The hash
function supports a backdoor that allows a data consumer to generate the same hash value for
the search keywords that were hidden withing stego files. The search index contained 2k − 1
hash values for each stego document. Therefore, the time complexity of building the search
index is O(k), which is efficient. We established a private link between a stego document and a
row of the search index by generating an encrypted file name. Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES), a symmetric key-based encryption scheme, was used. The encrypted file name was
also stored in the search index. As data users generate a hash string for search keywords at
their end, the search service provider neither knows the query string nor the sensitive informa-
tion. Moreover, it is not possible for the search service provider to determine the relationship
between the search string and the stego file in the stego database. Our experimental results
demonstrate the efficiency of our framework. The execution time linearly increases with the
increment of stego database size and the number of secret attributes of patient sensitive infor-
mation. In the second method, a secure search index for the stego database was developed for
supporting range queries using a symmetric order-preserving encryption scheme (SOPE). We
built the search index by generating encrypted values of sensitive numerical attributes. Despite
being encrypted, the ciphertexts preserved orders of corresponding plaintexts. The experimen-
tal results demonstrated the efficiency of our proposed framework. The search time almost
exponentially increased with the increment of stego database size and number of sensitive
information attributes.
6.1.4 Privacy preserving service computation framework
The fifth research question was addressed in Chapter 5. We discussed the privacy-preserving
QoS-aware edge service computation framework using a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
scheme in this chapter. Our contributions are two folds. First, we presented a privacy-
preserving model of Quality-of-Service (QoS) values of edge services during the service selection
process in the edge networks. Rather than proposing any new service selection algorithm, we
mainly focused on the novelty of privacy preservation during the service selection process,
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where the service selection task was done by an untrusted service composer (edge node in our
scenario). In our proposed privacy-preserving service selection model, QoS values of services
were encrypted using FHE, and service selection were performed on encrypted QoS values
for ensuring privacy. No QoS value was disclosed to the service composer. Second, we pro-
posed a composition model for edge services based on the functional dependency among edge
services. The composition model was used to optimize the service selection process. We con-
ducted several experiments in both centralized and distributed computing environments to
evaluate the performance of the proposed privacy-preserving service selection framework using
a synthetic QoS dataset. We use the MapReduce model for the distribution of tasks with a
different number of virtual machines (VMs) hosted by edge nodes. Experimental results show
that the execution time for the computation on the encrypted dataset was larger than that
of plaintext dataset when performed in a centralized computing environment. However, our
proposed MapReduce model significantly reduces the execution time of the privacy-preserving
edge service composition process.
6.2 Limitations and Future Directions of Research
In this thesis, privacy-preserving models have been developed for heterogeneous smart appli-
cations data stored at the edge of the network and QoS data related to edge services in the
context of edge computing. In order to preserve the privacy of outsourced smart application
data to the edge data center, data type-specific steganography approaches have been proposed
in a lossless manner in this research. Our developed lossless steganography approaches also
show the potential of steganography approaches in preserving the privacy of outsourced data
in an untrusted platform such as edge computing. In addition, we have demonstrated that
an insecure service platform, such as edge computing based service systems, can prevent ser-
vice manipulation and provide services in a private manner. Thanks to Fully Homomorphic
Encryption (FHE) based cryptosystem. While the proposed models have been successfully
developed with high levels of both performance and accuracy, there is the potential to improve
on the limitations of our models. This opens up pathways for future research, including:
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• In this thesis, we have developed lossless steganography approaches for numerical and
textual data types. Other data types (e.g., image, audio, and video) are not considered in
the context of the edge computing-based realtime smart applications. In our developed
steganography approaches, we have used symmetric key-based stego keys. We assumed
that stego keys are shared with legitimate users through established secure key distri-
bution protocols such as Diffie-Hellman key distribution [153]. Therefore, we have not
discussed the key distribution in detail in our developed approaches.
• We have mainly focused on developing lossless steganography approaches for hiding se-
cret information withing no-secret information of data for preserving privacy. The size
of stego keys in our proposed methods was not the primary concern. As steganogra-
phy approaches are data type-specific in general, the stego key size varies for different
steganography approaches. In the future, lossless steganography with reduced key sizes
should be investigated.
• During the development of privacy-preserving search techniques for stego data, we have
enabled search techniques for a keyword-based search for non-numeric attributes and
range search of numeric attributes of secret information hidden within stego data. Further
study on other possible search types such as ranked search [154, 155] and fuzzy search
[79, 156] techniques can be explored for stego data.
• In the case of privacy-preserving service selection, We believe that the performance of our
proposed privacy-preserving service selection approach with the MapReduce model can
be improved. In this thesis, we have used an optimization approach based on Multiple
Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) and Simple Additive Weighting (SAW) technique
[149]. However, any modern optimization approach, such as the Genetic Algorithm (GA)
[157, 158], should be used to optimize the resulting composite service instances. We have
not considered the aforementioned optimization techniques in this thesis and set them as
future work. Other distributed programming models, such as Apache Spark and Storm,
can be investigated for improving the efficiency of our proposed privacy-preserving service
selection approach.
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• We have developed an edge service composition model based on the static function of the
edge services. As edge services are abstractions of edge devices, the functionality may
be changed over time, depending on which service tasks are offloaded to edge devices
during task distributions. In the future, the edge service composition model should be
developed, considering the dynamic service abstraction of edge devices. As our main
contribution to the thesis is the privacy-preserving framework for service computation,
we also have not covered the distribution of service tasks among edge devices.
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